Ford's Disaster: The Pinto

The History Guy: History Deserves to Be Remembered
11 Jan 202318:01

Summary

TLDRThis video explores the history and controversy surrounding the Ford Pinto, a subcompact car released in the 1970s. It delves into the car's design flaws, particularly its dangerous fuel tank placement, which led to a reputation for exploding upon rear impact. The narrative also examines the broader context of automotive safety regulations and public perception at the time. Despite its notorious image, the video argues that the Pinto's dangers may have been overstated, comparing its safety record with other cars like the AMC Gremlin, Chevrolet Vega, and Volkswagen Beetle.

Takeaways

  • 🚗 The Ford Pinto was a subcompact car produced by Ford in the 1970s, initially marketed as a 'little carefree car'.
  • 🔥 The Pinto gained a notorious reputation for its design flaws, particularly the placement of the fuel tank, which made it prone to explosions in rear-end collisions.
  • 🏁 The Pinto was released in 1970, and by 1974, more than half a million units had been sold, making it initially popular despite its later safety issues.
  • 🏢 Ford's decision to produce the Pinto was influenced by Lee Iacocca, who argued that competing in the subcompact market would help Ford establish a stronger foothold against import brands.
  • 📈 Ford rushed the Pinto into production, imposing a strict deadline of 25 months from approval to market, prioritizing cost and weight over safety.
  • 💡 The Pinto's design was influenced by the need to meet the '2000 to 2000' rule – a weight of no more than 2000 pounds and a cost of no more than $2000.
  • 📚 The Pinto's safety issues were highlighted by consumer advocate Ralph Nader in his book 'Unsafe at Any Speed', which led to increased public awareness and regulatory changes.
  • 📉 Ford's internal cost-benefit analysis, which considered the costs of potential lawsuits versus safety improvements, was later criticized as placing a monetary value on human lives.
  • 🚑 The Pinto was involved in numerous legal cases, with one notable case, Grimshaw vs. Ford Motor Company, resulting in a large punitive damage award for the plaintiffs.
  • 🔍 Despite the Pinto's reputation, some argue that the car's safety record was not significantly worse than other subcompact cars of the era, and the public perception may have been overstated.

Q & A

  • What car did the narrator learn to drive in?

    -The narrator learned to drive in a 1976 Ford Pinto.

  • What was the public perception of the Ford Pinto due to its design flaws?

    -The public perception of the Ford Pinto was that it was one of the most dangerous cars ever built due to its design flaws, which could cause it to explode into flames if hit from behind or subjected to strong winds.

  • What was the significance of the 1970s small car market in the United States?

    -The 1970s small car market in the United States was significant because it saw the rise of imported small cars like the Volkswagen Beetle and the Nash Metropolitan, which found a niche in the American market dominated by larger automobiles.

  • Which American car manufacturer first released a small car model in response to the trend of imported small cars?

    -American Motors Corporation (AMC) was the first to release a small car model, the Gremlin, in April 1970.

  • What was the role of Lee Iacocca in the development of the Ford Pinto?

    -Lee Iacocca, then Executive Vice President of Ford Motor Company, championed the idea of Ford producing a sub-compact car, arguing that it would help Ford compete with imports and potentially lead to customer loyalty as they traded up to larger Ford models.

  • What was the '2000 to 2000' rule imposed by Lee Iacocca for the Ford Pinto?

    -The '2000 to 2000' rule imposed by Lee Iacocca stated that the Ford Pinto could weigh no more than 2,000 pounds and cost no more than $2,000.

  • What regulatory changes were happening in the automotive industry during the introduction of the Ford Pinto?

    -During the introduction of the Ford Pinto, the U.S. was undergoing regulatory changes with the creation of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the proposal of new safety standards, including requirements for fuel system integrity.

  • Why did Ford decide not to address the safety issues found in their crash tests?

    -Ford decided not to address the safety issues found in their crash tests because the Pinto tooling machines were almost completely built, and the company had already invested heavily in the production process. They also believed that the proposed safety regulations were not yet in effect.

  • What was the outcome of the Grimshaw vs. Ford Motor Company lawsuit?

    -In the Grimshaw vs. Ford Motor Company lawsuit, the jury awarded compensatory damages to the victims and their families, and initially awarded a large sum in punitive damages. However, the judge reduced the punitive damages, and Ford appealed the judgment, which was ultimately upheld.

  • How has the reputation of the Ford Pinto evolved over time?

