Why the US Lost the Vietnam War (Documentary)
Summary
TLDRThe video script details the final stages of the Vietnam War, focusing on the fall of Saigon in April 1975. It explores the factors leading to the North Vietnamese victory and the US withdrawal, including military strategies, political decisions, and public opinion. The aftermath of the war is discussed, highlighting the impact on both Vietnam and the US, including casualties, economic damage, and long-term legacies. The script also addresses the ongoing debate about the reasons for the US defeat and the lessons learned from the conflict.
Takeaways
- 🌍 North Vietnamese forces entered Saigon in April 1975, marking the end of the Vietnam War and the fall of Saigon, widely seen as a major US defeat.
- ✍️ The Paris Peace Accords were signed in March 1973, reducing the US military presence to a small detachment, but both North and South Vietnam soon violated the agreement.
- 📉 The US Congress and public sentiment opposed reintervention, leading to legislation that curtailed Presidential powers and cut funding to South Vietnam.
- 📆 The resignation of President Nixon in August 1974 and the subsequent presidency of Gerald Ford saw a promise of continued support to South Vietnam, but it was too late to alter the course of the conflict.
- 🚁 The final evacuation of US personnel and Vietnamese allies from Saigon in April 1975 was chaotic, marked by scenes of desperation at the US Embassy.
- 🔄 The North Vietnamese quickly established control over Saigon, and by May 3, 1975, the entire country was unified under the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
- ⚖️ The war resulted in heavy casualties and economic damage for both the US and Vietnam, with significant long-term impacts on Vietnamese society and US foreign policy.
- 💔 The US defeat in Vietnam is often attributed to a combination of military, political, and social factors, including flawed strategies and a lack of understanding of Vietnamese nationalism.
- 📺 Media coverage of the Vietnam War played a significant role in shaping public perception and sentiment, contributing to the growing anti-war movement in the US.
- 🗳️ The legacy of the Vietnam War continues to influence US foreign policy, with debates about the reasons for the US defeat and the impact of the conflict on American society and international relations.
Q & A
What event marked the end of the Vietnam War?
-The fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, marked the end of the Vietnam War, with North Vietnamese tanks crashing through the gates of the Presidential Palace.
What was the significance of the Paris Peace Accords signed in March 1973?
-The Paris Peace Accords aimed to establish peace in Vietnam and end US military involvement, although both North and South Vietnam violated the agreement almost immediately.
How did the Watergate Scandal impact US involvement in Vietnam?
-The Watergate Scandal weakened President Nixon's influence, leading to his resignation and limiting the US's ability to reintervene in Vietnam despite Nixon's promise to do so if necessary.
What was the outcome of the Ho Chi Minh offensive launched by the North in March 1975?
-The Ho Chi Minh offensive led to the rapid collapse of South Vietnamese forces and the eventual capture of Saigon by North Vietnamese troops.
How did US domestic politics influence the outcome of the Vietnam War?
-US domestic politics, including congressional opposition to reintervention and the public's anti-war sentiment, significantly influenced the outcome by limiting military and financial support for South Vietnam.
What were the consequences of the US withdrawal from Vietnam for South Vietnam?
-The US withdrawal left South Vietnam vulnerable, leading to the eventual defeat by North Vietnamese forces and the establishment of a unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
What role did the media play in shaping public perception of the Vietnam War?
-The media played a critical role by providing graphic coverage of the war, which increased public dissent and contributed to the perception of the war as a defeat, especially following events like the Tet Offensive.
What were some of the criticisms of the US military strategy in Vietnam?
-Critics argue that the US military strategy, focused on attritional warfare and 'kill counts,' failed to address the political legitimacy of the North and South Vietnamese governments, contributing to the US defeat.
How did the Vietnam War affect the US's future foreign policy decisions?
-The Vietnam War led to the 'Vietnam Syndrome,' a caution towards foreign interventions, which was eventually countered by Reagan's conceptualization of the war as a 'noble cause' and subsequent US military actions in the 1980s and 1990s.
What were some of the long-term impacts of the Vietnam War on Vietnam itself?
-Vietnam suffered significant economic damage, forced relocations to 're-education camps,' destruction of agricultural land, and a mass exodus of refugees known as the 'boat people,' particularly after the North imposed a centralized Communist ideology.
