Why We’re NOT Living in a Simulation
Summary
TLDRCe script explore les défis du scepticisme, notamment l'hypothèse de la simulation, et présente des arguments philosophiques contre cette idée. Il examine les théories de Moore, le contextualisme et l'argument de Putnam sur les 'cerveaux dans des vases', pour montrer que les croyances sceptiques sont souvent limitées et ne remettent pas en question notre connaissance quotidienne du monde.
Takeaways
- 🧐 Le scepticisme questionne la validité de toutes nos croyances, y compris la possibilité d'une réalité simulée.
- 🤔 L'hypothèse de la simulation soulève la question de la connaissance et de la réalité, et si nous pouvons vraiment connaître quelque chose.
- 😵 Le philosophe René Descartes a exploré l'idée d'un 'démon malin' qui pourrait nous induire en erreur sur l'existence de tout ce que nous croyons savoir.
- 📚 L'argument de G.E. Moore soutient que la connaissance directe de notre existence physique, comme avoir des mains, est plus solide que tout scénario sceptique.
- 🕵️♂️ L'approche contextuelle du savoir, telle que défendue par David Lewis, soutient que ce qui compte comme 'savoir' dépend du contexte dans lequel la déclaration est faite.
- 🧐 L'argument de Putnam contre le scepticisme utilise une théorie de la langue qui nécessite un lien causal entre les mots et les objets qu'ils désignent.
- 💡 L'idée que nous ne pouvons pas être dans un scénario sceptique sans pouvoir le référencer dans une langue qui n'est pas celle de la simulation est un point clé de l'argument de Putnam.
- 🤷♂️ Le scepticisme peut être vu comme un exercice intellectuel plutôt qu'une croyance sérieuse qui affecte notre façon de vivre et de prendre des décisions.
- 📉 L'argument de Putnam suggère que les définitions de la vérité et de la référence de nos déclarations sont indépendantes de la possibilité d'une simulation.
- 🤔 Les arguments anti-sceptiques abordés dans le script soulignent la complexité de la connaissance et de la réalité, et la difficulté de douter de tout ce que nous croyons savoir.
- 🎯 Le script invite à une réflexion plus approfondie sur la nature de la connaissance et les limites de la raison, en s'appuyant sur des arguments philosophiques classiques.
Q & A
Qu'est-ce que l'argument de l'hypothèse de la simulation et en quoi consiste le problème philosophique qu'elle soulève?
-L'hypothèse de la simulation est une idée selon laquelle notre réalité pourrait être une illusion, simulée par une intelligence supérieure. Elle soulève le problème philosophique de la connaissance et de la réalité, questionnant jusqu'à quel point nous pouvons être certains de la vérité de ce que nous percevons.
Quel est l'argument de René Descartes sur le 'mauvais démon' et comment cela se rapporte au scepticisme?
-L'argument du 'mauvais démon' de Descartes soutient que nous sommes potentiellement trompés par un démon qui nous fait croire que tout ce que nous croyons est faux. Cela se rapporte au scepticisme en ce que cela suggère que nous ne pouvons être certains de rien, y compris de notre propre existence.
Quel est l'argument de G.E. Moore contre le scepticisme et comment fonctionne-t-il?
-L'argument de Moore contre le scepticisme est basé sur la justification relative des croyances. Il soutient que nos croyances ordinaires, comme celle de l'existence de nos mains, sont plus justifiées que la possibilité d'un scénario sceptique, comme être dans une simulation.
Comment le contextualisme de David Lewis aborde-t-il le problème du scepticisme?
-Le contextualisme soutient que ce que nous considérons comme étant 'connu' dépend du contexte. Ainsi, les défis sceptiques, bien qu'abstraits, sont souvent inappropriés dans la plupart des contextes de la vie quotidienne et de la plupart des pratiques scientifiques.
Quelle est la différence entre le scepticisme externe et le scepticisme total?
-Le scepticisme externe remet en question notre connaissance de la réalité extérieure, tandis que le scepticisme total remet en question notre connaissance de tout, y compris nos états internes et notre propre existence.
Quel est l'argument de Hilary Putnam sur les 'cerveaux dans des bacs' et comment il est-il utilisé pour contrer le scepticisme?