    -The reputation of the Ford Pinto has evolved from being seen as a dangerous 'fire trap' to a more nuanced understanding that its safety issues were overstated and that it was as safe, if not safer, than other cars of its time.

  • What was the role of the Mother Jones article and the CBS television show '60 Minutes' in shaping public perception of the Ford Pinto?

    -The Mother Jones article and the CBS television show '60 Minutes' played a significant role in shaping public perception of the Ford Pinto by highlighting the internal Ford documents and the company's alleged cost-benefit analysis, which contributed to the narrative that Ford knowingly produced a dangerous vehicle.

Outlines

00:00

🚗 The Ford Pinto: A Tale of Controversy and Innovation

The Ford Pinto, introduced in 1970, was a sub-compact car designed by Ford to compete in the small car market dominated by imports like the Volkswagen Beetle. Despite its initial success, the Pinto became infamous for its safety issues, particularly the placement of the fuel tank which increased the risk of fire in rear-end collisions. The car's development was marked by a rush to meet aggressive deadlines set by Lee Iacocca, who envisioned the Pinto as a gateway for Ford to capture a larger market share. The Pinto's legacy is a complex interplay of corporate strategy, consumer demand, and evolving safety regulations, culminating in a pivotal case study in automotive history.

05:01

🔥 The Pinto's Safety Controversy: A Turning Point in Automotive Safety

The Ford Pinto's safety controversy began with a series of accidents that highlighted the car's vulnerability to fuel tank fires upon rear-end collisions. This issue was further complicated by Ford's internal cost-benefit analysis, which was later misconstrued as placing a monetary value on human lives. The controversy led to significant legal battles, including the Grimshaw vs. Ford Motor Company case, which resulted in a landmark punitive damages award. The Pinto's safety issues also coincided with the establishment of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and new automotive safety standards, marking a critical juncture in the industry's approach to consumer safety.

10:02

📉 Public Perception and Legal Battles: The Pinto's Legacy Reexamined

The Ford Pinto's reputation suffered greatly from the public perception of it being a 'death trap' due to its safety issues. However, subsequent analysis and legal reviews have suggested that the Pinto's safety record may have been overstated. Legal cases, such as Grimshaw vs. Ford, resulted in substantial damages awarded to the plaintiffs, but also led to a deeper examination of the car's actual safety record compared to other vehicles of the era. The narrative surrounding the Pinto has been challenged, with some arguing that the car's portrayal in the media and legal circles was not entirely accurate, and that its safety issues were not unique among its contemporaries.

15:04

🔍 Reevaluating the Pinto: Separating Myth from Reality

The final paragraph delves into the reevaluation of the Ford Pinto's legacy, challenging the myths and misconceptions that have persisted since the 1970s and 1980s. It suggests that the Pinto's reputation as an unsafe vehicle may have been exaggerated, and that its safety record was not significantly worse than other cars of the time. The paragraph also touches on the role of media and public sentiment in shaping the Pinto's narrative, and the importance of historical revisionism in understanding the true impact and significance of the Pinto in automotive history.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Ford Pinto

The Ford Pinto was a subcompact car produced by Ford in the 1970s. It is infamous for its design flaws, particularly concerning the placement of the fuel tank, which made it prone to catching fire in rear-end collisions. The Pinto is central to the video's theme of examining historical misconceptions and the reality behind the car's safety issues.

💡Safety Regulations

Safety regulations in the context of the video refer to the standards set by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to ensure vehicles meet certain safety criteria. The Ford Pinto's history is tied to these regulations, as it was subject to scrutiny for not adhering to proposed fuel system integrity standards, leading to the car's notorious reputation.

💡Lee Iacocca

Lee Iacocca was an executive at Ford Motor Company who played a significant role in the development of the Ford Pinto. He is mentioned in the video as the champion for Ford's entry into the subcompact car market. His influence and decisions are key to understanding the Pinto's development and the corporate strategy behind it.

💡Sub-Compact Car

A sub-compact car is a classification for small-sized automobiles, smaller than a compact car. The video discusses the rise of sub-compact cars in the U.S. market, with the Ford Pinto being a notable example. The term is important for understanding the market trend that led to the Pinto's creation.

💡Product Liability

Product liability refers to the legal responsibility a manufacturer has for damages or injuries caused by a defective product. The Ford Pinto became a landmark case in product liability due to the numerous lawsuits filed against Ford for the car's safety issues, as highlighted in the video.

