Where Does Your Mind Reside?: Crash Course Philosophy #22
Summary
TLDRThis Crash Course Philosophy episode explores the mind-body problem through the lens of Phineas Gage's case, where a brain injury drastically altered his personality. It delves into reductive physicalism, which posits that everything about us, including our minds, can be explained by our physical bodies. In contrast, substance dualism, advocated by Descartes, suggests that the mind is a separate non-physical entity. The episode also touches on epiphenomenalism and mysterianism, with the latter proposing that the nature of consciousness may be beyond human comprehension. The discussion raises questions about the true nature of our minds and whether they can be reduced to physical processes alone.
Takeaways
- đ§ The case of Phineas Gage demonstrates that physical changes to the brain can lead to changes in personality, challenging the idea of a non-physical mind.
- đ Reductive physicalism is the belief that everything, including the mind, can be explained by physical processes such as brain activity.
- đ€ Substance dualism, introduced by Descartes, posits that the mind and body are made of two different substances, with the mind being non-physical.
- đ Interactionism is the idea that the mind and body can influence each other, as seen in how emotions can affect physical health and vice versa.
- đ€·ââïž The mind-body problem questions how a non-physical mind can interact with a physical body, a conundrum that has puzzled philosophers for centuries.
- đš Qualia are the subjective experiences that some argue cannot be reduced to physical processes, as illustrated by Frank Jackson's thought experiment of Mary and the color scientists.
- đ§Ș Physicalists argue that as we learn more about the brain, the need for a separate non-physical mind becomes less necessary.
- đłïžâđ Epiphenomenalism suggests that while physical states can cause mental states, mental states have no effect on the physical world.
- đ”ïžââïž Mysterianism, advocated by Colin McGinn, is the view that the nature of consciousness may be beyond human comprehension due to the limitations of our cognitive abilities.
- đ€ The discussion on the mind and its relation to the body sets the stage for exploring the potential for consciousness in non-biological entities, like robots.
Q & A
What significant event happened to Phineas Gage in 1848?
-On September 13, 1848, Phineas Gage experienced a freak accident where an iron rod was driven straight into his skull, causing significant brain damage.
How did Phineas Gage's personality change after the accident?
-Post-accident, Phineas Gage's personality changed drastically. He went from being a proper, hard-working gentleman to a belligerent and disagreeable person.
What does the case of Phineas Gage suggest about the relationship between the brain and personality?
-The case of Phineas Gage suggests that personality, historically thought to be non-physical, is directly affected by physical changes in the brain.
What is reductive physicalism and how does it relate to the understanding of the mind?
-Reductive physicalism is the view that everything, including the mind, can be explained in terms of physical entities such as brains, hormones, and neurotransmitters. It posits that the mind is a product of physical processes.
What is substance dualism, and how does it contrast with reductive physicalism?
-Substance dualism is the philosophical view that the world is made of both physical and non-physical substances. It contrasts with reductive physicalism by asserting that the mind is a separate, non-physical entity that cannot be reduced to physical processes.
What is the mind-body problem, and why is it significant in philosophy?
-The mind-body problem is the philosophical question of how mental states can interact with physical states. It is significant because it challenges the understanding of the relationship between consciousness and the physical body.
What was Descartes' explanation for how the mind and body interact, and why was it considered unsatisfactory?
-Descartes proposed that the mind is tethered to the body at the pineal gland, suggesting that all mind-body interactions occur through this gland. This explanation was considered unsatisfactory because it did not adequately explain how a non-physical mind could interact with a physical body.
What is Frank Jackson's thought experiment involving Mary, and what does it argue against?
-Frank Jackson's thought experiment involves a woman named Mary who has extensive knowledge about color but has never experienced it. It argues against reductive physicalism by suggesting that qualitative experiences, like seeing color, are not reducible to physical facts alone.
What are qualia, and why are they significant in the debate between physicalism and dualism?
-Qualia are instances of subjective, first-person experiences, such as the feeling of pain or the taste of pizza. They are significant in the debate because they represent aspects of consciousness that some argue cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone.
What is epiphenomenalism, and how does it differ from substance dualism?
-Epiphenomenalism is the view that while physical states can give rise to mental states, mental states have no causal power over physical states. It differs from substance dualism in that dualism allows for interaction between the mental and physical, whereas epiphenomenalism denies such interaction.
What is mysterianism, and how does it approach the mind-body problem?
-Mysterianism is the view that the question of consciousness is fundamentally unsolvable by human minds due to the compartmentalized nature of our understanding. It suggests that our subjective understanding of consciousness and our objective understanding of the brain are incompatible modes of knowledge.
Outlines
đ§ The Impact of Physical Injury on Personality
This paragraph introduces the case of Phineas Gage, a man who survived a freak accident in 1848 where an iron rod pierced his skull. Despite his survival, his personality changed drastically from a hard-working gentleman to a belligerent individual. This case challenges the traditional philosophical view that personality is non-physical, suggesting instead that it can be directly affected by physical changes in the brain. The paragraph also introduces reductive physicalism, the belief that everything, including human consciousness, can be explained by physical processes. It contrasts this with Descartes' substance dualism, which posits that the mind and body are distinct entities.