-Putnam utilise l'argument des 'cerveaux dans des bacs' pour soutenir qu'il n'y a pas de causalité nécessaire entre les mots et les objets qu'ils désignent. Il soutient que même si nous étions dans une simulation, nos croyances ne seraient pas fausses car elles seraient évaluées selon les normes de référence de cette simulation.
Comment l'argument de Moore est-il considéré comme une réponse pragmatique au scepticisme?
-L'argument de Moore est pragmatique car il soutient que nous ne pouvons pas douter de l'existence de nos mains de manière significative, car cela affecterait notre façon de nous comporter et d'interagir avec le monde. Ainsi, la connaissance de l'existence de nos mains est plus forte que la possibilité d'un scénario sceptique.
Quels sont les arguments mathématiques qui soutiennent que nous sommes probablement dans une simulation?
-Certaines personnes utilisent des arguments mathématiques pour soutenir que la probabilité de vivre dans une simulation est élevée, en se basant sur l'idée que si les civilisations technologiques atteignent un certain stade, elles pourraient simuler des réalités alternatives, augmentant ainsi les chances que nous en soyons une.
Quelle est la différence entre le scepticisme ancien et le scepticisme moderne?
-Le scepticisme ancien, souvent incarné par les philosophes grecs, visait à encourager à suspendre le jugement et à vivre avec l'incertitude. Le scepticisme moderne, en revanche, explore davantage les implications de la possibilité d'être trompés dans nos connaissances et perceptions.
Quels sont les arguments contre l'argument de Moore selon lesquels la connaissance de l'existence de nos mains est plus forte que celle d'un scénario sceptique?
-Certains critiques soutiennent que l'argument de Moore ignore la théorie de la connaissance de base, où les faits spécifiques sont justifiés par des principes plus larges. Ainsi, remettre en question une méthode globale de connaissance remettrait en question tous les faits spécifiques acquis par cette méthode.
Quelle est la position du réalisme direct selon laquelle nous ne pouvons pas être dans un scénario sceptique?
-Le réalisme direct soutient que nous ne pouvons pas être dans un scénario sceptique car nos définitions de la vérité et de la référence de nos déclarations sont séparées de la réalité même si nous étions dans une simulation. Ce point de vue soutient que nos croyances et nos connaissances sont valides dans le contexte de notre réalité actuelle.
Outlines
🤔 Le défi sceptique et l'hypothèse de la simulation
Le paragraphe introduit le spectre du scepticisme en se demandant si tout ce que nous croyons savoir est en réalité faux, comme dans l'hypothèse d'une réalité simulée où nos perceptions sont contrôlées par un ordinateur. Il évoque l'idée que les philosophes ont débattu de la possibilité d'une telle simulation, et bien qu'elle soit troublante, de nombreux arguments philosophiques existent pour soutenir que nous ne sommes pas dans une simulation, ou que même si nous l'étions, cela n'aurait pas les conséquences désastreuses souvent associées. L'objectif est d'explorer ces arguments et de montrer que le scepticisme est plus complexe qu'il n'y paraît.
👐 Réponse à l'argument du scepticisme par G.E. Moore
Ce paragraphe présente une réfutation du scepticisme par l'anglais G.E. Moore, qui soutient que nous avons des preuves constantes de l'existence de notre monde extérieur, comme la connaissance préalable de nos mains. Moore utilise un argument modus tollens pour montrer que, même si nous ne savons pas que nous ne sommes pas dans un scénario sceptique, nous savons que le monde extérieur existe. Il soutient que la preuve de l'existence de nos mains est plus solide que celle de la possibilité d'un scénario sceptique, et que notre croyance en la réalité de nos mains est plus justifiée que celle d'un doute sceptique.
🔍 Le contextualisme face au scepticisme
Le contextualisme est introduit comme une réponse au scepticisme, où la connaissance est vue comme étant relative au contexte dans lequel elle est affirmée. Selon les contextualistes comme David Lewis, ce que nous considérons comme connu peut varier en fonction du contexte. Cela signifie que les attentes de ce qui constitue la connaissance diffèrent d'un domaine à l'autre et que le scepticisme, en élargissant le champ des 'alternatives' à considérer, peut rendre la connaissance impossible. Le contextualisme permet de comprendre que la connaissance est un concept flexible et que le scepticisme n'est pas toujours pertinent dans nos évaluations de connaissance quotidiennes.
