Competition is for Losers with Peter Thiel (How to Start a Startup 2014: 5)

Y Combinator
22 Mar 201750:27

Summary

TLDRIn this insightful talk, Peter Thiel emphasizes the importance of creating monopolies rather than engaging in competition, asserting that competition is for losers. Thiel, the co-founder of PayPal and Founders Fund, discusses the value of a business through the lens of creating value for the world and capturing a percentage of it. He critiques the common narratives that distort the nature of markets and stresses the significance of starting with small, niche markets to expand into larger monopolies, using examples from tech giants like Google, Amazon, and Facebook to illustrate his points.

Takeaways

  • 🤝 Peter Thiel's central thesis is that businesses should aim for monopoly to avoid competition, as competition is for losers.
  • 💡 A valuable company is defined by creating value (X dollars for the world) and capturing a fraction (Y% of X) of that value, with X and Y being independent variables.
  • 📉 The airline industry, despite its size, is less profitable and valuable compared to Google's search engine, illustrating the difference between high-revenue and high-profit-margin businesses.
  • 🧩 The dichotomy between perfect competition and monopoly is often misunderstood, with people lying about the nature of their businesses to avoid regulation or attract capital.
  • 🚀 Startups should target small markets to achieve a monopoly and then expand, rather than starting with a large market which often leads to excessive competition.
  • 💡 Monopolies are often created by having proprietary technology, network effects, economies of scale, and strong branding that can last over time.
  • 🕊️ The tech industry has been successful financially because it tends to create monopoly-like businesses that can accumulate high cash reserves.
  • 🌐 Software businesses are particularly adept at creating monopolies due to their low marginal costs and potential for rapid adoption and scaling.
  • ⏳ The value of a business is heavily weighted towards its future cash flows, emphasizing the importance of durability and long-term success over short-term growth.
  • 🔍 Thiel criticizes the lean startup methodology, suggesting that great companies often make a quantum leap with unique insights rather than iterating based on customer feedback.
  • 💭 The talk concludes with a call to rethink competition, suggesting that it may be a psychological blind spot that leads people to pursue validation through competition rather than focusing on what is truly valuable.

Q & A

  • What is Peter Thiel's primary business strategy advice for entrepreneurs starting a company?

    -Peter Thiel advises entrepreneurs to aim for monopoly and avoid competition, suggesting that competition is for losers and that a valuable company is one that creates substantial value for the world and captures a significant fraction of that value.

  • Why does Peter Thiel believe that competition is not ideal for businesses?

    -Thiel argues that competition tends to reduce profit margins and can lead to a situation where companies are constantly fighting for survival rather than thriving, which is not conducive to creating long-term value.

  • According to the transcript, what is the simple formula that Peter Thiel suggests for determining the value of a business?

    -The formula Thiel suggests is that a valuable company is one that creates X dollars of value for the world and captures Y% of X, where X and Y are independent variables.

  • How does Peter Thiel compare the US airline industry with Google in terms of value creation and capture?

    -Thiel points out that while the US airline industry is larger in terms of revenue, Google captures a much larger fraction of the value it creates, which makes Google more valuable despite being smaller in terms of industry size.

  • What does Peter Thiel suggest about the nature of businesses in the world?

    -Thiel suggests a dichotomy where there are only two kinds of businesses: those that are perfectly competitive and those that are monopolies, with very little in between.

  • Why do monopolists and non-monopolists tend to lie about the nature of their businesses according to Peter Thiel?

    -Monopolists lie to avoid government regulation and non-monopolists lie to attract capital and differentiate themselves. These lies distort the true differences between businesses.

  • What is the counterintuitive idea Peter Thiel presents about starting a business?

    -Thiel suggests that startups should aim for small markets first, gain a monopoly in that niche, and then expand outwards, rather than targeting large markets from the beginning which often leads to excessive competition.

  • What are some characteristics of a successful monopoly business according to Peter Thiel?

    -Characteristics include proprietary technology that is significantly better than the competition, network effects, economies of scale, and strong branding that creates a unique place in consumers' minds.

  • Why does Peter Thiel emphasize the importance of being the 'last mover' in a market?

    -Being the last mover implies that a company has established a lasting monopoly that will not be easily disrupted by competitors, capturing the most value over time.

  • What does Peter Thiel suggest about the relationship between innovation and financial success in the history of science and technology?

    -Thiel suggests that many great innovations in both science and technology have not led to financial success for their creators due to the competitive nature of their fields, where the value created is often competed away.

  • What is Peter Thiel's view on the common business advice of iterating based on customer feedback?

    -Thiel is skeptical of the lean startup methodology that emphasizes iteration based on customer feedback, suggesting that great companies often make significant advancements by having a clear vision and not being overly influenced by immediate customer opinions.

  • How does Peter Thiel describe the psychological attraction to competition?

    -Thiel describes a deep psychological tendency for people to be attracted to competition as a form of validation, often leading to the pursuit of activities that many others are doing, which he suggests can be a sign of insanity rather than wisdom.

Outlines

00:00

🤑 The Pursuit of Monopoly and Avoidance of Competition

In this opening paragraph, Peter Thiel emphasizes the importance of aiming for monopoly in business to avoid competition, which he deems 'for losers.' He introduces the concept that a valuable business is one that creates significant value for the world and captures a substantial percentage of it. Thiel illustrates the independence of value creation (X) and value capture (Y), using the airline industry versus Google as an example to highlight the difference in profitability and market valuation. He challenges the traditional economic view of perfect competition, suggesting that it often leads to businesses that are efficient but not necessarily valuable or profitable.

05:00

📊 The Dichotomy of Business Models: Perfect Competition vs. Monopoly

Thiel presents a binary view of businesses, categorizing them into either perfectly competitive or monopolistic. He argues that there is little in between due to the nature of business owners to misrepresent their market position. Monopolies downplay their dominance to avoid regulation, while competitive businesses exaggerate their uniqueness to attract capital. Thiel discusses the lies businesses tell about their market size, with monopolies expanding their market definition and non-monopolies narrowing theirs. He uses examples from the restaurant and movie industries to illustrate these points.

10:01

🛠️ Building a Monopoly: Starting Small and Expanding

This paragraph delves into strategies for building a monopoly. Thiel suggests that startups should target small markets to achieve a monopoly before expanding outward. He warns against entering large markets initially due to high competition. Thiel cites examples of successful companies like Amazon and eBay that started with narrow market focuses and gradually broadened their scope. He also discusses the counterintuitive nature of targeting small markets that others may overlook.

15:04

💡 Characteristics of Monopolistic Businesses

Thiel outlines the key characteristics of a successful monopoly, including proprietary technology, network effects, economies of scale, and strong branding. He argues that these elements contribute to a company's ability to capture and maintain a significant market share. The paragraph also touches on the importance of being the 'last mover' in a category, suggesting that companies that can sustain their monopoly over time are the most valuable.

20:05

🕊️ The Illusion of Value in Innovation and the Role of Competition

In this reflective paragraph, Thiel discusses the disconnect between the value created by innovations and the financial rewards reaped by those who create them. He suggests that throughout history, particularly in science and technology, the creators of valuable innovations often capture little of the value they produce. Thiel uses the examples of scientists and inventors who did not profit from their discoveries, such as the developers of the airplane and the creators of special and general relativity.

25:06

🏭 The Historical Context of Monopolies and Wealth Creation

Thiel provides historical context to the creation of wealth through monopolies and innovation. He discusses the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, highlighting the success of vertically integrated monopolies like Ford and Standard Oil. Thiel also touches on the rapid adoption and economies of scale unique to the software industry, which has allowed for the creation of significant monopolies and wealth in Silicon Valley.

30:08

🧐 The Psychological and Cultural Attraction to Competition

Thiel explores the psychological and cultural reasons why people are drawn to competition, suggesting that it is a deep-seated aspect of human nature. He challenges the audience to rethink the value of competition and to consider the benefits of pursuing unique paths rather than following the crowd. Thiel uses examples such as the allure of Hollywood and the intense competition in academia to illustrate his point.