đ€ Philosophical Perspectives on the Mind-Body Problem
The second paragraph delves into the philosophical implications of the mind-body problem, exploring the debate between physicalism and dualism. It discusses how physicalism, which posits that everything about us can be explained by our physical bodies, is the default scientific stance. However, it also presents the argument against physicalism through Frank Jackson's thought experiment of Mary, who, despite knowing everything about color scientifically, has never experienced it. This suggests that there might be more to human experience than what can be explained by physical processes alone, hinting at the existence of subjective experiences known as qualia. The paragraph also touches on epiphenomenalism, which allows for mental states to arise from physical states but not influence them, and mysterianism, which argues that the nature of consciousness may be inherently beyond human comprehension.
Mindmap
Keywords
đĄPhineas Gage
đĄReductive Physicalism
đĄSubstance Dualism
đĄMind-Body Problem
đĄQualia
đĄInteractionism
đĄEpiphenomenalism
đĄMysterianism
đĄCogito ergo sum
đĄNeurotransmitters
Highlights
Phineas Gage's accident and survival with an iron rod through his skull provided insights into the mind-body connection.
The change in Phineas Gage's personality post-accident suggests a direct link between brain physiology and personality.
Reductive physicalism posits that everything about us, including our minds, can be explained by our physical bodies.
Descartes' substance dualism argues for the existence of both physical and non-physical substances, with the mind being non-physical.
The interactionism theory within substance dualism claims that the mind and body interact, influencing each other.
The mind-body problem questions how a non-physical mind can interact with a physical body.
Descartes' explanation of the mind-body interaction via the pineal gland is criticized for not fully resolving the issue.
Some philosophers and scientists reject substance dualism due to the lack of a satisfactory solution to the mind-body problem.
Frank Jackson's thought experiment of Mary the color scientist argues against reductive physicalism by highlighting the difference between knowledge and experience.
Qualia, or subjective experiences, are central to the debate on whether physicalism can fully account for the mind.
Physicalists argue that thought experiments like Mary's assume conclusions that physicalism disputes.
Epiphenomenalism is a view that allows for mental states to arise from physical states but not influence them.
Colin McGinn's mysterianism posits that the nature of consciousness may be inherently unsolvable by human cognition.
The mind-body problem remains unresolved, with physicalism and dualism both offering insights but no definitive answers.
The episode concludes by posing questions to the viewer about the nature of their own mind and the possibility of knowing the truth about consciousness.
Transcripts
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On September 13, 1848, a freak accident caused an explosion
that drove an iron rod straight into the skull of a worker named Phineas Gage.
A metal rod almost as tall as he was went through his skull â and he didnât die.
But, the Phineas from before the accident, and the one who lived after it, didnât seem to have a lot in common, personality-wise.
The Phineas with no hole in his brain was a proper, hard-working gentleman.
And the Phineas with the injured brain was, uh, sort of a belligerent jerk.
Phineasâ brain was changed â and his personality changed too.
This misfortune has provided lots of fodder for researchers of psychology and neurology.
But the case of Phineas Gage holds lessons for philosophers too.
It provides us with some rare, hard evidence that a part of us that's historically been thought of as non-physical
â our personality â is actually, directly affected by what happens to us physically.
Which raises the question: Where does our mind reside?
[Theme Music]
Now, not a lot of contemporary scientists would be all that surprised that an injury like the one Gage suffered could cause such a radical change.
That's because the dominant view held in much of Western science is what we call reductive physicalism.
This is the view that the world is made only of physical stuff, including us.
By this logic, everything about me, and you, can be explained in terms of our bodies
â our brains, hormones, and neurotransmitters.
So if everything about Phineasâs personality could be explained in terms of his brain,
itâs no shock that a radical change in his brain would bring about a radical change in his personality.
This same belief is at work when a psychiatrist prescribes antidepressants to a patient.
Change the patient's brain chemistry, change the patient's mood.
Now, physicalism may be the default scientific position, but remember, way back in episode 5,
our old friend Rene Descartes introduced us to cogito ergo sum â I think, therefore, I am.
Descartes believed that he could cast doubt on the existence of his body, but not the existence of his mind.
The fact that he could doubt one but not the other told him that he must be made of two different kinds of stuff.
This view, known as Substance Dualism, says that the world is made of both physical stuff and mental stuff.
Substance dualists say that minds are a separate, nonphysical substance that cannot be reduced to,
or explained in terms of, physical stuff, like brains.
And in this view, some things â like God â are pure mind, and other things â like rocks â are pure matter.
But humans, well, weâre kinda special.
Weâre the only kind of thing that combines both stuffs in one being â both body and mind.
Whatâs more, these two substances appear to interact with each other inside of us.
This is called interactionism.
When I âmake up my mindâ to do something,
I have the power to compel my body to do as I please â
to get up off the couch and make myself a nice pb and j, for example.
Whatâs more, my mental states seem to have the ability to affect my physical states even against my will.
You ever notice how many people who are grieving or under a lot of stress, for example, often get physically sick?