🧠 Le scénario du 'cerveau dans un bac' et l'argument de Putnam
Ce paragraphe explore l'argument de Putnam contre le scepticisme, utilisant le scénario hypothétique du 'cerveau dans un bac'. Putnam soutient que si nous étions effectivement des cerveaux dans des bacs, nos mots et concepts ne se référeraient qu'à des objets à l'intérieur de la simulation, et non à l'extérieur. Ainsi, nos croyances ne seraient pas rendues fausses par la simple existence d'une simulation. Putnam conclut que nous ne pouvons pas être dans un scénario sceptique de cette nature, car cela voudrait dire que nos définitions de vérité et de référence sont complètement séparées de la réalité, ce qui est logiquement impossible.
🕊️ L'intuition derrière les arguments anti-sceptiques
Dans ce dernier paragraphe, l'auteur conclut en soulignant l'intuition sous-jacente à tous les arguments anti-sceptiques présentés, à savoir que les implications du scepticisme sont limitées. Il mentionne que l'argument de Putnam ne tient que si nous ne pouvons pas sortir de la simulation, ce qui donnerait un espoir de découvrir la réalité. L'auteur invite les spectateurs à réfléchir sur la portée de ces arguments et à débattre de leur validité dans les commentaires, tout en reconnaissant que le scepticisme peut toujours être une position philosophique importante à considérer.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Scepticisme
💡Simulation
💡Connaissance
💡Mensonge universel
💡Doute
💡Céphalée déconnectée
💡Argument de Moore
💡Contextualisme
💡Brain in a Vat
💡Inférence
💡Causalité
💡Référence
Highlights
Le scepticisme philosophique explore l'idée que toutes nos croyances peuvent être fausses, ce qui remet en question la possibilité de connaître quoi que ce soit.
L'argument de Moore soutient que nos croyances ordinaires, comme celle de l'existence de nos mains, sont plus justifiées que les hypothèses sceptiques.
Le scepticisme antique visait à libérer les individus du besoin de juger, en acceptant l'incapacité à prendre des décisions définitives.
Les scénarios sceptiques comme celui du 'cerveau dans une fût' questionnent la réalité de notre perception et de notre connaissance de l'extérieur.
L'argument de Putnam contre le scepticisme soutient qu'une langue doit être connectée causalement aux objets qu'elle désigne.
Si nous étions des cerveaux dans des fûts, nos concepts et nos mots ne se référeraient pas à l'extérieur du simulateur, mais à l'intérieur.
Le contextualisme en épistémologie soutient que ce que nous considérons comme connaissance dépend du contexte dans lequel la revendication est faite.
L'analyse de Putnam suggère que nous ne pouvons pas même formuler la notion d'être dans un scénario sceptique de manière cohérente.
L'argument de Putnam remet en question la possibilité de se trouver dans un scénario sceptique sans pouvoir le référencer dans notre langage.
Le scepticisme peut être vu comme un défi limité, qui n'affecte pas la majorité de nos croyances ou de nos actions quotidiennes.
L'idée que nous ne pouvons pas avoir de connaissance absolue est moins radicale que celle selon laquelle nous ne pouvons pas avoir de connaissance du tout.
La théorie de la connaissance de Moore soutient que nous avons des preuves constantes que nos mains existent, ce qui les rend plus justifiées que n'importe quelle hypothèse sceptique.
Le contextualisme propose que les seuils de connaissance varient selon les situations, ce qui peut expliquer notre incapacité à douter de certaines croyances.
L'argument de Putnam peut être interprété comme montrant que nous ne sommes pas dans un scénario sceptique, ou que nous ne pouvons pas y penser de manière cohérente.
Le scepticisme peut être vu comme un défi intellectuel qui, selon certains arguments, a un impact limité sur notre compréhension du monde et de la réalité.
L'idée que nous sommes tous vivant une vie simulée n'affecte pas notre capacité à référencer des objets réels dans notre langage quotidien.