Outlines
📉 The Fall of Saigon and US Defeat
In late April 1975, Saigon falls to North Vietnamese forces, marking a significant US defeat despite their military withdrawal two years prior. This event sparks ongoing debates about the reasons behind the US's loss in the Vietnam War. After the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, both North and South Vietnam violated the agreement, leading to continuous fighting. US support dwindled due to public and congressional opposition, and the Watergate scandal further weakened President Nixon's influence. The North's intensified military actions led to the rapid fall of South Vietnam, culminating in chaotic evacuations and the final capture of Saigon on April 30, 1975.
⚖️ The Cost and Consequences of the Vietnam War
The Vietnam War resulted in significant casualties and economic damage for both the US and Vietnam. While over 58,000 US personnel died, Vietnamese civilian and military casualties were much higher. The North imposed Communist ideologies on the South, leading to forced relocations and economic devastation. The legacy of the war includes increased cancer and birth defect rates due to defoliants like Agent Orange. The North's victory also led to Communist takeovers in neighboring countries and the mass exodus of 'boat people.' The US struggled with the war's high costs and domestic turmoil, questioning the effectiveness and morality of its involvement.
🔄 The Complexity of US Failure in Vietnam
Debates about the US defeat in Vietnam focus on multiple factors, including strategic errors and political misjudgments. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara and others criticized US hubris and the lack of understanding of Vietnamese history. General Westmoreland's attritional strategy is often blamed for failing to address the core political issues. Critics argue that while the US won many battles, they never destroyed the North's ability to wage war. Blame is also placed on civilian leaders and restrictive policies. Public dissent, fueled by media coverage, played a crucial role in pressuring US leaders to end involvement.
📺 Media's Role in Shaping Public Opinion
The media's portrayal of the Vietnam War significantly influenced public opinion, though it's debated how much it created dissent versus reflecting existing sentiments. Coverage of protests and political scandals like the My Lai massacre and Pentagon Papers contributed to anti-war sentiment. Post-war, some officers blamed the media for losing the war, highlighting figures like Walter Cronkite and Jane Fonda. However, critics argue these figures were scapegoats for deeper failings. The North Vietnamese strategy targeted US public opinion, understanding that human factors, not just military power, were decisive in war.
🌍 Lessons and Legacy of the Vietnam War
The Vietnam War's legacy continues to impact US foreign policy and military strategy. Despite significant support, South Vietnam never developed strong political legitimacy. The North's clear goals and strategic flexibility contributed to their victory. The war's controversial nature led to the concept of 'Vietnam Syndrome,' limiting US interventions until later conflicts restored confidence. The defeat's politicization prevents learning from past mistakes. Ground News offers a tool to understand media biases, helping readers navigate today's news landscape with greater transparency.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Fall of Saigon
💡Paris Peace Accords
💡Vietnam War
💡ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam)
💡Ho Chi Minh offensive
💡US Withdrawal
💡Watergate Scandal
💡Re-education camps
💡Agent Orange
💡Vietnam Syndrome
Highlights
In late April 1975, dramatic images from Saigon are beamed across the world as North Vietnamese troops proclaim final victory.
Despite their absence, the fall of Saigon is seen as a major US defeat, sparking long and unresolved debate.
In March 1973, the US, North, and South Vietnam sign a Peace Agreement, reducing US military presence to a small Marine detachment at the US Embassy in Saigon.
Both North and South Vietnam violate the Paris Peace Accords almost immediately.
Congress and the public oppose President Nixon’s promise to reintervene if necessary, and pass legislation limiting Presidential power.
The Watergate Scandal further limits Nixon’s influence, leading to his resignation in August 1974.
In December, North Vietnam captures Phuoc Long, and by March 1975, they intensify operations, expecting victory in 1976.
Thieu orders a retreat from the Central Highlands towards Saigon, but it becomes a rout, leading to the collapse of ARVN units.
Thieu resigns on April 21, and Ford prepares for final evacuations, leading to chaotic scenes at the airport and US Embassy.
On April 30, NVA tanks crash through the gates of Thieu’s Presidential Palace, and the South Vietnamese government surrenders.
The North announces a unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976, with Saigon renamed Ho Chi Minh City.
The US involvement from at least 1950 is over, with more than 58,000 US personnel killed and 300,000 wounded.
Vietnam suffers great economic damage, with 10% of South Vietnam’s agricultural land destroyed.
The North imposes a centralized Communist ideology on the South, even concerning some southern revolutionaries.