35:11

🚪 Choosing the Path Less Traveled: Embracing the 'Monopoly Mindset'

In the concluding paragraph, Thiel encourages individuals to avoid the crowded path of competition and instead seek opportunities that are less traveled and more unique. He emphasizes the importance of questioning the value of competition and the need to differentiate oneself in meaningful ways. Thiel ends with a call to action for the audience to consider the 'monopoly mindset' and to think critically about the nature of competition in their own lives and careers.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Monopoly

Monopoly refers to a market condition in which one company has exclusive control over a product or service. In the video, Peter Thiel emphasizes the importance of aiming for a monopoly to avoid competition, which he views as detrimental to business success. Thiel argues that a monopoly allows a company to capture a significant percentage of the value it creates, which is a key to building a valuable business.

💡Competition

Competition is the contention for the same objective or goal among individuals or groups. Thiel posits that 'competition is for losers' by suggesting that it often leads to a race to the bottom in terms of pricing and margins, making it difficult for companies to capture the value they create. The script uses the airline industry as an example of a competitive market with low profitability.

💡Value Capture

Value capture is the concept of a company obtaining a portion of the value it creates for the world. Thiel suggests that a valuable company is one that creates value (X dollars) and captures a percentage (Y%) of that value. This concept is central to the video's theme, as it highlights the importance of not just creating value but also being able to capture it.

💡Perfect Competition

Perfect competition is an economic market structure with many buyers and sellers, where no single entity can influence prices and products are homogeneous. Thiel contrasts perfect competition with monopolies, arguing that in a perfectly competitive market, companies do not make significant profits because the market dynamics drive down margins.

💡Innovation

Innovation refers to the introduction of new methods, ideas, or products. Thiel discusses innovation in the context of creating monopolies, suggesting that innovative companies that invent new technologies or markets can become monopolies by providing significantly better products or services than what existed before.

💡Network Effects

Network effects occur when the value of a product or service increases with the number of people using it. Thiel mentions network effects as one of the characteristics of a successful monopoly business, as they can create a self-reinforcing cycle that makes it difficult for competitors to enter the market.

💡Economies of Scale

Economies of scale are the cost advantages that a business obtains due to expansion and the increased production of goods and services. Thiel points out that businesses with high fixed costs and low marginal costs, such as software companies, can benefit greatly from economies of scale, which can contribute to their monopolistic position.

💡Branding

Branding is the process of creating a unique name, symbol, or design that identifies and differentiates a product or service from others. Thiel acknowledges the power of branding in creating value, even though he admits not fully understanding how it works, and notes that strong branding can be a component of a monopoly business.

💡Last Mover Advantage

Last mover advantage is the strategic benefit of being the final significant entrant in a market, often capitalizing on the mistakes and innovations of earlier entrants. Thiel suggests that being the last mover can be more valuable than being the first mover, as it allows a company to solidify its position and avoid the competitive struggles of early pioneers.

💡Vertical Integration

Vertical integration is a business strategy where a company owns or controls several stages of the supply chain for its products or services. Thiel cites vertically integrated monopolies as a historical example of successful businesses that were able to control costs and increase efficiency by managing all aspects of production.

💡Risk Mitigation

Risk mitigation involves taking steps to reduce or eliminate the impact of risks that might affect a business. Thiel expresses skepticism about the lean startup methodology, which emphasizes iterative feedback to mitigate risk, suggesting that it might not be the best approach for creating a breakthrough company that can dominate a market.

Highlights

Peter Thiel emphasizes the importance of aiming for monopoly and avoiding competition when starting a company.

A valuable company is defined by creating value for the world and capturing a percentage of that value.

The value of a business (X) and the percentage captured (Y) are independent variables, critical for creating a valuable company.

Comparing the US airline industry with Google illustrates the difference in value creation and profit margins despite industry size.

Monopolies are more stable and valuable than perfectly competitive industries.

The dichotomy between perfectly competitive businesses and monopolies is often misunderstood due to industry narratives.

Monopolists tend to downplay their market dominance, while non-monopolists exaggerate their uniqueness to attract capital.

The tech industry's success is attributed to its propensity to create monopoly-like businesses.

Building a monopoly involves starting with a small market and expanding it over time.

Successful companies often start with a small market and grow to dominate larger markets, like Amazon with books or eBay with Pez dispensers.

Chasing large markets from the start is a common mistake that often leads to excessive competition.

Characteristics of a successful monopoly business include proprietary technology, network effects, economies of scale, and strong branding.

Software businesses are particularly adept at achieving economies of scale due to the low marginal cost of software.

The value of a company is heavily weighted towards its future cash flows, emphasizing the importance of durability over growth rates.

The 'last mover' advantage is critical for building a lasting monopoly, as seen with companies like Microsoft, Google, and Facebook.

Thiel challenges the conventional wisdom that competition is inherently good, suggesting it often leads to a race to the bottom.

The talk concludes with a call to rethink the value of competition and the benefits of pursuing unique business models that avoid it.

Transcripts

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all right good afternoon uh today's

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speaker is Peter teal Peter was the

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founder of PayPal and paler and Founders

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fund and has invested in uh most of the

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tech companies in in silica Valley and

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he's going to talk about strategy and

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competition thank you for coming Peter

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awesome thanks uh Sam thanks for

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inviting me thanks for for having me uh

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I I sort of have a I have a single eay

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FS that I'm completely obsessed with in

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um on on the business side which is that

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uh if you're starting a company if

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you're the founder entrepreneur starting

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a company you always want to aim for

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Monopoly and um and that uh and you want

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to always avoid competition and so uh

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hence uh competition is for losers uh

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something we'll be talking about

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today I'd like to um I'd like to start

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by saying something about um the the

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basic idea of uh when you start one of

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these these companies um how you go

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about uh creating value and there's this

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question what makes a business valuable

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and I want I want to suggest that

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there's basically a very simple uh very

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simple formula that um um you you have a

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valuable company if two things are true

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uh number one that it creates X dollars

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of value for the world and number two

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that you capture y% of X and and the

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critical thing that uh that I think

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people always miss in the sort of

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analysis is that X and Y are completely

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independent variables and so um X can be

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very Big Y can be very small X can be of

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intermediate size and if Y is is

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reasonably big you can still get a very

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big business so to create a valuable

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company you have to basically uh both

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create something of value and capture

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some fraction of the value of what

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you've

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created and sort of just to just to

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illustrate this as a as a contrast um

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there's if you sort of compare the US

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airline industry with a company like

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Google on search um if you sort of

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measure by the size of these industries

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you could you could say that airlines

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are still more important than search if

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you just measure it say by revenues

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there's 195 billion in uh domestic

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revenues in 201 uh 2012 Google had uh

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just north of 50 billion um and so and

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certainly sort of on some intuitive

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level if you said uh if you were given a

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choice and said well do you want to get

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rid of air all air travel or do you want

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to get rid of your ability to use search

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engines the intuition would be that air

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travel is something that's more

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important than search and this is of

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course just the domestic numbers if you

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looked at this globally um airlines are

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much much bigger than um than uh than

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than than than search or than Google is

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but uh but the profit margins are quite

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a bit less uh you know they were

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marginally profitable in 2012 12 uh I

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think the entire 100-year history of the

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airline industry the cumulative profits

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in the US have been approximately zero

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the companies make money they

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episodically go bankrupt they get

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recapitalized and you sort of cycle and

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and repeat and this is reflected in you

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know the the combined market

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capitalization of the of the airline

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Industries maybe uh something um of the

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US airline industry something like a

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quarter that of Google so so uh you have

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you have a search engine much much

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smaller than than air travel but much

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more valuable and I think this this

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reflects these very different uh

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valuations on X and

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Y so um you know if we look at perfect

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competition um you know there are sort

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of there's some pros and cons to the

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world of perfect competition um on a

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high level uh uh it's always um this is

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what you study in econ one it's always

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it's easy to model which I think is why

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econ professors like talking about

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perfect competition um it somehow is

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efficient especially in a world where

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things are static because you have all