💡Cost-Benefit Analysis

Cost-benefit analysis is a method used to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of alternatives by comparing their costs against their benefits. In the video, it is mentioned in relation to Ford's internal assessment of the financial implications of addressing the Pinto's fuel tank issue versus the potential cost of lawsuits, which became a controversial point in the public's perception of Ford's ethics.

💡Rear-End Collision

A rear-end collision occurs when one vehicle hits another from behind. The video emphasizes this type of collision in relation to the Ford Pinto, as it was discovered that the car's fuel tank design made it particularly susceptible to fire upon such impacts, leading to serious accidents and fatalities.

💡Corporate Ethics

Corporate ethics pertains to the moral principles that guide businesses in their dealings. The Ford Pinto case is presented in the video as a critical examination of corporate ethics, questioning Ford's decision-making process and the prioritization of cost-saving over consumer safety.

💡Pinto Madness

Pinto Madness is an article published by Mother Jones magazine that brought significant public attention to the Ford Pinto's safety issues. The video discusses the impact of this article on the public's perception of the Pinto and the subsequent legal and ethical debates it sparked.

💡Recalls

A recall is a request by the manufacturer to return a product due to safety concerns. The video mentions that Ford issued a voluntary recall for some Pintos to address the fuel system issues. However, the effectiveness and implications of this recall are part of the broader narrative on the Pinto's safety and Ford's corporate responsibility.

💡Historical Revisionism

Historical revisionism refers to the reinterpretation of historical events or figures. The video suggests that the Ford Pinto's reputation may have been a result of historical revisionism, as new insights and data have led to a reevaluation of the car's safety issues and Ford's actions.

Highlights

The Ford Pinto was introduced in 1970 as a subcompact car, initially marketed as a 'little carefree car'.

The Pinto was designed to be lightweight and cost-effective, with a focus on economy and style.

Controversy arose due to the Pinto's fuel tank design, which was prone to explosion in rear-end collisions.

Ford's decision to prioritize styling over safety led to significant engineering challenges and public backlash.

The Pinto's fuel tank was placed behind the rear axle, reducing its crush zone and increasing the risk of fire in accidents.

Ford conducted crash tests that revealed the vulnerability of the Pinto's fuel system, but chose not to implement changes.

The Pinto was rushed to production, with styling dictating engineering decisions, leading to safety compromises.

Ford's internal cost-benefit analysis, which considered the cost of potential lawsuits versus safety modifications, was later criticized.

The Pinto's reputation was tarnished by a series of high-profile legal cases, including the Grimshaw v. Ford case.

Ford was accused of knowingly producing a dangerous vehicle and was held liable for significant punitive damages in some cases.

Despite meeting safety regulations, Ford eventually recalled over a million Pintos to address the fuel tank issue.

The Pinto's safety issues became a major topic in discussions of corporate ethics and product liability.

Contrary to popular belief, the Pinto's safety record was not significantly worse than other subcompact cars of the time.

The Pinto's reputation as a 'fire trap' was largely a result of media sensationalism and may have been overstated.

Ford's management decisions regarding the Pinto have been re-evaluated, with some arguing that the company's actions were not as malicious as initially portrayed.

The Pinto case serves as a cautionary tale in the balance between corporate profits, consumer safety, and regulatory compliance.

The Pinto's legacy continues to influence discussions on automotive safety and the responsibilities of manufacturers.

Transcripts

play00:01

foreign

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I'm going to reveal a bit of the history

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guy history that might surprise you I

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Learned to Drive in a 1976 Ford Pinto I

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know I know you're thinking you're way

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too cool for that I mean surely a

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Corvette at least but no it was an

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orange Ford Pinto that had fake wood

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paneling on the side for

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Style

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and if you were born prior to 1980 you

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might be wondering but how did you

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survive because we all well know the

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fort Pinto head design flaws it meant

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that if it got hit from behind by

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another car or just a really strong wind

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it would explode into flames and how the

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car that Ford described as the little

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Carefree car that was built to be as

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indestructible as a Model T came to

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regard it as one of the most dangerous

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cars ever built is history that deserves

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to be remembered

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before the term Sub-Compact car was

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coined there were small car

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manufacturers in the United States the

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Crosley Corporation for example produced

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lightweight cars between 1939 and 1952

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but as the big three automakers started

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to mass produce larger cars the market

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for Crossley collapsed and the company

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folded

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from the 1950s onward very small cars