The Vietnam War’s legacy continues to impact US foreign policy, with debates over its causes and consequences ongoing.
Transcripts
In late April 1975, dramatic images from Saigon are beamed across the world. North Vietnamese
troops have entered the South Vietnamese capital and proclaimed final victory. US
forces are nowhere to be seen, having withdrawn two years prior. Still, despite their absence,
the fall of Saigon is seen as a major US defeat – a defeat which has spurred long,
and still unresolved debate. Just how did the US lose the Vietnam War?
In March 1973, the US, North and South Vietnam sign a Peace Agreement,
and the US military presence is reduced to a small Marine detachment at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.
Almost immediately both North and South Vietnam violate the Paris Peace Accords.
The North still feels it has the military advantage, while Southern
President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu refuses to deal with Communists in a Council of Reconciliation.
Fighting also continues. South Vietnamese ARVN forces move into contested zones, although,
the North avoids large scale combat to avoid provoking a US return. However,
it does reequip its units with modern equipment and heavy weapons and infiltrates more forces
into the South – in violation of the agreement. A US return though, looks unlikely. Congress
and the public oppose President Nixon’s promise to reintervene if necessary. Senators from both
parties pass legislation limiting Presidential power, ordering an end to the bombing of
Cambodia and slashing funds to South Vietnam. The Watergate Scandal – which reveals Nixon
illegally spied on rivals – further limits his influence. Facing impeachment, Nixon resigns
in August 1974, but new President Gerald Ford promises to continue to support South Vietnam.
„Therefore, I shall resign the Presidency effective at noon tomorrow. Vice President
Ford will be sworn in as President at that hour in this office.”
The North now steps up military actions, capturing Phuoc Long in December. The ARVN
response is lacklustre, so the North intensifies operations in March 1975. They expect the new
Ho Chi Minh offensive to be victorious in 1976, but victory comes much, much sooner.
Following diversionary attacks, the North captures Ban Me Thuot in a surprise raid. Thieu orders a
retreat from the Central Highlands towards Saigon, but it soon becomes a rout. ARVN units collapse as
the NVA advances along the coast before swinging towards Saigon. The ARVN hold out at Xuan Loc bu t
the NVA push them back after 12 days of fighting. North Vietnamese forces now attack Saigon:
“There is a strange, sad giddiness in Saigon... like the feeling one gets when the score is 56
to 0 late in the fourth quarter and your team is the one with zero. You aren’t happy about
the thrashing your team got, but at this point the most merciful thing is the for
the game to end.” (Harrison in Yancy 182) There is no US military response, and Thieu
resigns on April 21. Instead, Ford prepares for final evacuations. These become chaotic
scenes as thousands of South Vietnamese civilians descend on the airport, which is under attack.
“[T]he airplane started to move with the door still open. I was looking out the door
and saw people running around in all directions shooting crazily into the air. They seemed to be
in a panic. People all around me on the airplane started screaming and crying. Some of them started
praying very loudly.” (Langer 283) The chaos shuts down the airport,
so civilians surge to the US Embassy and break in just as the final
helicopters depart. The US evacuates 1,000 Americans and 5,500 Vietnamese in two days.
“Because to the Vietnamese people, all the fighting, more than 25 years now. So,
now that we stop fighting, I am very happy, very happy for all the young kids, same as me,
all the people who have been in the army.” Shortly afterwards, North Vietnamese units
enter Saigon to little resistance. On April 3 0, NVA tanks crash through the
gates of Thieu’s Presidential Palace and the South Vietnamese government surrenders.
SEGUE By May 3,
the North clears the final areas of the Mekong Delta and the war is over. In 1976,
the North announces a unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam, with Saigon renamed Ho Chi Minh City.
For the US, their long involvement from at least 1950 is over. For North Vietnam,
the struggle for independence arguably started in 1858 against the French.
Until 1973, 2.7 million US personnel served in South Vietnam. Of this number,
more than 58,000 are killed and 300,000 wounded. The cost of 1
trillion dollars in today’s value also led to a growing economic crisis in the 1970s.
Counting Vietnamese casualties is harder. Fighting and bombing kills up to 2 million
Vietnamese civilians, and perhaps up to 1 million North Vietnamese military
personnel. The US estimates around 250,000 South Vietnamese military killed in action.