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the consumer surplus gets captured by

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everybody and uh and politically it's uh

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What uh what we're what we're told is

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good in our society that you you want to

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have competition and this is somehow a

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good thing um of course there are lot of

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negatives uh it's it's generally not

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that good if you're you're um you're

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involved in anything that's hyper

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competitive um because you often don't

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make money I'll come back to this a

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little bit later so uh so I think at one

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end of the spectrum you have uh

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industries that are perfectly

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competitive and at the other end of the

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spectrum um you have things that um I

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would say are monopolies and um and

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they're you know they're much stable

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longer term businesses you have more

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Capital uh and um and if you get a

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creative Monopoly for inventing

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something new I think it's symptomatic

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of having created something something

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really valuable um and so I do think

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this you know the the the sort of the

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the the extreme binary view of the world

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I I always articulate is that there are

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exactly two kinds of businesses in this

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world there are businesses that are

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perfectly competitive and there are

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businesses that are monopolies and um

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there's shockingly little that is in

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between and uh this dichotomy is not

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understood very well because uh people

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uh are constantly lying about the nature

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of the businesses they're in um and this

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is why this is in my mind this is the

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most important it's not necessarily the

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most important thing in business but I

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think it's the most important business

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idea that people don't understand that

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there are just these two kinds of

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businesses and so let me say a little

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bit about the lies that people tell and

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so you basically um the basic uh if you

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sort of imagine that there was a

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spectrum of companies from perfect

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competition to Monopoly um the um the

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apparent differences are quite small

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because the people who have monopolies

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pretend not to they will basically say

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uh you know and it's because you don't

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want to get regulated by the government

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you don't want the government to come

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after you so you will never say that you

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have Monopoly so anyone who has a

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monopoly will pretend that they're in

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incredible competition and on the other

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end of the spectrum if you are

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incredibly competitive um and if you're

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in some sort of business where you will

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never make any money um you will be

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tempted to tell a lie that goes in the

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other direction where you will say that

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you're doing something unique um that um

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is is somehow uh less competitive than

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it looks because um because you want to

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you will want to differentiate you want

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try to attct Capital or something like

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that so if the monopolists pretend not

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to have monopolies the non- monopolists

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pretend to have monopolies the apparent

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difference is very small whereas the

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real difference I I would submit is is

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actually quite big and so there's this

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Distortion that happens because of the

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lies people tell about their businesses

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and the lies are sort of in these these

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opposite direction let me let me drill a

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little bit down further on the uh the

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way these lies

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work and so um you know

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the the the basic uh lie you tell as a

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non-m monopoly is that we're in a very

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small Market the basic lie you tell as

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the Monopoly is that the market you're

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in is much bigger than it looks and so

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um and so typically if you want to think

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of this in sort of set theoretic terms

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you could say that a monopoly tells um a

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a lie where you describe your business

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as the union of these vastly different

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markets and the non- monopolist

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describes it as the intersection so that

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uh in effect um if you're if you're a

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non monopolist you will rhetorically

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describe your Market as super small

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you're the only person in that market if

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you have Monopoly you will describe it

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as super big and um and there's lots of

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competition in it so uh some examples of

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how this how this works in practice uh

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so I always use restaurants as the

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example of a terrible business this is

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always you know sort of my ideaas you

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know capitalism and competition are

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antonyms um capitalist is someone who

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accumulates Capital world of perfect

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competition is a world where all the

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capital gets competed away so uh you're

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opening a restaurant business no one

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wants to invest because you just lose

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money so you have to tell some

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idiosyncratic narrative and you will say

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something like well we're the only

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British food restaurant in paloalto so

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it's British paloalto and uh and of

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course that's too small a market because

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people may be able to drive all the way

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to Mountain View or even Meno Park um

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and there probably are no people who eat

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nothing but British food at least no

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people who are still

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alive and so so that is um that's that's

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a sort of a fictitiously narrow Market

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um there's there's sort of a Hollywood

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version of this where uh the way movies

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always get pitched is you know okay it's

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like a college football star you know uh

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joins an elite group of hackers to um to

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catch the shark that killed his

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friend um sorry and so that's now that

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is a movie that has not yet been

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made but um but but the question is is

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is that the right category or is the

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correct category it's just another movie

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in which case you know there are lots of

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those it's super competitive incredibly

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hard to make money no one ever makes

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money in Hollywood uh doing movies or

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it's really really

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hard and so you always have this

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question about

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does the intersection does is it real

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does it make sense does it have value

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that one should ask and of course there

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are startup versions of this where you

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and the the sort of the bad really bad

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versions you just take a whole series of

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buzzword sharing mobile social apps you

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combine them and you have some kind of

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uh narrative and whether or not that's a

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real business or not uh is is uh um is

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it's generally a bad sign so it's it's

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almost this pattern recognition when you

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have this rhetoric of the sort of

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intersections um it it it generally does

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not work the something of somewhere is

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really mostly just the nothing of

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nowhere and it's like the Stanford of

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North

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Dakota uh one of a kind but it's not

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Stanford um so let's look at the

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opposite the opposite lie is um if you

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are uh let's say uh the uh the search uh

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company that's down the street from here

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and has about a happy 66% market share

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um and uh is you know is completely

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dominant in the search Market um Google

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has not just almost never describes

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itself as a search engine these days um

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and instead it uh it describes itself in

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all these different ways so it sometimes

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says it's an advertising company so if

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it was search you'd say wow this this

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like it's it's it has this huge market

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share that's really really crazy it's

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it's like a incredible Monopoly it's

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much bigger than it's much a much more

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robust Monopoly than Microsoft ever had

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in the 90s maybe that's why it's making

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so much money um but if you uh if you

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say it's an advertising Market you could

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say well there's search advertising is

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17 billion and that's part of uh online

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advertising which is much bigger and

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then you know all us advertising is

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bigger and then by the time you get to

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Global advertising that's close to 500

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billion and so you're talking about 3

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and a half% so um a tiny part of uh of

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this much larger

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market um

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or if you don't want to be an

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advertising company you can always say

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that you're a technology

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company

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um and so

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um sorry let me see um and so the and