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like the Nash Metropolitan built in

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England for the American market and

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especially the Volkswagen Beetle were

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imported

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finding a niche in an American market

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dominated by larger automobiles

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Volkswagen even stressed its odd design

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in its marketing campaign saying think

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small

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by 1970 Volkswagen's American subsidiary

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Volkswagen group of America sold more

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than a half million cars from more than

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a thousand dealerships capturing seven

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percent of the U.S car market

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American manufacturers began to take

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notice of the trend and develop their

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own models the first to be released was

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the American Motors Gremlin released in

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April 1970 and described in marketing as

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the first American built-in port

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the auto review website Victory and

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Reseda notes that the gremlin arrived in

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1970 to the curious and the defying did

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anyone notice that the gremlin was half

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a hornet two-door yet the gremlin made

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respectable sales in excess of 25 000 in

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its first abbreviated model year a 1971

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edition of Popular Mechanics noted that

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there's a definite player about the

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gremlin a unique personality owners say

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but when surveyed the number one reason

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given for purchasing the car was economy

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Chevrolet under the market in the fall

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with the Vega a highly touted Car Motor

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Trend Magazine named the Vega the car of

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the year in 1971 design that ran into

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many difficulties the subject of another

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episode of the history guy

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writing in business ethics quarterly in

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2005 John R Danley of Southern Illinois

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University knows that it was not a

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foregone conclusion that Ford would

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produce a pinto the discussion was

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because the small car market is rarely

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profitable and American automakers were

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debating whether to try to compete with

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the small Imports or just to ignore that

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space and focus on more profitable lines

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but Lee Iacocca then Executive Vice

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President of Ford Motor Company

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championed the idea of Ford producing a

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Sub-Compact a Coca had been at Ford

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since 1946 and participated in the

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design of several successful models

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notably the Ford Mustang

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iacocca's argument was not just

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competition in the Sub-Compact car

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market he reasoned that if Ford competed

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with the Imports in that market it would

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make it more difficult for those Imports

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to gain a foothold in the United States

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and build things like dealerships and

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thus they wouldn't be able to compete as

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much in more profitable markets two if a

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person started out buying a Ford as

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their first car then they might be more

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likely to buy another Ford as they

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traded up the pinto was considered to be

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iacocca's project and it was a victory

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for him when the board in January 1969

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approved the production of the car

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Danley explains given the extremely

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competitive environment Iacocca imposed

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the 2000 to 2000 rule I.E the pinto

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could weigh no more than two thousand

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pounds and cost no more than two

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thousand dollars

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knew that other American manufacturers

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were producing their own models and thus

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Popular Mechanics notes he required a

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delivery deadline of just 25 months a

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record at the time and still impressive

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today

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writing in the 1992 edition of the

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general management decision authors

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Marilyn Helms and Betty Hutchins

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explained that when a decision was made

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to produce the pinto it was given the

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shortest production planning schedule in

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history the directive came from the top

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president Lee Iacocca who emphasized

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that the pinto was not to weigh an ounce

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over two thousand pounds and not Costa

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Cent over two thousand dollars and that

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safety was not a priority because safety

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doesn't sell

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a court would later determine that Pinto

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however was a rush project so that

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styling preceded engineering and

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dictated engineering design to a greater

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degree than usual among the engineering

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decisions dictated by styling was the

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placement of the fuel tank

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named after the pony with bright spots

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Victory and Rosita explained this was

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Lee iacocca's idea though instead of

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adapting a global platform the European

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escort to be exact it decided to go

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All-American the result was a unibody

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construction with small Dimensions

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lightweight a four-cylinder engine a

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choice of manual or automatic with a

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coupe and a wagon available

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the design was also sold under Ford's

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Mercury brand as the bobcat

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the car's exterior design by Ford's

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Robert eichen saw some controversy well

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the June 1972 edition of the San

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Bernardino County Sun offered a

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compliment the pinto was a great example

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that a small economy car doesn't have to

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be ugly in 2009 edition of Business Week

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listed the pinto as number eight on the

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list of ugliest cars of the last 50

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years although to be fair the gremlin

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was ranked number six

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the Ford Pinto debuted at the Chicago

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Auto Show and went on sale September 11

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1970. initially only the sedan version

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was available but a hatchback version

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went on sale the following February

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Ford marketed the car as the little

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Carefree car advertisements explained

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that Pinto was one little car that can

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free you from your car cares big and