L'argument de Putnam suggère que les définitions de vérité et de référence de nos déclarations sont indépendantes de la possibilité d'être dans une simulation.
Transcripts
if you seek truth it is necessary to
doubt all things at least once imagine
for a moment that everything you thought
you knew was completely wrong that the
world around you does not really exist
it is an illusion you are actually a
disembodied brain hooked up to a
computer that is simulating every one of
your perceptions and Sensations this is
the sort of philosophical problem that
gives people existential nightmares
famously dayart said that ideas like
this were completely intolerable the
notion that every single proposition
that you believe is actually false is
incredibly disturbing it raises the
horrifying possibility that we cannot
know anything perhaps knowledge itself
is an illusion and we are all
perpetually a drift in a pool of our own
ignorance maybe everyone is irreparably
living a lie however despite its
persistence and popularity many
philosophers have argued that we are
definitely not living in a simulation or
that even if we did this would not have
the disastrous effects often associated
with it and it is these arguments that
we will look at today get ready to learn
how you can do philosophy just by waving
your hands why the simulation hypothesis
might be impossible and so much more
first remember that this is not a
definitive or final Guide to the issue I
only covering a fraction of the
literature that is out there but I hope
to convince you by the end of this video
that skepticism is a bit more
complicated than it first appears but
with that out of the way let's get
started one a skeptic's guide to
skepticism in the 1999 sci-fi film The
Matrix the protagonist Neo discovers
that his entire life has been one big
delusion whereas he thought he was
working a classic office job and living
a relatively ordinary existence in '90s
America it turns out that he and every
other human in our world was actually in
a simulation and that the real world has
fallen to robot overlords Who harvest
our heat for energy in a way that turns
out to not be economical but hey hum
we're philosophers not pedants when
people talk about skeptical scenarios
they normally mean that we might be in
the position of Neo prior to waking up
all of our beliefs about the external
world might be false and we don't even
know it some skeptical scenarios go even
further than this in the case of
decart's evil demon we are deceived even
about our internal states with our sole
certainty being that we exist hence I
think therefore I am other proposed
skeptical scenarios include the idea
that we are a brain inat or in some
never-ending dream what these situations
have in common is that they express the
possibility either that all of our
beliefs are false or that all of our
beliefs about the external world are
false there are further arguments that
can be had about the likelihood of
different skeptical scenarios some
people have tried to make mathematical
arguments that it is not just possible
but probable that we are living in a
simulation with varying degrees of
plausibility but for this video I just
want to focus on this basic idea that
all of our beliefs about the world could
be false part of what makes a skeptical
scenario so philosophically compelling
is that it essentially extends something
that we all know to be true to its
logical extreme that we humans can make
mistakes in our perceptions and our
judgments most of us have misremembered
something or misheard someone or gone
through the embarrassing experience of
mistaking a total stranger for your
friend and jumping on their back as a
joke only to end up apologizing
profusely to a very kind Albanian man
the point is that everyone makes
mistakes and all a skeptic has to do is
say well you could have made a mistake
to every one of our beliefs each time we
will have to concede that it is possible
at which point the skeptic can clap his
hands and say fantastic well you could
be mistaken about everything then the
skeptical scenarios are partly just to
make this idea Vivid some ancient Greek
Skeptics did not rely on this idea and
instead took the one by one approach to
doubting everything that we thought we
knew and different philosophers have
very different AIMS in proposing
skeptical scenarios some have argued
they imply we have no real knowledge at
least about the external World others
have been more modest and said that it
means we don't have certain knowledge of
anything a lot of ancient Greek Skeptics
had a very different in mind they wanted
people to give up judgment entirely for
their own good and live in peace with
the idea that we could never really make
conclusive judgments about anything so
why worry ourselves about it however
it's important to recognize that these
are all very separate claims the idea
that we can have no certain knowledge is
much more minimal than the idea we
cannot have Knowledge full stop if you
take knowledge as a precursor to action
the second type of skeptic basically
paralyzes us whereas the first simply
reminds us that we should always be open
to the possibility that we are wrong
however certain we may feel so the
stakes of the debates vary wildly
between which skeptic you are talking to
for our purposes we shall Define the
