Why One Nuke Is Never Enough - Myth of the Overkill

Summary

This video explores the history and evolution of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), highlighting its role in nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. It delves into the challenges SAC faced, the transformation under Curtis LeMay, and the differing views on nuclear deterrence between LeMay and General Thomas Power, ultimately showcasing SAC's readiness during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Takeaways

• 😀 The video discusses the history and impact of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), a powerful military force during the Cold War, focusing on its rise and fall.
• 💥 The Dayton Raid in 1949 highlighted the poor state of the U.S. Air Force, with nearly two-thirds of bombing runs significantly off target, indicating a need for improvement.
• 🌐 The detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, Joe-1, and the Korean War were pivotal events that fueled the Cold War and influenced SAC's development.
• 🔧 SAC faced numerous challenges in the late 1940s, including personnel shortages and inadequate resources, which hindered its operational capabilities.
• 🚀 The B-36 Peacemaker and B-47 Stratojet were notable aircraft that faced significant issues, reflecting the broader struggles within SAC.
• 💪 General Curtis LeMay is credited with transforming SAC into a highly effective force, emphasizing the importance of his leadership in its success.
• 🤔 General Thomas Power, often overlooked or misrepresented, played a significant role in SAC's history and its approach to nuclear deterrence.
• 🔫 The Cuban Missile Crisis showcased SAC's peak readiness, with over 1,400 bombers and 145 missiles ready to launch, demonstrating its strategic capabilities.
• 🤝 The debate between LeMay and others over nuclear deterrence strategies, such as preemptive strikes, highlights the complexity of military thinking during the Cold War.
• 📚 The video recommends books like 'Winning Armageddon' and 'To Rule the Skies' for deeper understanding of SAC and its key figures, suggesting the importance of historical context.

Q & A

What is the significance of the Dayton Raid in the history of the Strategic Air Command (SAC)?

The Dayton Raid in January 1949 was a significant event that exposed the weaknesses of the United States Air Force in the years following World War II. Despite the impressive display of air power, the raid was a disaster, with nearly two-thirds of the bombing runs being significantly off target. This served as a wake-up call for SAC, highlighting the need for improvement in capabilities and marking the beginning of its transformation into a more effective force.

How did the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, Joe-1, and the Korean War impact the United States' perception of its military readiness?

The detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, Joe-1, and the outbreak of the Korean War were both shocks to the United States, causing a fear that the U.S. was 'losing the peace' despite having won the war. These events led to a sense of urgency in improving the readiness and capabilities of the U.S. military, particularly the Strategic Air Command (SAC).

What were the initial challenges faced by SAC in terms of personnel and resources?

SAC faced significant challenges in terms of personnel and resources in the late 1940s. Authorized to have 43,729 personnel, SAC only had 37,426 in its ranks. Many of the skilled personnel had left the service during the drawdown, leaving behind a large proportion of unskilled personnel. Additionally, the command was inadequate in terms of material, basing, and other resources, which hindered its ability to fulfill its mission effectively.

How did Curtis LeMay contribute to the transformation of SAC?

Curtis LeMay is often credited with transforming SAC into a more effective and powerful force. By the time he left for Washington in the summer of 1957, SAC had become essentially the command he set about to build when he arrived in 1948. Under his leadership, SAC developed the ability to quickly carry out large-scale nuclear warfare in a fairly successful manner.

What was General Thomas Power's role in the history of SAC, and how is he often portrayed in historical accounts?

General Thomas Power is a significant figure in the history of SAC, but he is often overlooked or dismissed in historical accounts. He is sometimes portrayed as a tyrannical sadist, embodying everything wrong with nuclear weapons and the military mind. However, his contributions and the complexities of his character are often overlooked, and he is sometimes seen as merely a carbon copy of Curtis LeMay.

What was the concept of nuclear counterforce, and how did General Power react to it?

Nuclear counterforce is a concept that emphasizes 'restraint' in nuclear warfare, focusing on targeting the enemy's military capabilities rather than civilian populations. When General Power heard about this concept, he reacted strongly against it, arguing that the goal of warfare was to kill the enemy and questioning the need for restraint.

How did Curtis LeMay's understanding of deterrence differ from the traditional view?

Traditionally, deterrence is understood as the active threat of war to prevent conflict. However, Curtis LeMay applied the term to the execution of a preemptive mission itself. For LeMay, starting a war to prevent a larger war was a worthwhile venture, suggesting an interest in correlating the prevention of war with attacking the enemy's offensive force first.

What are the potential problems associated with an overreliance on the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD)?

An overreliance on MAD can result in several problems, including overestimating one's own force or underestimating an adversary's ability to counter it, superimposing one's assumptions of deterrence value on a potential adversary, and aligning goals more with the capabilities one has rather than what is needed or desired. This can lead to a false sense of security and a neglect of other important aspects of deterrence.

How did SAC approach the calculation of its capabilities based on the intended end goal?

SAC approached the calculation of its capabilities by starting with the end goal in mind, asking what was required to achieve that goal and then backtracking from there. This involved identifying targets, establishing margins of error, calculating kill probabilities, and aggregating information to determine the required number of weapon systems per target.

What was the controversy surrounding the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), and how did General Power view it?

The SIOP was the general U.S. plan for nuclear war between 1961-2003. Controversy arose over the plan's requirement for a 90% assurance rate for each target, which was seen as too expensive and requiring the delivery of too many nuclear weapons. General Power believed that the forces assigned to the SIOP should be programmed and that excess forces should be used in the plan to add flexibility.