But the Vietnam War’s legacy goes further than combat casualties. After victory,
Northern agents forcibly move some Vietnamese into so-called “re-education camps” - perhaps 200,000,
though estimates vary. There are reports of political executions of southern figures,
but their scale and frequency remain debated. Vietnam does suffer great economic damage.
Around 10% of South Vietnam’s agricultural land is destroyed, including by US defoliants like Agent
Orange. Some also associate these herbicides with an increased rate of cancer and birth
defects among both Vietnamese and US veterans. Meanwhile, the North imposes a centralised
Communist ideology on the south, even concerning some southern revolutionaries.
Not all within the Viet Cong’s Provisional Revolutionary Government were Communist,
and some expected a more pluralistic system: “Now, with total power in their hands,
they began to show their cards in the most brutal fashion. They made it understand
that the Vietnam of the future would be a single monolithic block, collectivist and totalitarian,
in which all the traditions and culture of the South would be ground and molded by the
political machine of the conquerors.” (Ruane 160) Economic restructuring and post-war tension with
China cause 2 million Vietnamese to leave by 1979, including many
ethnic Chinese merchants. Many escape by sea, becoming known as the ‘boat people’.
The North’s victory in Vietnam also coincides with Communist takeovers in
Laos and Cambodia. By August 1975, the whole of Indochina is under Communist control.
The legacy of Vietnam also continues in the US. Even today,
some struggle to come to terms with the high casualties, expense and domestic turmoil of
the war years. There is even debate about whether the US lost the Vietnam War at all.
Nixon felt his agreement provided “peace with honor” and later claimed,
“We had won the war.” Critics though, point out the Peace Agreement included major US concessions
while allowing the North to keep military forces in the south. General Westmoreland
complained the deal amounted to surrendering the field to the enemy and the de facto end
of South Vietnamese sovereignty. Secretary of State Dean Rusk called it a “surrender”.
Others, like Nixon’s Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, point out that Washington
didn’t really expect the South to last, and the agreement was designed to cover a US withdrawal
with some semblance of respectability: “we know the goddamned agreement will
probably not work, but we’ve got to be in the position where if it doesn’t it will be
the result of the other side.” (Daddis 196) At the very least, this was clearly not a
US victory but a strategic defeat as historian Gregory Daddis concludes:
“True, the US withdrawal advanced as a matter of policy rather than collapse. Yet judged on what
it left behind, one seems hard pressed to argue [the US military] “won” its war.” (Daddis 204/205)
So why did the US fail in Vietnam? Debate also rages on this question,
with a person's position often differing based on their professional role,
political background and beliefs, and proximity to wartime decision making.
Some see the roots of US defeat in a failure of execution in Vietnam. This viewpoint often
suggests US intervention in Vietnam had good intentions, but practical problems, strategic
errors and poor judgement hindered operations. Later in life Former Secretary of Defence Robert
McNamara outlined a long list of causes for the US defeat, focusing on US hubris,
a lack of understanding of Vietnamese history and over-reliance on military might.
General Westmoreland’s attritional strategy is often criticised, especially its focus on “kill
counts”. Critics say this approach, although gaining many tactical victories for the US,
failed to address the actual critical element of the Vietnam struggle – the rival political
legitimacy of North and South Vietnam. US leaders disregarded North Vietnam as merely a Sino-Soviet
puppet, whose forces could be systematically destroyed as a hostile foreign force. But North
Vietnam was largely independent and represented sincere and widespread nationalist aspirations:
“By wrongly attributing the conflict to external sources, the United States drastically misjudged
its internal dynamics. By intervening in what was essentially a local struggle,
it placed itself at the mercy of local forces, a weak client,
and a determined adversary.” (Hopkins 102) Some US offensive operations are also of
limited value and rarely developed the political legitimacy of the Southern government. Even some
victories are counter-productive. For example, in May 1969, the 101st Airborne Division stormed NVA
trenches on Hill 937 – better known as Hamburger Hill. After seven days of intense fighting,
the 101st took the hill with 450 casualties, only to abandon it to the NVA several days later. The
hill itself held little strategic value and the battle came to typify wasteful US attacks.
Or as journalist Jonathan Schell wrote, “The more we won, the more we lost.” (Daddis 206)
Regardless, some see consistent US tactical victory as evidence the US did not lose the
Vietnam War - but others question this logic. Firstly, although the US defeated every major
North Vietnamese offensive and performed larger scale search and destroy missions,
most combat in Vietnam was small scale. 96% of firefights involved less than 200 US soldiers,
and the North Vietnamese instigated around 75% of all combat, giving them a distinct advantage.