skeptical challenge as the idea that all
of our beliefs could be false and that
as a result we have no knowledge we will
further subdivide this into the external
skeptical challenge the idea that we
cannot have knowledge about the external
world and the total skeptical challenge
the idea that we cannot have knowledge
about anything we will mainly focus on
the external skeptical challenge simply
because it is the most popular and it's
the one that people spend the most time
talking about but with that groundwork
laid let's Plunge in with our first
response to the skeptic and it's
something that most philosophers have
wanted to shout at the top of their
lungs at one point or another if you
want to see more videos like this then
please consider supporting me through my
patreon or my email list the links are
in the description two stuff obviously
exists I remember once having a
discussion about skeptical scenarios
with a group of my friends at school and
one of them said something that always
stuck with me in response to someone
claiming that the table in front of them
might not exist they said yeah but I
trust the table more than I trust you he
meant it as a tongue-and-cheek joke but
many years later I found a much more
sophisticated version of this very same
argument in the work of English
philosopher GE Moore according to Mo
when someone raises a skeptical scenario
they are essentially inferring from the
possibility of that scenario to the idea
that knowledge about the external world
might not exist this is a
straightforward modus ponin argument one
if we don't know that we are not in a
skeptical scenario then we don't know
that the external World exists two we
don't know that we're not in in a
skeptical scenario conclusion we don't
know that the external World exists
however for every modus ponent argument
there is a corresponding modus tolan's
argument and here more employs a
startlingly simple one the first premise
is the same but then the arguments begin
to diverge wildly again in propositional
form one if we don't know that we are
not in a skeptical scenario then we
don't know that the external World
exists two if I know that my hand exists
I know that the external World exists
three I know that my hand exists
conclusion one I know that the external
World exists conclusion two I know that
I'm not in a skeptical scenario take a
moment just to let that argument rest
because at first it can come across a
bit like a joke but there's actually
kind of something in this what more is
touching upon here is something I call
the relative justification of beliefs
for instance imagine that you find out
that two of your beliefs contradict one
another you cannot believe both at the
same time otherwise Rogue logicians will
come to your house and burn down your
shed so you are forced to abandon one of
your beliefs which one do you pick well
most of us would say that we pick
whichever belief we are most sure of or
is most justified if one belief has
incontrovertible evidence that it is the
case and the other is mere speculation
then it makes sense to hold on to the
evidenced belief Mo's contention is that
my belief that I have hands is much
stronger and much more Justified than
any belief that a skeptical scenario is
possible in some nebulous sense there
are two ways that you can pitch this
argument you can either say that your
belief that your hands exist is
genuinely more Justified than your
belief in the possibility of some
skeptical scenario or you can say that
on a pragmatic level you are simply
stuck with the belief that your hands
exist and by extension you are also
stuck with the idea that the external
World exists the epistemological version
of this argument is closer to the one
more presents he says that we have
constant reaffirming evidence that our
hands exist every time they drift into
view I see that they exist every time I
pick something up I gain another piece
of evidence that they exist with every
hug or hold or handshake I accumulate
ever more justification that my hands
are real by contrast what is my evidence
that I might be living in a skeptical
scenario the words of a few people in a
seminar Hall and some notion of
possibility that philosophers spend ages
arguing about anyway now it might be
that these arguments are really
persuasive and the idea of possibility
at play is genuinely robust and reliable
but the question is do I have more
evidence for the possibility of the
skeptical scenario than I do that my
hands exist Moore says the answer is no
and his point is definitely worth
considering even even if there are
criticisms we can make of it for
instance you might be what some call a
foundationalist about epistemology that
is you might think a properly
constructed theory of knowledge must
justify specific facts on wider
principles so you can justify that the
sky is blue based on the reliability of
inductive reasoning but you cannot quell
any doubts about inductive reasoning
based on the fact that the sky is blue
similarly if you throw into doubt an
overall method of gaining knowledge you
simultaneously throw into doubt all of
the specific pieces of knowledge
acquired by that method many famous
philosophers thought in this way
including dayut and if you share their
view then Mo's argument will seem
understandably quite fishy however there
is another angle we can take we could