Likewise, our bodies also appear to be able to affect our minds.
Like when youâre so hungry you just canât focus on what your teacher is saying at all.
Or how a pure physical pleasure â like having a good cuddle with your cat â can pull you out of a bad mood.
Interactionists say that what's going on is that our two substances â minds and bodies â are interacting with each other.
But, if you think about it, this is actually a pretty puzzling proposition.
How can a purely mental thing have any affect on a purely physical thing?
The puzzle of how minds and bodies can interact with each other is known as the Mind-Body Problem.
This is the problem that makes us wonder:
How can my body have a separate entity called a mind lurking inside of it â
controlling it, and being controlled by it?
What would tether my mind to this body in particular â
why couldnât my mind just go running off on its own, or take a dip into other bodies to see what itâs like in there?
Descartesâ answer, frankly, wasnât all that satisfying.
He said that the mind is tethered to the body at the pineal gland â located at the base of the brain â
and that all mind-body interactions are filtered through that portal, if you will, between the mind and the body.
But that really only pushes the problem back, without solving it,
since the pineal gland is part of the physical body.
Many modern philosophers of mind, seeing no way to solve the mind-body problem,
have felt compelled to abandon substance dualism altogether.
Some are happy to be physicalists, but others are convinced that there are some parts of
human experience that simply canât be boiled down to brains.
To see what they think is being left out, letâs head over to the Thought Bubble for some Flash Philosophy.
Contemporary Australian philosopher Frank Jackson presents us with the thought experiment of Mary,
a woman who has spent her entire life in a black and white room, learning everything via a black and white television.
While locked in this room, Mary becomes a neurophysicist specializing in the science of color.
She learns everything there is to know about light, optics, the physics of color,
and how it affects our sensory organs, but she has never seen it for herself.
So hereâs the question:
When Mary finally walks out of the room and sees color for the first time, has Mary learned something new?
Jackson devised this thought experiment as an argument against reductive physicalism.
Because, Jackson says, the qualitative experience of seeing a color â say, red â isn't the same as knowing facts about red.
If everything could be explained in terms of the physical, then when Mary finally saw red,
it wouldnât have contributed to her understanding at all.
It wouldnât have told her anything that she didnât already know.
Thanks, Thought Bubble!
Whatâs missing from a physicalist account, many argue, is what are known as qualia
â instances of subjective, first-person experience.
Qualia are what it feels like to stub your toe,
or take the first bite out of a slice of pizza,
or to learn that you have been deeply betrayed by a trusted friend.
Itâs what Mary is said to gain when she steps out of the room and sees color for the first time.
Physicalists respond to thought experiments like Jacksonâs by arguing that they beg the question.
Begging the question, you'll recall, is a philosophical fallacy in which the premises
assume the conclusion theyâre supposed to be proving.
Jacksonâs thought experiment assumes that Mary learns something new when she steps out of the room.
But, if physicalism is true, and if she really knows everything physical about color,
then of course seeing it for herself isnât going to add to her understanding of it in any way.
Now, physicalists argue that their case is making progress,
as we learn more and more about the physical processes of the mind.
Well thatâs not really satisfying, because we want an answer, not a promissory note.
But, to be fair, physicalists have only been at work for a few decades,
while dualists have been bashing their heads against the mind-body problem for centuries.
But not everybody falls cleanly into either the physicalist or the dualist camp.
The Mary case, and other arguments like it, convince some people that they have to maintain their commitment to dualism,
even though they canât see a solution to the mind-body problem.
Some of those people adopt a view called epiphenomenalism.
This view says that physical states can give rise to mental states, but mental states canât affect physical states.
So by this thinking, your beliefs, desires, and temperaments do exist,
but they have no power over anything physical about you.
Which might sound kind of weird and unconvincing.
But then thereâs contemporary British philosopher Colin McGinn, who advocates a view called mysterianism.
This says that the question of consciousness is unsolvable by human minds.
Itâs not that McGinn thinks weâre dummies.
He thinks humans are natural knowers â just give us a problem and we can figure it out.
But not this.
The reason, he says, is that our brains are compartmentalized.
The way we understand our mind is through reflection.
Itâs deeply personal and subjective.
But the way we understand our brains and bodies is objective, and verifiable.
And those two modes of understanding just donât mix.
No amount of reflection could lead to any claims about neurons firing,
and no amount of empirical research is going to give rise to what itâs like to see color through someone elseâs eyes.
Our brains just donât have a compartment that can piece together those different modes of evidence.
The mind-body problem hasnât been solved, and physicalism hasnât been proven, because
both of those things require our brains to do something they canât do.
So what do you think?
Is your mind a separate substance, riding around in your body until it dies?
Can the complicated thing that is you â that thinks and feels and desires and hurts â be
reduced to a purely physical thing?
Did Mary learn something new? Is it possible to know?
Well that is up to your mind to figure out.
Today we talked about theories about where the mind resides.
We learned about reductive physicalism, substance dualism, and mysterianism.
And next time, weâre going to think about these issues some more,
with the help of some of my favorite kinds of potential persons â robots!
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