There is no reliable data for who “won” these countless small-scale actions, but the fact the
US never destroyed the North’s ability to launch them weakens claims of US military victory.
And military victories are a means to political victory,
not a means to an end themselves. As Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz claimed:
“war is the continuation of politics”, and victory comes not from killing more of the enemy,
but using force to settle the political questions over which the war is fought. US battlefield
successes did not prevent Northern political victory, as a US negotiator in Hanoi recalled:
“You know you never beat us on the battlefield,” I told my North Vietnamese Army counterpart...
“That may be so,” he replied, “but it is also irrelevant.” (Langer 282)
But even those who accept this conclusion are quick to point out the blame does not ultimately
rest with the common US soldier. Who ultimately takes responsibility is another hot topic.
President Nixon blamed congress, while some military leaders blamed the civilian government:
“In the end, we sent our sons to be maimed and crippled and to die for naught because
the political leaders of this country lost their will. There was no lack of
courage or skill on the battlefield. The lack of fortitude was solely in the
corridors of power in Washington.” (Langer 333) As early as 1967, military officers began to
complain they were fighting with “one armed tied behind their backs”. President Johnson
refused to allow a conventional invasion of North Vietnam, or Cambodia, and Laos,
where North Vietnamese forces operated freely. Westmoreland understood cutting the Ho Chi Minh
trail in neighbouring countries was vital to “isolating the battlefield” and did try to
strengthen border security, but it wasn’t enough. But even when incursions into Cambodia and Laos
were allowed under Nixon, they achieved little. Westmoreland and his supporters claim the source
of the attritional strategy was really President Johnson’s civilian advisors, the so-called Wise
Men. They say figures like Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow had a disastrous
influence by insisting military strategy fit into new methods of quantitative analytics. It was
this they argue, not an obsession with firepower, which prioritised kill counts and an attritional
strategy. Pacification efforts would require even more troops and result in lower “kill counts”.
Some military figures, like Colonel Harry Summers, while blaming civilian leaders,
also argue the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided poor strategic planning and
failed to adequately brief presidents. Another argument is that Vietnam was lost
not in the jungle, but on the streets of America. Public dissent to the war certainly had an impact
in pressuring US leaders. Public support is critical in any war, especially limited wars
in which national survival is not at stake. It is undeniable public outrage helped end
US involvement, but where did it come from? One common suggestion is that the US media
misrepresented the war to the public and gave small scale tactical events strategic significance
through graphic reporting and media framing. Most famously, the photo of Phan Thị Kim Phúc,
a South Vietnamese girl wounded by napalm, raised serious questions about US methods.
General Westmoreland was especially critical of reporting during the 1968 Tet offensive:
“... voluminous, lurid and distorted newspaper and particularly television reporting of
the Tet offensive, had transformed a devastating Communist military defeat
into a ‘psychological victory’.” (Jesser 91) Critical US reports did increase after Tet, but
before Tet coverage was largely supportive. The media often promoted optimistic government claims,
and some news editors suppressed negative stories to maintain connections in the White House or
appeal to audiences. Within the Cold War context, disloyalty was considered economic suicide.
But the media did play a role expanding the credibility gap between government claims
and the reality in Vietnam, resulting in more anti-war sentiment. However,
it has been debated how much the media created this dissent, rather than reinforcing pre-existing
opinions. By the time media became more critical, public opinion and civic and political leaders
had already shifted the conversation – and the news marketplace. In this sense, instead
of developing anti-war sentiment, the media may have simply followed it as a business decision.
Domestic news coverage of protests and political revelations may have also been more influential
than television war coverage from Vietnam. Covering protests publicised and normalised
them as a legitimate activity, while major stories like the My Lai massacre and Pentagon Papers were
released by American domestic journalists and were first exposed by ex-military figures. Initially,
no major news outlet would publish the My Lai massacre reporting. Overall, viewership of
television network news was lower than commonly believed and less than half of TV owners claimed
to watch it. Susan Carruthers, a professor specialising in the media and war, concludes:
“...television may have confirmed the trend towards disillusionment,
but many academics are adamant that television did not set it; indeed it was,
in fact, considerably to its rear.” Regardless of its actual impact,
the idea the media lost the war became attractive to post-Vietnam officers and
affects US media-military relations to this day. Some highlight media figures such as news
anchor Walter Cronkite, or actress Jane Fonda – who visited North Vietnam – as traitors who
undermined the US war effort. Others argue their impact has been grossly overstated,
and instead they function as easy scapegoats for deeper military and political failings.