first say that we are beholden to keep
our set of beliefs consistent so we must
reject either the possibility of a
skeptical scenario or the knowledge
about our hands we can then argue that
even if you try to doubt the existence
of your hands you will ultimately
probably fail to do so I may say that
I'm not sure that my hands exist but
this implies certain things it means
that I would have hesitation when I go
to type at my computer or when I go to
pick something up or when I go and give
someone a hug I might feel gentle
surprise when my hands drift into Vision
but in practice none of these things
happen even for avowed Skeptics likewise
I can say that I doubt the existence of
an external world but I certainly don't
act like it in fact it's an open
question what acting like you doubted
the existence of the world would even
look like would it entail a sort of
apathy proportional to How likely I
think the non-existence of the world is
if I think I may live in a Sim ation
does that require that I treat my loved
ones as if they're computer programs the
point here is that it is sort of unclear
what a belief in a skeptical possibility
amounts to or how it would manifest in
our Behavior whereas it seems
essentially impossible to doubt the
existence of my hands to any meaningful
extent Beyond simply stating that I do
so from a pragmatic perspective it makes
a certain sense to say that we
involuntarily have a belief in our hands
and thus if we are presented with a
choice between accepting the possibility
of a skeptical scenario and the
knowledge that our hands EX exist we
have already rejected skepticism and
embraced hology of course there are many
criticisms you can make of Mo's argument
in either of these forms perhaps most
obviously you could question the idea
that you knowing your hands exist has
anything to do with the sense of
knowledge that a skeptic uses in fact
the next view we will consider does just
this three the contextualist imagine you
and I are having a conversation about a
mutual friend Jennifer she has told you
that on weekends her mother goes to the
bottom of her garden and eats bees that
is she grabs the insects puts them in
her mouth chews and swallows you
casually say did you hear Jennifer's mom
eats bees I am understandably not going
to take this at face value and I say do
you really know that Jennifer's mom eats
bees to which you reply of course
Jennifer told me but then I say yeah but
do you really know that Jennifer's mom
eats bees in response to this second
question you might go on second thoughts
I don't know that Jennifer's mom does
that Jennifer could have been lying or
she could have been mistaken here it
seems my repeated questioning has
changed your self assessment of your
position from the idea that you know
Jennifer's mom has these bizarre Apen
eating habits to conceding that you
don't know after all despite nothing
about the evidence having changed to
explain this phenomenon some
philosophers have proposed an analysis
of knowledge called contextualism
according to contextualists like David
Lewis whether we know something or not
is partly a matter of the context in
which we make the knowledge claim for
instance whereas imp pure mathematics we
might only say that we know something
when it has been proven in other fields
like biology we might say we know
something if the evidence very strongly
suggests it's true while still
acknowledging that some great discovery
tomorrow morning could blow our best
theories out of the water essentially
the contextualist views someone claiming
they know something as them saying I
have ruled out all the relative
alternatives to this being true but then
what counts as a relevant alternative is
context dependent this sounds very
abstract at first but we see it a lot in
our everyday speech for instance if if I
were to walk into a human biology lab
and claim that they did not really know
that all men are mortal because not
everyone has died yet I would get a lot
of strange looks from people in lab
coats and the field of biology would
emerge completely unscathed the
possibility that I am Immortal is simply
not relevant in this context but it is
immediately clear this can help us in
our fight against the skeptical scenario
when the skeptic tells us we cannot know
anything because we cannot know we are
not in a simulation they seem to be
using two very different definitions of
the word no on the one hand we have the
kinds of knowledge that are contextually
appropriate for our everyday actions and
even 99% of philosophy but on the other
we have a kind of knowledge that is
really only in use when we are dealing
directly with skepticism as a
philosophical issue this really takes
the sting out of the skeptical challenge
as I said in the last section the thing
that makes a skeptical scenario
philosophically distressing is the idea
that we can doubt all our beliefs just
in the same way that we can doubt that
we have heard someone correctly or that
we can doubt all of our research is
correct but for the textualist the
skeptical challenge is doing something
very different the situation they are
raising is so often completely
irrelevant to what we mean when we say
that someone knows something that in
almost every case it is an idol concern
and it certainly does not preclude
almost every type of knowledge this