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little from cares about high price and

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big gas bills from cares about

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maintenance and repairs power and

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stability roominess and quiet

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the little Carefree car takes care of

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all that

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noting that it had more interior space

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than the Volkswagen Beetle and was

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priced like little economy Imports Ford

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said that the pinto was a little better

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idea from Ford

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the initial reaction was positive

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Victory and receda write that with the

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gremlin receiving some giggles and the

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Vega being slapped with recalls the

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pinto seemed to be the winner amongst

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the three

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by 1974 more than a half million pintos

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were sold but Victory and receipt to

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continue

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things seem to be going great until

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someone got rear-ended in a pinto

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the introduction of the pinto came at a

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Crossroads in terms of Automotive

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regulations in the United States in 1966

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consumer Advocate Ralph Nader have

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published the book unsafe at any speed

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the designed in dangers of the American

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Automobile

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the book posted that American automobile

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manufacturers were reluctant to spend

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money on safety and resisted efforts to

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regulate Automotive Safety the book

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changed public attitudes and was the

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best-selling non-fiction book of 1966.

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the book and others spurred Senate

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hearings that resulted in the creation

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of the U.S Department of Transportation

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and several agencies intended to

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establish and force Highway and

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Automotive Safety standards those

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agencies would be combined in the

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highway safety Act of 1970 which created

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the national highway traffic safety

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administration or nhtsa

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Danley writes that in 1969 the new

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agency released a proposal for new

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regulations to address issues of

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post-crash survivability these included

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requirements for fuel system Integrity

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these were at the time mere proposals

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released for comment under the rules of

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the 1946 administrative procedures Act

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Ford and other U.S manufacturers

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responded during the comments phase

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Danley writes on September 19th 1973

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Ford submitted petition for

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reconsideration of Federal Motor Vehicle

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Safety standard number 301. attachment 2

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contained a cost-benefit analysis

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conducted by two engineers at Ford the

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report considered the costs and benefits

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for society the proposed regulations

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regarding fuel tank fires that

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attachment would come back to haunt the

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company

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meanwhile Ford began testing in

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anticipation of the new regulations

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starting by testing modified Ford

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Mavericks and then in 1970 the first

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model of the pinto Danley notes that

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while the testing demonstrated

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vulnerability of fuel Integrity there

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were no federal performance standards at

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the time and proposed regulations

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addressed only front-end collisions

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moreover Helms and Hudson's right

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tooling went on at the same time as

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product development so when testing

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revealed the series defect with the gas

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tank the 200 million dollar Pinto

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tooling machines were almost completely

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built Ford decided not to address the

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problems found in their crash tests

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in 1974 decided that the model year 1973

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Pinto would satisfy the proposed

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standards from 1969 but no regulation

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said yep and promulgated by then the

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nhtsa was proposing stricter regulations

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including requirements for rear-end

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collisions and rollovers but the new

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standards would be effective until the

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1977 model year Stanley writes at the

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1974 Pinto was already in production and

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Ford decided against modifications in

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the 1975 and 76 pintos notably Ford had

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solutions to meet the new standards but

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chose not to implement the changes prior

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to the regulations coming into effect

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Ford would come to regret these

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decisions Stanley knows that by 1977

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Ford was embroiled in a legal and public

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relations nightmare

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approximately 177 legal cases were filed

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against four work based on death or

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injury following failure of the fuel

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tank in the event of a rear end

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collision

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among the most important of these cases

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began in 1977 regarding an accident in

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May 1972. Grimshaw versus Ford Motor

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Company

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Superior Court Judge Stephen K tamura

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explains a 1972 Ford Pinto hatchback

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automobile unexpectedly stalled on a

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freeway erupting into flames when it was

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rear-ended by a car proceeding in the

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same direction

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Mrs Gray the driver of the pinto

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suffered fatal Burns and 13 year old

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Richard Grimshaw a passenger in the

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pinto suffered severe and permanently

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disfiguring burns on his face and entire

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body

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Grimshaw and The Heirs of Mrs Gray sued

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Ford Motor Company and others

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the judge notes several issues in the

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case that styling dictated design

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placing the fuel tank behind the rear

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axle where it had far less Crush base

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than in any other American Automobile

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that crash test during design

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demonstrated that the pintos fuel system

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is designed could not meet the 20 mile

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per hour proposed in a TSA standard but

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Ford produced and sold the pinto to the

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public without doing anything to remedy