But many of these arguments about US defeat focus almost exclusively
on the US itself. But as the saying goes “The enemy also gets a vote.”
By 1975, revolutionary nationalist forces in Vietnam had already fought a series of wars
over 30 years. They gained experience but also the ideological conviction to see through the
struggle. Their experiences also taught North Vietnamese leaders that strategic flexibility
was essential to defeat a more powerful enemy. North Vietnam shifted regularly from conventional
to unconventional operations, navigated the Sino-Soviet ideological split to their advantage,
and maintained public support through regimentation and propaganda. The North
Vietnamese casualty rate was not necessarily driven by US actions, but North Vietnamese ones,
as they generally dictated the frequency and intensity of combat. Their small-scale
attritional attacks combined with infrequent, but ambitious offensives were also partially
designed to weaken US public will. North Vietnamese Commander-in-chief Vo Nguyen Giap,
who oversaw the victorious campaign against the French in 1954, understood that public will was a
critical US strategic weakness – one which could be targeted via the battlefields of Vietnam:
“The war was fought on many fronts. At that time the most important one was American public
opinion... Westmoreland did not believe in human beings, he believed in numbers... He believed
in weapons and material. Military power is not the decisive factor in war. Human beings! Human
beings are the decisive factor.” (Langer 318) South Vietnam also played a key role in the
outcome. Despite significant US support, Thieu and his predecessors never seriously
worked to develop state legitimacy or create a South Vietnamese identity. Its actions were
undermined by the Viet Cong, but corruption, political favoritism and elitism meant ARVN
pacification efforts were ineffective at best, and counterproductive at worst. Without a strong
rural political base from which to develop the nation, South Vietnam was on shaky
ground even with massive US military support. North Vietnamese political goals were proactive
and clearly identifiable for the Vietnamese population. By contrast, the US’s were vague
and passive. By fighting to maintain the political status quo, the US locked itself into a commitment
which would last as long as the North Vietnamese were willing to oppose that status quo. Although
North Vietnamese morale began to suffer from 1968, it was much stronger than US public morale,
precisely because the stakes of victory or defeat were higher and better understood.
The Vietnam War remains one of the most controversial US military actions, and its
legacy continues to impact US foreign policy. After the war, some claimed a so-called
“Vietnam Syndrome” would limit future US foreign interventions. A 1975 survey
suggested only 36% of Americans believed the US should keep commitments to other nations.
But by the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan conceptualized the war as a “noble cause”
to restore US confidence. The supposed end of the Cold War, and US victories in Grenada,
Haiti, Panama and the Gulf War further diminished post-Vietnam caution. By 1991, President Bush Sr
was confident enough to announce, “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”
The cause of the US defeat was complex and multi-faceted and not the doing of
any single group. Debates often also ignore an effective and long developed North Vietnamese
strategy which withstood an unprecedented military onslaught and may have continued
to do so even if the US had acted differently. “If there is one general historical lesson to be
drawn from the American experience in Vietnam, it is that local history and culture set real
limits on the effectiveness of external force, no matter how great that force may
be. The United States had one failed war in Vietnam, and for a great and wise nation, one
Vietnam War should be enough.” (Anderson TVW 128) But these lessons may have become muddied. The
humiliation of the defeat has politicized the debate as supporters of one argument
look to shift the blame to others – whether it's the military, congress,
media or anti-war groups – or deny defeat altogether. By failing to come to terms with
the reality of defeat, the possibility of making similar mistakes in the future is left wide open.
The media coverage of the Vietnam War was seen by millions and iconic images like last American
helicopter to leave Saigon in 1975 were used by various groups to support their stance on the
conflict. In today’s media landscape, it can be a challenge to understand who is behind the news
and what biases they might carry. Luckily, there is a way to alleviate that challenge:
Ground News works to aggregate news articles from a wide spectrum of news organizations
to expose bias and provide a more accurate and transparent picture of what’s really going on
in the world. Now, whenever I’m reading the news – or history books for that matter – I
keep in mind who's presenting the information and what their biases might be. Importantly,
it’s not just what they’re telling me, it's also what they’re not saying. With Ground News,
this insight is all available in a single app and website. On Ground News, every story
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