reflects an intuition that a lot of
people have when someone raises the idea
that we are all living in a simulation
or being tricked by an evil demon namely
why does this matter and while this
might at first just seem like
anti-intellectualism the contextualist
really lends Ence to their view just
like my challenge to the biology lab the
skeptic is raising a concern that is so
outside the scope of our everyday
knowledge evaluations that it fails to
actively wound them we can look at the
skeptic and say yeah sure you're right
in a
sense but it's
not it's not really relevant is it this
touches on a similar point to the one I
was making earlier about struggling to
disbelieve in the existence of your
hands the skeptical scenario does not
seem to touch the justification for
believing in our hands because the
standards for us knowing that our hands
exist is very different to the kind of
absolute certainty the skeptic demands
of us sure the skeptic could respond to
this by saying that knowledge is not
contextual at all but is absolute and
implies total certainty that is in order
for us to know something we must believe
it to be true infallibly there is
certainly nothing wrong with the skeptic
doing this but it is a marked departure
from how we use the word no in our
everyday language and how we use it as a
basis for our actions in practice we do
not wait for infallibility before
ascribing knowledge or acting as if
something is true it just has to pass a
reasonable threshold for doubt and if
the contextualist is right then this
threshold might be very different in
different situations we might even have
a go at measuring these thresholds using
a methodology Frank Ramsey outlines in
his fantastic paper truth and
probability which he intended to measure
the strengths of beliefs but we can
repurpose it here imagine that I had to
stake something valuable on the claim
that a given statement was true and if
it turned out to be false then I lost
whatever valuable thing I wagered we
might estimate the thresholds for
knowledge in different situations on the
basis of how much value I'm willing to
bet on a proposition being true if based
on the evidence we are unwilling to bet
very much at all then we probably don't
know it in many contexts perhaps we
would only make knowledge claims in the
very loosest of situations like when
we're down the pub with some friends
however if we were justified in betting
our house then we probably do know this
proposition in a great number of
contexts even if it fall short of
absolute certainty we can then say that
the skeptic points out there are limits
to the extent we should bet on any
proposition since the possibility of a
skeptical scenario however remote means
they might all turn out to be false I'm
not saying this measuring system is
perfect it certainly wasn't designed
with this in mind but I hope it gives
you an intuitive feel for what
skepticism looks like on a contextualist
worldview it is still a legitimate
concern in some contexts but those
contexts are very limited and so we can
free ourselves of the constant need to
be beating back decart's demon resting
assured that in most scenarios the
skeptical challenge simply doesn't
matter but finally I want to move on to
what I think is one of the most
interesting arguments against skepticism
out there it is incredibly
philosophically and logically
sophisticated and even if you don't
think it's right it is undeniably cool
at least as far as any philosophical
argument can be considered cool you
might think that's a contradiction in
terms four brains in Vats and brains in
Vats a classic skeptical scenario people
often turn to is the idea of a brain in
a vat this is a very similar scenario to
the one depicted in The Matrix everyone
is not in fact living in the real world
but is instead plugged into a machine
simulating an experience for them with
no basis in external reality however
this particular thought experiment was
not originally put forward by a skeptic
but by the philosopher Hillary putam and
he used it in an anti- skeptical
argument that still has me scratching my
head years after I first read it in its
original form it is quite technical so
I'm going to scrub off some of its
complexity and instead keep only what is
needed to get most of the argument if
you are familiar with the original paper
I apologize in advance partner entire
Point rests on a certain theory about
language that a language must have some
form of causal connection with the
objects it refers to so if no one had
ever seen heard or encountered an
elephant then there would be no way to
refer to elephants in our language this
makes a certain amount of intuitive
sense after all with no causal story
about how a given object came to be
named by a certain word it seems
mysterious how the word would then refer
back to that object and even things that
at first look like exceptions to this
rule such as imaginary creatures do not
by their very nature refer to anything
out in the world so this is the first
idea that forms Pam's argument in order
to refer to something by means of our
language there must be a causal chain
linking that thing back to the word in
our language that refers to it secondly
he points out that if we were So-Cal
brains in Vats then we would be speaking
some form of vat language that is all of