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the defects disturbingly the judge noted

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that Harley Copp a former Ford engineer

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and executive in charge of the crash

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testing program testified that the

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highest level of Ford's management made

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the decision to go forward with the

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production of the pinto knowing that the

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gas tank was vulnerable to puncture and

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rupture at low rear impact speeds and a

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significant risk of death or injury from

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fire and knowing that fixes were

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feasible at nominal cost

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he testified that Management's decision

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was based on the cost savings which

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would endure from omitting or delaying

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the fixes

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following a six-month trial a jury

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awarded Grimshaw two million 516

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thousand dollars in compensatory damages

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and the Grays 559 680 in compensatory

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damages

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most notably though the jury awarded

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Grimshaw 125 million dollars in punitive

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damages

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punitive damages were thought at the

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time to have been the largest award ever

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in a U.S product liability and personal

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injury case but the judge reduced the

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punitive damages to three and a half

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million dollars

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still it was by far the largest punitive

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damage award in the history of the state

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of California at the time

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Ford appealed the Judgment but it was

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upheld after the Judgment Ford decided

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to settle other cases out of court

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as the trial was proceeding Mother Jones

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magazine published an article called

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Pinto Madness the article paid

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particular attention to the attachment

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to that have been included with Ford's

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1973 appeal of the nhtsa regulations

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Danley writes attachment 2 contained a

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cost-benefit analysis conducted by two

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engineers at Ford e s grush and C.S

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zombie the report considered the cost

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and benefits for Society of the proposed

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regulations regarding fuel tank fires

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Mother Jones interpretation of the

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attachment was that Ford waited eight

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years because its internal cost benefit

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analysis which places a dollar value on

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human life that it wasn't profitable to

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make the changes sooner

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according to Mother Jones Dr Leslie ball

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who had worked at Nasa said that the

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release to production of the pinto was

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the most reprehensible decision in the

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history of American engineering in Los

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Angeles safety expert Byron blush opined

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that Ford made an extremely

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irresponsible decision when they placed

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such a weak tank in such a ridiculous

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location in such a software end it's

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almost designed to blow up

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premeditated Mother Jones estimated from

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nhtsa data that between 500 and 900

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fatalities resulted from Pinto fires the

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article received a Pulitzer Prize many

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of the claims made of the Mother Jones

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article were repeated on an episode of

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the CBS television show 60 minutes

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in 1978 Ford agreed to a voluntary

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recall of some one and a half million

play12:52

pintos and bobcats despite the pinto

play12:55

meeting relevant nhtsa regulations but a

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year later about a third of the vehicles

play12:59

recalled had not received the fuel

play13:01

system modifications

play13:02

while there were no significant issues

play13:04

identified with the 1979 Pinto by then

play13:06

the car had gained the reputation of

play13:08

being unsafe

play13:09

sales declined in 1980 was the last

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production year in total more than 3.1

play13:14

million units were produced between 1971

play13:17

and 1980.

play13:19

the pinto has long been regarded as a

play13:21

keystone case in corporate ethics and

play13:22

product liability Stanley writes that

play13:24

with respect to moral reasoning and

play13:26

blame the case is routinely viewed as a

play13:27

slam dunk no-brainer

play13:30

yet analysis safter leads to some

play13:32

surprising conclusions

play13:34

in a 1991 article in Rutgers law review

play13:36

Gary Schwartz of UCLA law school

play13:38

concludes that several significant

play13:40

factual misconceptions surround the

play13:42

Public's understanding of the case given

play13:44

the cumulative force of these

play13:45

misconceptions the case can probably be

play13:47

referred to as

play13:48

mythical

play13:50

first attachment 2 often described as a

play13:52

crass corporate calculation of the value

play13:53

of human life has been entirely

play13:55

misconstrued Professor Lee vinsel of

play13:57

Virginia Tech University explained in

play13:59

2021 that the document was not about

play14:01

pintos it was not about rear end

play14:03

collisions but about rollovers it was

play14:05

not about lawsuits it was not aimed at

play14:06

internal design decisions but external

play14:08

regulatory rule-making ones

play14:10

the attachment did not give a cost

play14:12

calculation of the cost of lawsuits

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versus the cost of addressing the pinto

play14:15

fuel issue but rather used a standard

play14:18

nhtsa value to consider the cost of the

play14:21

new regulation across the industry

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importantly not only did the attachment

play14:25

not as Mother Jones suggested place a

play14:27

dollar value in human life and decide it

play14:29

wasn't profitable to make changes in

play14:31

fact it did not reflect internal

play14:32

decision making at all did not assist

play14:34

potential deaths in the pinto due to the

play14:36

field design and had no impact on

play14:38

internal decisions regarding the Pinto's

play14:40

design

play14:41

further Mother Jones assessment of 500

play14:43

to 900 fatal accidents was a result of

play14:45

completely misunderstood nhtsa data that

play14:48

represented not deaths due to Pinto

play14:50

fires but industry-wide rollover

play14:52

fatality data the actual number was not

play14:55

500 to 900 but 27.