play11:43

and so um and and the technology Market

play11:47

is something like a one trillion Doll

play11:48

Market and the narrative that you tell

play11:51

as Google in the in the technology

play11:52

Market is um well we're competing with

play11:55

all the car companies with our

play11:56

self-driving cars we're competing with

play11:58

app apple on TVs and iPhones uh we're

play12:02

competing with Facebook we're competing

play12:04

with Microsoft on um on Office Products

play12:07

we're competing with Amazon on cloud

play12:09

services and so we are in this giant

play12:12

technology Market where there's

play12:13

competition in every direction uh you

play12:16

you look and uh no we're not the

play12:17

Monopoly the government's looking for

play12:19

and we should not get regulated in any

play12:21

way whatsoever and so I think one has to

play12:23

always be super aware that there are

play12:26

these uh these very powerful incentives

play12:29

to uh to distort the nature of these

play12:31

markets one way or or the

play12:33

other so um you know the the the

play12:36

evidence of narrow markets in the uh in

play12:39

the tech industry is um is if you

play12:42

basically just uh if you look at sort of

play12:45

the some of the big tech companies Apple

play12:48

Google Microsoft Amazon um they just um

play12:52

they've just been building up cash for

play12:55

um year after year and you have these

play12:57

incredibly High profit margins and I

play12:59

would I would say that the the one of

play13:01

the reasons the tech industry in the US

play13:04

has been uh has been so successful

play13:07

financially is because it's it's prone

play13:09

to creating all these Monopoly like

play13:11

businesses and that's that's um and it's

play13:14

reflected uh by the fact that these

play13:16

companies just accumulate so much cash

play13:18

they don't even know what what to do

play13:19

with it Beyond a certain point um and

play13:22

so so let me say um let me say a few

play13:26

things about uh about how to how to

play13:29

build a monopoly and I think uh I think

play13:31

the one of the sort of very

play13:34

counterintuitive ideas that comes out of

play13:36

this Monopoly a thread is that um you

play13:40

want to go after small markets if you're

play13:43

a

play13:44

startup um you know you want to get to

play13:47

Monopoly you're starting a new company

play13:48

you want to get to Monopoly um Monopoly

play13:51

is you have a large share of a market

play13:53

how do you get to a large share of a

play13:55

market you start with a really small

play13:57

market and you take over that whole

play13:59

market and then uh and then over time

play14:01

you find ways to expand that market in

play14:04

in concentric circles and uh the thing

play14:06

that's always a big mistake is going

play14:09

after a giant market on uh on day one

play14:12

because that's typically evidence that

play14:15

um that you somehow haven't defined the

play14:16

categories correctly that and it's it

play14:19

normally means that there's going to be

play14:20

too much competition in one way or

play14:22

another and so I think almost all the

play14:25

successful companies uh in Silicon

play14:27

Valley had some model of starting with

play14:31

small markets and expanding and you know

play14:35

if you take Amazon you start with you

play14:38

start with you know just um a bookstore

play14:41

we have all the books in the world so

play14:43

it's it's a it's a it's a better

play14:45

bookstore than anybody else has in the

play14:46

world when it starts in the 90s it's

play14:48

online there's things you can do you

play14:49

can't do before and then you gradually

play14:51

expand into all sorts of different forms

play14:54

of e-commerce and other things beyond

play14:56

that um you know eBay you start with Pez

play15:00

dispensers you move on to beanie babies

play15:03

and eventually uh it's it's all these

play15:06

different um auctions for all these

play15:08

sorts of different Goods um and uh and

play15:11

what was very counterintuitive about

play15:13

what's very counterintuitive about many

play15:14

of these companies is they often start

play15:16

with markets that are so small that

play15:18

people don't think um they don't think

play15:20

that they're uh valuable at all when

play15:22

when you get

play15:24

started um the the PayPal version of

play15:27

this was uh was you we started with uh

play15:31

with power sellers on eBay which was

play15:33

about 20,000 people when when we first

play15:36

saw this happening in December of 99

play15:38

January 2000 right after we launched uh

play15:41

there was a sense that uh that these

play15:43

were all um it was such a small Market

play15:45

it was terrible we thought these were

play15:47

terrible customers to have it's just

play15:48

people selling junk on the internet why

play15:50

in the world do we want to be going

play15:52

after this Market but um but you you

play15:54

know you there was a way to get a

play15:56

product that was much better for

play15:57

everybody in that market you could um

play15:59

and we got to something like 25 30% you

play16:02

know Market penetration in two or 3

play16:04

months and you got some lockin you got

play16:06

brand recognition and you're able to to

play16:08

build the business from there so um so I

play16:11

always think these um these these very

play16:13

small markets are are quite underrated

play16:16

uh the Facebook version of this I always

play16:17

give is that uh you know the initial

play16:20

Market at Facebook was 10,000 people at

play16:22

Harvard it went from Zer to 60% market

play16:25

share in 10 days that was a very

play16:27

auspicious start um the way this gets

play16:29

analyzed in Business Schools is always

play16:32

um that's ridiculous it's such a small

play16:33

Market it can't have any value at all

play16:35

and so I think the business school

play16:36

analysis of Facebook early on or of uh

play16:40

PayPal early on or of eBay early on is

play16:43

that the markets were perhaps so small

play16:45

as to have uh almost no value uh and

play16:49

they they would have had little value

play16:50

had they stayed small but it turned out

play16:52

there were ways to then grow them

play16:53

concentrically and that's what made them

play16:55

uh that's what made them so valuable um

play16:58

now I think the opposite version of this

play17:00

is always where you have super big

play17:02

markets and um and I there's so much so

play17:06

many different things that went wrong

play17:07

with all the clean tech companies in the

play17:09

last decade but uh but one one theme

play17:13

that ran through almost all of them was

play17:15

they all started with massive markets

play17:17

and every clean tech PowerPoint

play17:19

presentation that one saw in the Years

play17:21

2005 to 2008 which was sort of the clean

play17:24

tech bubble in in Silicon Valley started

play17:27

with we're in the energy Market we're in

play17:29

a market that's measured in hundreds of

play17:30

billions or trillions of dollars and um

play17:33

and then you know once you're sort of a

play17:35

a minnow in a vast ocean um that's not a

play17:39

good place to be that means that you

play17:41

have tons of competitors and you don't

play17:43

even know who all the competitors are

play17:45

and so you want to be you know you want

play17:47

to be a one-of-a-kind company where it's

play17:49

the only one in a small ecosystem you

play17:52

don't want to be the fourth online pet

play17:54

food company you don't want to be the

play17:56

10th thinfilm solar panel company you

play17:58

don't want to be the H hundredth

play17:59

restaurant in paloalto um you know

play18:01

restaurant industry is a trillion dollar

play18:02

industry so if you do a market size

play18:04

analysis you'd include restaurants are a

play18:06

fantastic business to go into and it's

play18:08

often large markets large existing

play18:11

markets typically mean that you have uh

play18:14

tons of competition very very hard to uh

play18:17

to differentiate so the first very

play18:20

counterintuitive int uh idea is is to go

play18:23

after small markets often markets that

play18:25

are so small people don't even notice

play18:28

them they think they make sense that's

play18:30

where you get a foothold and then um and

play18:32

then if those markets are able to expand

play18:34

you can scale into a big Monopoly

play18:38

business um you know um a second uh sort

play18:42

of there's sort of several different uh

play18:44

characteristics of these Monopoly

play18:46

businesses um that I like to um focus on

play18:49

and U there's probably no no sort of

play18:51

single formula to it and I I always

play18:54

think that uh that in technology there's

play18:57

always a sense that you know the history

play18:58

of technology is such that every every

play19:00

moment happens only once and so you know

play19:03

the next Mark Zuckerberg won't build a

play19:05

social network the next uh uh the next

play19:07

Larry Page won't be building a search

play19:09

engine the next uh Bill Gates won't be

play19:10

building an operating system and if

play19:12

you're copying these people you're not

play19:14

learning from them but it's it's and so

play19:16

um there is always um these very unique

play19:19

businesses that are doing something

play19:21

that's not been done before end up um

play19:25

end up having the potential to be a

play19:26

monopoly if you're you know the the the

play19:28

opening the opening line in um Anna

play19:30

kenina is that all happy companies sorry

play19:34

all happy families all happy families

play19:36

are alike all unhappy families are

play19:38

unhappy in their own special way and the

play19:41

opposite is true in business where I

play19:42