our words and Concepts would not refer
to things outside the simulation that we
are a part of but things within the
simulation itself for instance in that
world my word hands does not refer to
hands outside of the simulation but
instead hands inside the simulation that
is when I speak the sentence I have two
hands inside the simulation I would be
totally correct additionally if I were
to say I am a brain and a vat that
statement would strictly speaking be
false because my word brain would not
pick out the brain outside of the
simulation but instead the brains inside
the simulation likewise for my word vat
and since using these reference it is
false that I am a brain and a vat my
statement would be incorrect even within
this context of a skeptical scenario
arguably all of the normal epistemic
ideas like knowledge verification truth
evidence Etc would all be defined in vat
language so the statements of the vat
people would be evaluable by those
standards not by the standards of the
world outside the Vats if you are
familiar with the disquotational theory
of Truth you can also put it in those
terms that's what putam does but I'm not
going to go into it here putam then asks
us to consider our world he points out
that just as the the simulation people
in our thought experiments could not
refer to things outside of their
simulation and so their beliefs weren't
actually rendered false by the fact they
were in a simulation so too we cannot be
in a skeptical scenario such that it
renders all of our beliefs incorrect In
fact we cannot even formulate the idea
that we are in a skeptical scenario in a
way that makes this possible in order to
do this we would need to be speaking the
language of people outside the
simulation and we cannot do that so
putam concludes that we cannot be in a
simulation by any meaning of the word
simulation that we can make sense of and
we cannot construct a New Concept that
truly encompasses the idea of a
skeptical scenario since if we were in
one we would by definition be causally
cut off from the world outside of the
supposed simulation you may want to go
through this argument a few times just
to check all the moving Parts I know
that I had to there are various
different conclusions people have tried
to draw from putnam's argument some have
argued that once we accept it it shows
that we genuinely are not in a skeptical
scenario whereas others have instead
taken it to mean that if we are in a
so-called skeptical scenario we cannot
talk about it or even think about it
coherently others have claimed that what
we really mean by a skeptical scenario
is that there might be a language within
which ours could be embedded which has
different truth standards but ones that
we would want to adopt if we ever came
across that language and then there is a
further debate around whether this
thought itself is intelligible I
obviously cannot go through all of these
possibilities here so I will leave you
guys to battle it out in the comments
what do you think we can logically take
from putnam's argument and to what
extent do you think it refus Ute aspects
of the skeptical challenge but whatever
its appropriate scope I think that
putnam's argument again gives a
logically sophisticated voice to this
underlying intuition that there is
something off about the skeptical
challenge expressed through his idea
that whether or not there is some sense
in which we might be in a simulation our
own definitions of truth and the
reference of our own statements are
entirely separate from that even if I am
in The Matrix when I say I have two
hands I am right because I'm not talking
about metaphysically mysterious hands
that may or may not exist in some higher
plane I've never visited I'm referring
to these hands right here and by the
standards of reference and existence
within this reality they bloody well
exist I've chosen to talk about these
three antis skeptical arguments as
opposed to the hundreds of others out
there because I think they best Express
this intuition I've been talking about
that whatever the consequences of the
skeptical possibility are they are
severely limited I also want to point
out that putnam's argument only works as
originally intended if you also
stipulate that nobody's going to wake up
up from the simulation because at that
point you would have a language in which
talking about the simulation would be
perfectly sensible but of course just
like in The Matrix if we could wake up
from the simulation that would give us
hope because it would present a
possibility where we can learn about the
actual world so that too takes a lot of
the bite out of the skeptical scenario
of course perhaps none of these
arguments hold the slightest bit of
water and an evil demon is fooling
people into believing that they do I
guess we'll never
know or will we I hope you enjoyed this
video I've been doing a lot on sort of
heavy topics at the moment and this was
a really nice change of pace it's just a
bit more light-hearted and if you want
more on this sort of analytic philosophy
and find distinctions between Concepts
then click here to watch me examine the
recent book by Robert sapolsky which
claims to show we have no Free Will and
furthermore that moral responsibility
does not exist and stick around for more
on thinking to improve your life
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