play14:59

in August of 1978 the state of Indiana

play15:01

filed a Criminal suit against Ford based

play15:03

on the deaths of three teenage girls who

play15:05

died when their Pinto was involved in a

play15:06

rearing Collision the state argued that

play15:08

Ford's actions amounted to Reckless

play15:10

homicide according to an Associated

play15:12

Press report defending forward Harold

play15:14

McDonald Ford's vice president of

play15:16

engineering argued that the decision to

play15:17

place the fuel tank behind the rear axle

play15:19

was sound because the gas tank should be

play15:21

as far from the engine as possible

play15:23

in the company's defense he offered a

play15:25

startling statistic that challenges the

play15:27

entire fire trap image

play15:28

a federal study showed that in 1975 in

play15:31

1976 1.9 percent of the nation's cars

play15:34

were pintos

play15:36

and 1.9 percent of the fatal accidents

play15:38

involving fire an average of just 13 per

play15:41

year occurred in a pinto

play15:43

despite its fearsome reputation the

play15:46

Pinto's record in fire fatalities was

play15:48

average for subcompacts and in terms of

play15:50

fatalities as a whole the pinto fared

play15:52

approximately even with the Vega and

play15:53

Gremlin and significantly better than

play15:55

the VW Beetle

play15:57

Stanley concludes that in light of the

play15:58

facts as we know them there's little

play16:00

evidence that there is even a kernel of

play16:02

Truth to the myth of the Ford Pinto

play16:04

writers Matthew Lee and David Ehrman

play16:06

contend in a 1986 issue of presidential

play16:08

studies quarterly that the pinto

play16:10

narrative is largely the result of a

play16:11

post-watergate journalistic fever in

play16:14

which conspiracy and moral calculations

play16:15

and organizational wrongdoing where

play16:17

regularly being highlighted by reporters

play16:20

people like to throw around the term

play16:21

historical revisionism but in fact

play16:24

history is being revised all the time as

play16:25

we gather new data or gain new insights

play16:27

based on the perspective of history that

play16:31

is the discipline of history and perhaps

play16:33

an overdue revision is to admit that all

play16:36

the horrible things we heard about Ford

play16:37

Motor Company and the pinto in the 70s

play16:39

and 80s might well have been overstated

play16:42

the monster might not have been as

play16:44

monstrous as we once thought even if the

play16:46

car's reputation

play16:48

continues

play16:49

thus the the great controversy of the

play16:52

pinto yes four designers knew that it

play16:54

had design flaws it might cost lives and

play16:55

they didn't address those design flaws

play16:57

but the reasons for those decisions

play16:59

might not have been as malicious as we

play17:02

were once told and the car's reputation

play17:04

is a fire trap and a death Trappers

play17:06

clearly overstated the fact is you were

play17:08

just as safe in a pinto as you were in a

play17:10

AMC Gremlin or a Chevy Vega and probably

play17:13

safer than you would have been in a

play17:14

Volkswagen Beetle

play17:16

but exploding the myth of the pinto

play17:18

might lead many of us Children of the

play17:21

70s and 80s to wonder if our entire

play17:23

childhood

play17:25

was a lie

play17:27

I hope you enjoyed this episode of the

play17:28

history guide check out our community on

play17:30

the

play17:31

historyguyguild.locals.com our webpage

play17:33

at thehistoryguy.com and our merchandise

play17:36

at teespring.com or book a special

play17:38

message from the history guy on Cameo

play17:40

and if you'd like more episodes of

play17:42

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play17:45

[Music]

play17:51

[Applause]

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[Music]

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Etiquetas Relacionadas
Ford PintoCorporate EthicsSafety StandardsAutomotive HistoryProduct Liability1970s CarsDesign FlawsConsumer AdvocacyLegal CasesIndustry Controversy
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