think all happy companies are different

play19:45

because they're doing something very

play19:46

unique all unhappy companies are alike

play19:49

because they fail to escape the

play19:50

essential sameness that is competition

play19:53

and so so one one sort of characteristic

play19:56

of a monopoly technology company is some

play19:59

sort of proprietary technology um my

play20:02

sort of crazy somewhat arbitrary rule of

play20:04

thumb is you want to have a technology

play20:07

that's an order of magnitude better than

play20:09

the next best thing so Amazon had over

play20:12

10 times as many books I it's maybe not

play20:13

that Hightech but you figure out a way

play20:15

to sell 10 times as many books in an

play20:17

efficient online way you know PayPal the

play20:19

alternative for PayPal was using um was

play20:22

using uh uh checks to uh send money on

play20:25

eBay took 7 to 10 days to clear PayPal

play20:27

could do it more than 10 times as fast

play20:30

so you want to have some sort of very uh

play20:33

very powerful Improvement in some um on

play20:37

in some order maybe an order of

play20:38

magnitude Improvement on some key

play20:40

Dimension um of course you know if you

play20:42

if you actually come with something

play20:43

totally new um it's it's it's just like

play20:47

an infinite Improvement so I would say

play20:48

the the iPhone was the first smartphone

play20:50

that worked and so that's you know

play20:52

that's like maybe maybe not infinite but

play20:54

it's sort of definitely an order of

play20:56

magnitude or more of an improvement so I

play20:58

think uh the the technology is designed

play21:01

to give you a massive Delta over over

play21:04

the next the next best thing I think um

play21:09

I think there often are network effects

play21:11

that can kick in that really help the

play21:13

thing that's very um and these these

play21:15

lead to monopolies over time the thing

play21:16

that's very tricky about Network effects

play21:19

is uh they're often uh they're often

play21:21

very hard to get started and so um so

play21:24

even though everyone understands how

play21:26

valuable they are uh there's always this

play21:28

incredibly tricky question why is it

play21:30

valuable to the first person who's doing

play21:32

something um economies of scale uh if

play21:35

you have something that with very high

play21:37

fixed costs very low marginal costs uh

play21:40

that's typically a monopoly like

play21:42

business and then um then there's this

play21:44

thing uh of of branding uh which is sort

play21:47

of like just uh this idea that gets

play21:49

lodged in people's brains I I never

play21:51

quite understand how branding Works uh

play21:54

so I never invest in companies where

play21:55

it's just about branding but it is I

play21:57

think a real phenomenon that uh that

play21:59

creates uh that creates real value I

play22:02

think one of the things I'm going to

play22:03

come back to this a little bit towards

play22:05

the end but one of the things that's

play22:06

very striking is that software

play22:09

businesses are often um are for some

play22:12

reason uh very good at some of these

play22:14

things they're especially good at the

play22:15

economies of scale part because uh the

play22:18

marginal cost of software is zero and so

play22:20

if you get something that works in

play22:22

software um it's often significantly

play22:25

better than the existing solution and

play22:28

then you have these tremendous economies

play22:29

of scale and you can scale fairly

play22:31

quickly so even if the market start

play22:33

small um you can grow your business

play22:35

quickly enough to uh stay um stay at the

play22:39

same size as the growing market and uh

play22:41

and maintain the sort of Monopoly uh

play22:44

Power now the critical thing about these

play22:47

monopolies is um is it's it's not enough

play22:50

to have a monopoly for just a moment the

play22:53

critical thing is to have one that lasts

play22:55

over time um and so you know in s value

play22:58

is always the sort of idea that you want

play22:59

to be the first mover and I I always

play23:01

think it's it's in some ways um the

play23:04

better framing is you want to be the

play23:05

last mover you want to be the last

play23:07

company in a category those are the ones

play23:10

that are really valuable Microsoft was

play23:12

the last operating system at least for

play23:14

many decades uh Google is the last

play23:16

search engine Facebook will be valuable

play23:18

if it turns out to be the last social

play23:20

networking site and um and one way to

play23:23

one way to think of this uh last mover

play23:26

uh value is this IDE that most of the

play23:28

value in these companies exists far in

play23:31

the future um if you do sort of a

play23:33

discounted cash flow analysis of a

play23:35

business you look at you have sort of

play23:37

all these profit streams you have a

play23:39

growth rate the growth rate is much

play23:41

higher than the discount rate and so

play23:42

most of the value exists far in the

play23:45

future I did I did this exercise at

play23:47

PayPal in March of 2001 we had been in

play23:50

business for about 27 months and um and

play23:54

we sort of had you know the growth rate

play23:56

was 100% a year we were disc counting

play23:58

future cash flows by about

play23:59

30% and it turned out that about 3/4 of

play24:03

the value of the business as of 2001

play24:06

came from cash flows in years 2011 and

play24:09

Beyond and um and whenever you do the

play24:11

math on any of these tech companies you

play24:13

get to an answer that's something like

play24:15

that so if you are trying to analyze any

play24:17

of the tech companies in Silicon Valley

play24:19

Airbnb Twitter uh Facebook um any

play24:22

emerging internet companies all the ones

play24:24

in y combinator um the math tells you

play24:28

that 34 80 85% of the value is coming

play24:32

from cash flows in years 2024 and Beyond

play24:35

it's very very far in the future and uh

play24:38

and so one of the things that uh we

play24:39

always overvalue in Silicon Valley is

play24:42

growth rates and we undervalue

play24:44

durability because uh growth is

play24:46

something you can measure in the here

play24:48

and now and you can always track that

play24:50

very precisely um the question of

play24:52

whether a company's still going to be

play24:54

around a decade from now that's actually

play24:56

what what dominates the value equation

play24:59

and that sort of is a much more uh

play25:00

qualitative sort of a thing and so if if

play25:04

we um if we went back to this idea of

play25:06

these characteristics of Monopoly uh

play25:08

proprietary technology Network effects

play25:10

economies of scale um um you can think

play25:13

of these these characteristics as ones

play25:16

that exist at a moment in time where you

play25:18

capture a market and take it over but

play25:20

you also want to think about are these

play25:22

things going to last over time and so

play25:24

there's a Time Dimension to all these

play25:26

characteristics so Network effects often

play25:28

have a great time element where as the

play25:30

network scales the network effects

play25:32

actually get more robust and so if you

play25:33

have a network effect business that's

play25:35

often one that uh um can become a um a

play25:39

bigger and stronger Monopoly over time a

play25:43

proprietary technology is always a

play25:45

little bit of a tricky one so you want

play25:46

something that's an order of magnitude

play25:48

better than uh the state-of-the-art in

play25:51

the world today and that's how you get

play25:53

people's attention that's how you

play25:55

initially break through but then um you

play25:57

don't want to be superseded by somebody

play25:59

else and so there are all these areas of

play26:01

innovation where there was tremendous

play26:03

Innovation but no one made any money so

play26:05

uh you know dis Drive Manufacturing in

play26:07

the 1980s um you could you could do a

play26:10

better dis build a better dis Drive than

play26:12

anybody else you could take over the

play26:14

whole world and two years later someone

play26:16

else would come along and replace yours

play26:18

and in the course of 15 years you got

play26:21

vastly improved disc drives so it had

play26:23

great benefit to Consumers but um it

play26:26

didn't actually help the people who

play26:27

started these companies and so there's

play26:29

always this uh question about having a

play26:32

huge breakthrough in technology but then

play26:34

also being able to say explain why uh

play26:37

yours will be the last breakthrough uh

play26:40

or at least the last breakthrough for a

play26:41

long time or will you make a

play26:42

breakthrough and then you can keep

play26:44

improving on it at a quick enough Pace

play26:46

that no one can ever catch up so if you

play26:49

have a structure of um structure of the

play26:52

future where there's a lot of innovation

play26:55

and other people will come up with new

play26:57

things in the thing you're working on um

play26:59

that's great for society it's um it's

play27:01

actually not that good for your business

play27:03

typically um and then um economies of

play27:06

scale uh I talked about so so I think

play27:09

anyway so I think this last mover thing

play27:10

is is very critical I'm always tempted

play27:13

you know I don't want to overdue the

play27:14

chess analogies but you know the first

play27:16

mover in chess is someone who plays

play27:18

white white is about a one-third of a

play27:20

pawn Advantage so there's a small

play27:22

advantage to uh going first you want to

play27:24

be the last mover um who who wins the

play27:27

game so there always the Kappa Blanca

play27:29

world champion chess champion Kappa

play27:31

Blanca line you must begin by studying

play27:33

the end game and and I do think that's

play27:36

um well I wouldn't say that's the only

play27:38

thing you should study I think this uh

play27:40

the sort of perspective of asking these

play27:42

questions why will the still be the

play27:43

leading company 10 15 20 years from now

play27:46

is a uh is a really critical one to to

play27:48

try to think

play27:50

through let me um let me sort of uh I

play27:54

want to sort of go in two slightly other

play27:56

directions with this uh monop versus

play27:58

competition idea and I think um so I

play28:01

think this is the the central idea in my

play28:05

mind for for business for starting

play28:06

business for thinking about them and U

play28:08

and there are some some very um

play28:10

interesting perspectives I think it

play28:11

gives on the whole you know on the whole

play28:14

history of innovation and technology and

play28:16

science because um you know we we've

play28:19

lived through um we've lived through um

play28:23

you know 250 300 years of incredible

play28:26

technological progress in you know many

play28:28

many different domains uh you know steam

play28:31

engine to Railways

play28:34

to telephones Refrigeration household

play28:37

appliances um you know the computer

play28:40

Revolution Aviation all sorts of

play28:43

different areas of technological

play28:44

innovation and then there's sort of

play28:46

analogous thing that one can say about

play28:48

science where uh we've lived through

play28:50

centuries of of enormous amounts of

play28:52

innovation in in in science as well and

play28:56

um and the the thing that I think um

play28:59

people always miss when they think about

play29:02

these things is um is that um because X

play29:05

and Y are independent variables um some

play29:08

of these things can be extremely

play29:10

valuable Innovations but uh the people

play29:13

who invent them who come up with them do

play29:15

not get rewarded for this and uh and

play29:17

certainly if you go back to um you need

play29:19

to create X dollars in value you capture

play29:22

y% of X I would suggest that the history

play29:25

of science has generally been one why is

play29:28

0% across the board the scientists never

play29:31

make any money um they're always duded

play29:33

into thinking that they live in a just

play29:35

universe that will reward them for their

play29:37

work and for their inventions and this

play29:39

is probably the fundamental delusion

play29:41

that uh that scientists tend to suffer

play29:43

from in our in our society um and and

play29:47

even in technology there are sort of

play29:49

many different areas of Technology where

play29:51

um where there were great innovations

play29:53

that created tremendous value for

play29:55

society but uh but but people uh did not

play29:58

uh did not actually capture uh that much

play30:01

of the of the value and so I think there

play30:03

is this sort of whole uh history of um

play30:07

science and technology that can be told

play30:10

from the perspective of how much value

play30:12

was actually captured and um and

play30:16

certainly there are entire sectors where

play30:18

people didn't capture anything so you

play30:21

you're the smartest physicist of the

play30:23

20th century you come up with special

play30:25

relativity you come up with general

play30:26

relativity you don't get to be a

play30:28

billionaire you don't even get to be a

play30:29

millionaire um it just it just somehow

play30:32

doesn't work that way um the railroads

play30:35

incredibly valuable most of them just

play30:37

went bankrupt because it was too much

play30:39

competition um right Brothers um you fly

play30:42

the first plane you don't make any money

play30:44

and so I think there is sort of the

play30:45

structure to these industries that's uh

play30:47

that's very important um and I think the

play30:50

uh the thing that's actually rare are

play30:52

the success cases most the so it's

play30:54

actually you really think about the

play30:56

history in this in this 250 years sweep

play30:58

um it's unus Y is almost always 0% it's

play31:01

always zero in science it's almost

play31:03

always in in technology and so it's very

play31:05

rare where people made money you know

play31:08

the early uh the late uh 18th early 19th

play31:10

century the first Industrial Revolution

play31:12

was the textile mills you had the steam

play31:14

engine you sort of automated things and

play31:16

you had these Relentless improvements

play31:18

that people improved efficiency of

play31:20

textile factories of manufacturing

play31:22

generally at a clip of 5 to 7% every

play31:25

year year after year decade after decade

play31:27

you had 60 70 years of tremendous

play31:30

improvement from 1780 to

play31:34

1850 um but even in 1850 most of the

play31:37

wealth in Britain was still held by the

play31:40

landed aristocracy uh the workers didn't

play31:42

you know the workers didn't make that

play31:43

much the capitalists didn't make that

play31:45

much either it was all competed away

play31:46

there were hundreds of people running

play31:48

textile factories it was an industry

play31:50

that just uh um the structure of the

play31:53

competition prevented people uh from

play31:55

from making any money um and so I think

play31:58

there are in my mind there probably are

play32:00

only two broad categories in the entire

play32:03

history of the last 250 years where

play32:05

people have actually uh come up with new

play32:08

things and made money doing so um one is

play32:11

uh these sort of vertically integrated

play32:13

complex monopolies which people uh did

play32:16

build in the Second Industrial

play32:17

Revolution at the end of the 19th and

play32:19

start of the 20th century and so this

play32:22

was like Ford it was the vertically

play32:23

integrated oil companies like Standard

play32:25

Oil um and what these vertically

play32:27

integrated monopolies uh typically

play32:29

required was this very complex

play32:31

coordination you got a lot of pieces to

play32:33

fit together in just the right way uh

play32:35

when you assembled it you had a

play32:37

tremendous Advantage this is actually uh

play32:40

done surprisingly little today and so I

play32:42

think this is sort of a business form

play32:44

that um when people can pull it off is

play32:47

very valuable it's typically fairly

play32:49

Capital intensive uh we live sort of in

play32:52

a in a in a culture where it's very hard

play32:54

to get people to buy into anything

play32:57

that's super complicated and takes very

play32:59

long to build uh but I you know when I

play33:01

sort of think about my colleague Elon

play33:03

Musk from PayPal success with Tesla and

play33:06

SpaceX uh I think the key to these

play33:09

companies was the complex vertically

play33:11

integrated Monopoly structure they had

play33:14

so if you sort of look at Tesla or

play33:16

SpaceX if you ask you know was there

play33:18

sort of a single breakthrough I mean

play33:20

they certainly innovated on a lot of

play33:22

Dimensions I don't think there was a

play33:23

single 10x breakthrough in battery

play33:26

storage or

play33:27

you know maybe working on some things on

play33:29

rocketry but they hadn't there was no

play33:31

sort of single massive breakthrough but

play33:34

what was really impressive was

play33:35

integrating all these pieces together

play33:38

and um and doing it in a way that was

play33:39

more vertically integrated than most of

play33:41

their competitors so Tesla you also

play33:43

integrated The Car Distributors so they

play33:45

wouldn't uh steal all the money as has

play33:47

happened with the rest of the car

play33:48

industry in the US or SpaceX um you

play33:51

basically uh pulled in all the

play33:54

subcontractors um uh where most of the

play33:56

large aerospace companies have single

play33:58

Source subcontractors that are able to

play34:00

sort of charge Monopoly profits and make

play34:03

it very hard for the integrated

play34:05

aerospace companies to make money um and

play34:07

so uh vertical integration I think is

play34:09

sort of a a very underexplored modality

play34:12

of of technological progress that people

play34:15

uh would uh would do well to look at

play34:17

more and then I think there is there is

play34:20

something about software itself that's

play34:22

very very powerful um software has these

play34:25

incredible economies of scale these low

play34:27

marginal costs and there is something

play34:29

about the world of bits as opposed to

play34:31

the world of atoms where you can often

play34:33

get very fast adoption and and the fast

play34:36

adoption is critical to capturing and

play34:38

taking over markets because even if you

play34:40

have a small Market if the adoption rate

play34:42

is too slow there'll be enough time for

play34:44

other people to enter that market and

play34:46

compete with you whereas if you have a

play34:48

small to midsized Market and have a fast

play34:50

adoption rate you can uh take over this

play34:52

market and so and so I think this is one

play34:54

of the reasons Silicon Valley has done

play34:56

so well and why software has been this

play34:59

phenomenal industry and what I what I

play35:01

would suggest uh what I would want to

play35:03

leave you with is there are sort of

play35:04

these different rationalizations people

play35:07

give for why certain things work and why

play35:10

certain things don't work and I think

play35:12

these rationalizations always obscure

play35:14

this question of um creating X Dollar in

play35:17

value and capturing y% of X so the

play35:20

science rationalization we're always

play35:22

told is that the scientists aren't

play35:23

interested in making money they're doing

play35:25

it for charitable reasons and that

play35:27

you're not a good scientist if you're

play35:29

motivated by money and I'm not even

play35:30

saying people should always be motivated

play35:33

by money or something like this but I I

play35:35

think we should we should be a little

play35:36

bit more critical of this as a

play35:38

rationalization we should ask is this a

play35:41

rationalization um uh to obscure the

play35:44

fact that y equals 0% and the scientists

play35:46

are operating in this uh in this sort of

play35:49

world where all the uh all the

play35:51

Innovation is effectively competed away

play35:53

and they can't capture any of it

play35:54

directly and then the the software

play35:57

Distortion that often happens is because

play36:00

people are making such vast Fortunes in

play36:02

software we infer that this is the most

play36:04

valuable thing um in the world being

play36:06

done full stop and so if people at

play36:09

Twitter make uh billions of dollars it

play36:11

must be that Twitter is worth far more

play36:13

than anything Einstein did um and um and

play36:17

uh and what that sort of rationalization

play36:19

tends to obscure is again that X and Y

play36:21

are independent variables and there are

play36:23

these businesses where you capture a lot

play36:25

of X and there others where you don't

play36:27

and so uh and so I do think um I do

play36:29

think the history of innovation has been

play36:31

this uh this history where uh the the

play36:35

the the microeconomics the structure of

play36:36

these industries has mattered a

play36:38

tremendous amount and when um and um and

play36:41

and and there is sort of this this story

play36:44

where some people have made vast

play36:45

fortunes because they were in Industries

play36:47

with the right structure and other

play36:49

people uh made uh nothing at all because

play36:52

um because they were in these sort of

play36:54

very competitive things and we shouldn't

play36:56

just rationalize that way I think it's

play36:57

worth understanding this better and then

play36:59

finally let me come back to this this uh

play37:03

this sort of overarching theme for this

play37:05

talk this competition is for losers idea

play37:08

which um is always this provocative way

play37:10

to to title things because we always

play37:13

think of the losers as the people who

play37:15

are not good at competing we think of

play37:17

the losers as the people who are um slow

play37:20

on the sports on the track team in high

play37:22

school or who do a little bit less well

play37:24

on the standardized tests um and don't

play37:26

get into the right schools and so we

play37:28

always think of losers as people who

play37:30

can't compete um and I want us to really

play37:33

rethink and and revalue this and

play37:36

consider whether it's possible that

play37:38

competition itself um is off that we we

play37:41

we're sort of it's not just the case

play37:43

that we don't understand this Monopoly

play37:44

competition dichotomy intellectually so

play37:47

sort of been talking about why why you

play37:49

wouldn't understand it intellectually

play37:50

because um people lie about it it's

play37:52

distorted we have all these uh the

play37:55

history of innovation rationalizes

play37:57

what's happening in all these very very

play37:58

strange ways but I think it's more than

play38:00

just an intellectual blind spot I think

play38:02

it's also a psychological blind spot

play38:04

where we find ourselves you know very

play38:06

very attracted to competition in in one

play38:08

form or another um we find it reassuring

play38:11

if other people do things the word ape

play38:14

already in the time of Shakespeare meant

play38:15

both primate and imitate uh and there is

play38:18

something about human nature that's

play38:19

deeply mimetic imitative aplike

play38:22

sheeplike leming like cd-like um and

play38:26

it's this very very problematic uh thing

play38:28

that uh we need to always think through

play38:30

and and try to overcome and and there is

play38:32

always this question about um

play38:35

competition um as as a form of

play38:38

validation where we we go for things

play38:40

that lots of other people are going for

play38:43

and um it's not that there is wisdom in

play38:45

crowds it's not when lots of people are

play38:46

trying to do something that that's proof

play38:48

of uh it being valuable I think it's

play38:50

when lots of people are trying to do

play38:51

something that is often um that is often

play38:54

proof of insanity there 20,000 people a

play38:56

year who moved to Los Angeles to become

play38:58

movie stars about 20 of them make it um

play39:01

I think the Olympics are a little bit

play39:02

better because you have a you know um

play39:05

you can sort of figure out pretty

play39:06

quickly whether you're good or not so

play39:07

it's there's a little bit less of a dead

play39:09

weight loss to society um you know um um

play39:13

you know your your the sort of

play39:15

educational experience at a place uh the

play39:17

the the pre- Stanford educational

play39:19

experience um there's always sort of a

play39:20

non-competitive characterization where I

play39:22

think most of the people in this room

play39:24

had machine guns they were competing

play39:25

with people with bows and arrows so um

play39:27

it wasn't exactly a parallel competition

play39:29

when you were in junior high school and

play39:30

high school um there's always a question

play39:33

does the tournament make sense as you

play39:34

keep going and this is uh and so um

play39:37

there is always this question if people

play39:39

go on to grad school or post

play39:41

post-doctoral educations does the

play39:43

intensity of the competition really make

play39:45

sense there's the uh the you know

play39:47

classic uh Henry Kissinger line that uh

play39:49

um describing his fellow faculty at

play39:52

Harvard that the uh um the battles were

play39:55

so ferocious because the Stakes were so

play39:57

small describing sort of Academia and um

play40:00

and and you sort of think on one level

play40:01

this is a description of insanity you

play40:03

know why would people fight like crazy

play40:05

when the stakes are so small but it's

play40:07

also I think simply a function of the

play40:09

logic of the situation when it's imp

play40:12

really hard to differentiate yourself

play40:13

from other people when the differences

play40:15

are when the objective differences

play40:17

really are small then uh you have to uh

play40:19

compete ferociously to maintain uh a

play40:22

difference of one sort uh or another um

play40:25

that's often more imagin than real

play40:27

there's always sort of a personal

play40:29

version of this that I I tell where um

play40:31

you I was sort of hyper hypert tracked I

play40:34

you know my e8th grade Junior High

play40:35

School yearbook one of my friends wrote

play40:37

in you know I know you'll get into

play40:38

Stanford in four years as a sophomore I

play40:41

sort of went into went into Stanford

play40:42

four years later uh at the end of High

play40:44

School uh went to Stanford Law School uh

play40:47

you know ended up um at a big law firm

play40:49

in uh New York uh where from the outside

play40:52

everybody wanted to get in on the inside

play40:54

everybody wanted to leave um

play40:57

and and you had um and it was this very

play40:59

strange Dynamic where after I uh sort of

play41:01

realized this was maybe not the best

play41:03

idea um and I left after 7 months and 3

play41:06

days you know one of the people down the

play41:08

hall from me uh told me um it's really

play41:11

reassuring to see you leave Peter I had

play41:12

no idea that it was possible to escape

play41:14

from Alcatraz which of course all you

play41:16

had to do was go out the front door and

play41:18

not come back but um but so much of

play41:21

people's identities got wrapped up in um

play41:24

in winning uh these competitions

play41:26

that they somehow lost sight of what was

play41:28

important what was valuable you know

play41:31

competition does make you better at

play41:33

whatever it is that you're competing on

play41:35

because when you're competing you're um

play41:36

comparing yourself with the people

play41:38

around you you're figuring out how do I

play41:40

beat the people next to me how do I do

play41:41

somewhat better at whatever it is

play41:43

they're doing and you will get better at

play41:45

that thing I'm not I'm not questioning

play41:47

that I'm not denying that but um but it

play41:49

often comes at this tremendous price

play41:52

that uh you stop asking some bigger

play41:54

questions about what's truly important

play41:56

and truly valuable and so I would I

play41:58

would say that uh don't always go

play42:00

through the tiny little door that

play42:01

everyone's trying to rush through maybe

play42:03

go around the corner and go through the

play42:05

vast gate that no one's taking thank you

play42:07

very

play42:09

much I guess time for you want to take a

play42:13

few questions

play42:16

or

play42:19

S oh yeah uh people want to take I'll

play42:22

take a few questions we have a few

play42:23

minutes time yeah go ahead um since yeah

play42:27

as you mentioned earlier often

play42:28

monopolies and competition often look

play42:30

similar because of the narratives people

play42:32

tell the Nares we tell

play42:33

ourselves do you have any ways to easily

play42:36

determine the difference when you're

play42:37

looking at an idea or evaluating your

play42:39

own idea well I I'd say the question I'm

play42:42

I always try to focus on is what is the

play42:44

actual market so not what's The

play42:45

Narrative of the market because you can

play42:47

always tell a fictional story about a

play42:48

market that's much bigger or much

play42:49

smaller but what is the what is the real

play42:52

objective market so it's always yeah you

play42:54

always try to figure it out and you real

play42:56

people have incentives to powerfully

play42:58

distort these

play42:59

things yeah so which of the aspects of

play43:02

monopolies that you mentioned would you

play43:03

say software comp like Google

play43:06

Excel um well they have uh they have

play43:09

Network effects with the the ad Network

play43:12

they had proprietary technology that

play43:14

gave them the initial lead because they

play43:15

had the the page rank algorithm which

play43:17

was uh sort of an order of magnitude

play43:19

better than any other search search

play43:20

engine you have economies of scale uh

play43:24

because of the need to store you know

play43:25

all these different uh sites and at this

play43:27

point you have brand so Google has all

play43:28

four maybe maybe the proprietary

play43:30

technology is somewhat weaker at this

play43:32

point but definitely it had all four and

play43:34

maybe three and a half out of four now

play43:37

yeah how does this apply to paler and

play43:39

second what's you like second is what

play43:42

but with the iPhone uh headph oh this is

play43:45

that's that's a that's a there sort of a

play43:47

set of companies that are doing

play43:48

different copycat payment systems on on

play43:50

mobile phones there's square there's

play43:52

PayPal sort of they have just they just

play43:54

have sort of different shapes that's how

play43:55

they differenti themselves one as a

play43:56

triangle one is a square um and so you

play43:59

know um maybe at some point the Apes

play44:01

will run out of shapes or something like

play44:02

that but um but I think um no palente

play44:05

here we we started with a focus on on um

play44:07

the um intelligence Community which is

play44:09

small submarket um you had a proprietary

play44:12

technology that used a very very

play44:14

different approach um uh where it was

play44:17

focused on the human um computer uh

play44:22

synthesis rather than the uh uh sub

play44:24

substitution which I think is the

play44:25

dominant Paradigm so there's a whole set

play44:27

of things I would say on the on the

play44:28

market approach and the and the

play44:30

proprietary

play44:32

technology uh yes um we have design

play44:36

thinking methodology and uh lean uh

play44:39

startup thinking um which is used to

play44:42

mitigate Risk by not creating things

play44:44

that people don't want but how do young

play44:45

innovators uh have inspiration to create

play44:48

complex systems that last can you repeat

play44:51

the question yeah so the question is um

play44:53

what do I think about lean startups uh

play44:55

um itera of thinking where you get uh

play44:57

feedback from people uh versus uh

play44:59

complexity that may not work so I I am

play45:03

personally quite skeptical of all the uh

play45:04

Lean Startup methodology I think the the

play45:07

the really great companies um did

play45:09

something was sort of somewhat more of a

play45:12

Quantum Improvement that really

play45:14

differentiated them from everybody else

play45:16

um they they typically did not do

play45:19

massive you know customer surveys the

play45:22

people who ran these companies uh

play45:24

sometimes not always suffered from Wild

play45:25

forms of bers so they were not actually

play45:27

that influenced not that easily deterred

play45:29

by what other people thought or told

play45:30

them to do um so I I do think we're

play45:33

we're way too focused on um iteration as

play45:36

a modality and not enough on trying to

play45:39

um have um you know um a virtual ESP

play45:43

link with the public and figuring it out

play45:44

ourselves um I I would say that uh let

play45:48

me see um I would say that uh the um I

play45:52

I'm not quite the risk question I think

play45:53

is always a very tricky one because

play45:55

there are um you know there there it's

play45:59

it's not it's often I think it's often

play46:01

the case that you don't have enough time

play46:03

to really mitigate risk if if you're

play46:05

going to take enough time to figure out

play46:06

what people want um you often will have

play46:09

missed the boat by then um and um and

play46:12

then of course there's always the risk

play46:14

of of doing something that's uh that's

play46:17

not that uh significant or meaningful so

play46:19

you know you you could say a track in um

play46:22

in law school is a low-risk track from

play46:25

one perspective persective it may still

play46:27

be a very highrisk track in the sense

play46:28

that maybe you not um have a high risk

play46:30

of not doing something meaningful with

play46:31

your life so we have to think about risk

play46:34

in these uh in these very complicated

play46:36

way I think risk is for of this very uh

play46:38

complicated concept yes you talking

play46:40

about the last move Advantage but then

play46:41

doesn't that imply that there's already

play46:43

competition to begin with on chest piece

play46:45

on the chest

play46:46

board um yeah so there's always this

play46:49

terminology thing so I would I would say

play46:51

that uh there are uh there are

play46:54

categories in which people sort of are

play46:56

bundle together I would say the Monopoly

play46:59

businesses were in in effect they really

play47:01

were a big first mover in some sense you

play47:04

could say you could say Google was not

play47:05

the first search engine there were other

play47:07

search engines before but on one

play47:09

dimension they were dramatically better

play47:11

than everybody else so they were the

play47:12

first one with page rank with with sort

play47:14

of a automated approach um Facebook was

play47:17

not the first uh social networking site

play47:19

my friend Reed Hoffman started one in

play47:21

1997 they called it social net so they

play47:23

already had the name social network

play47:26

uh in the name of their company s years

play47:28

before Facebook uh their idea was that

play47:30

it was going to be this virtual cyers

play47:32

space where I'd be a dog and you'd be a

play47:34

cat and we'd have all these different

play47:35

rules about how we'd interact with each

play47:36

other in this virtual alternate reality

play47:39

Facebook was the first one to get real

play47:40

identity so it was so I'd say I hope

play47:43

Facebook will be the last social

play47:45

networking site it was the first one in

play47:47

a very important Dimension people often

play47:49

would not think of it as the first

play47:50

because they' sort of lump all these

play47:51

things together I have one more question

play47:54

okay one more question let's take one

play47:55

here uh if you're theoretically someone

play47:58

who uh worked at Golden Sachs out of

play48:00

college and left out six months and is

play48:02

now studying computer science at

play48:03

Stanford uh how would you recommend

play48:05

rethinking uh of

play48:12

that um you know I don't I don't have a

play48:15

I don't have a great um I'm not great at

play48:18

the Psychotherapy stuff so I don't I

play48:19

don't quite know how to I don't quite

play48:22

know how to uh how to solve this that

play48:23

there are these um you know there are

play48:25

these very odd studies they've done on

play48:27

people who go to um business school

play48:29

there's one they've done at Harvard

play48:30

Business School where um it's sort of

play48:32

the anti- asger um personality we have

play48:35

people who are super extroverted uh

play48:37

generally have low convictions uh few

play48:40

ideas and you have sort of a hot house

play48:42

environment you put all these people in

play48:43

for two years and at the end of it uh

play48:46

they systematically end up the largest

play48:48

cohort systematically ends up doing the

play48:50

wrong thing they try to catch the last

play48:51

wave you know uh 1989 everyone at

play48:54

Harvard tried to work for Mike milin it

play48:55

was one or two years before he went to

play48:56

jail for all the junk bond stuff they

play48:59

were never interested in Silicon Valley

play49:00

OR tech except for 99 2000 when they

play49:02

timed the dotcom bubble peing perfectly

play49:06

um they did uh and then you know 05 to7

play49:08

was housing uh private Equity stuff like

play49:10

this so so I do think um I do think this

play49:14

uh tendency for us to see competition as

play49:17

validation is um is very deep um I don't

play49:21

think there's some any sort of easy

play49:23

psychological formula to uh to avoid it

play49:26

so I don't I don't quite know how to uh

play49:28

what sort of therapy to to recommend but

play49:31

um but my my my first my first starting

play49:34

point which is only like it's maybe 10%

play49:36

of the way is to never underestimate how

play49:38

big a problem it is we always think this

play49:40

is something that afflicts other people

play49:41

so it's easy for me to point to people

play49:43

in Business Schools or people at Harvard

play49:44

or people on Wall Street I think it

play49:47

actually does afflict all of us to a

play49:48

very profound degree we always think of

play49:50

advertising as things that work on other

play49:51

people how who are all these stupid

play49:53

people who fall for All Those ads on TV

play49:56

they obviously work to some extent and

play49:58

they work to a disturbing extent on all

play49:59

of us and it's something we we all

play50:01

should work to

play50:02

overcome thank you very

play50:04

[Applause]

play50:24

much

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