Unforgivable!! The Tragic tale of Air Algérie Flight 6289
Summary
TLDROn March 6, 2003, Air Algerie Flight 6289 crashed after an engine failure during takeoff from Tamanrasset Airport. The crew's inadequate preparation and non-adherence to standard procedures, such as not retracting the landing gear and the captain's sudden takeover, contributed to the tragedy. The flight, operated with a 20-year-old Boeing 737-200, had a takeoff weight close to its maximum, exacerbating the situation. Despite the captain's inexperience on the aircraft type, he failed to identify the problem and follow proper emergency protocols, leading to the aircraft's rapid descent and crash, resulting in 102 fatalities and a sole survivor.
Takeaways
- 😨 The flight was delayed due to a hydraulic pump issue, highlighting the importance of pre-flight checks and maintenance.
- ✈️ The aircraft was a 20-year-old Boeing 737-200, indicating that age can be a factor in aircraft performance and safety.
- 🔥 The left engine's high-pressure turbine blades fractured due to thermal fatigue, underscoring the need for regular engine inspections.
- 📉 The aircraft was close to its maximum takeoff weight, which could have affected its performance during the emergency.
- 🛫 The first officer was left to complete pre-flight preparations alone, emphasizing the necessity of teamwork and communication in flight operations.
- 👨✈️ The captain's lack of recent experience on the 737 and his distraction during the flight contributed to the inadequate handling of the emergency.
- 🛑 The crew failed to follow standard operating procedures, such as retracting the landing gear and using correct engine thrust settings after an engine failure.
- 🚨 The captain took control from the first officer without fully understanding the situation, demonstrating the potential dangers of non-standard cockpit responses during emergencies.
- 🔇 The lack of effective communication and crew resource management (CRM) in the cockpit was a significant factor in the accident.
- 🔥 The aircraft's impact and subsequent fire resulted in a high number of fatalities, illustrating the critical nature of quick and correct emergency response.
Q & A
What was the date of the Air Algerie flight incident described in the script?
-The incident occurred on the 6th of March, 2003.
What was the issue that caused the initial delay of the flight?
-The flight was delayed almost three hours due to a problem with the system B hydraulic pump.
How old was the Boeing 737-200 aircraft involved in the incident?
-The aircraft was almost 20 years old at the time of the incident.
What was the significance of the left engine's status in the story?
-The left engine had clocked over 30,000 hours, and its high number of hours, along with cracks in the high-pressure turbine blades, played a crucial role in the engine failure during the flight.
Why did the captain not attend the initial briefing with the rest of the crew?
-The captain did not attend the initial briefing because he arrived later when the issue with the hydraulic pump had been resolved.
What was the impact of the high temperature and high altitude on the aircraft's performance?
-The high temperature and high altitude affected the aircraft's performance by increasing the density altitude, which reduced the air density and thus the lift and thrust, requiring a higher speed and longer takeoff distance.
Why was the first officer preparing to operate as pilot flying for the first flight?
-The first officer was preparing to operate as pilot flying for the first flight because the captain arrived later and she had completed all the pre-flight preparations by herself.
What was the takeoff weight of the aircraft, and how did it compare to the maximum takeoff weight?
-The takeoff weight of the aircraft was 48,708 kilos, which was only about 800 kilos away from the aircraft's maximum takeoff weight.
What was the role of the purser in the cockpit, and why was his presence unusual?
-The purser, who is the most senior cabin crew member, was present in the cockpit during takeoff, which is unusual as his role requires him to be in the cabin to guard the main emergency exits and help organize any issues that might arise.
What was the sequence of events that led to the aircraft's stall and crash?
-The aircraft's stall and subsequent crash were caused by a combination of factors: an engine failure, the captain taking over controls without properly identifying the problem, failure to retract the landing gear, and the aircraft's rapid descent due to the captain maintaining a high pitch attitude without enough speed.
What were the recommendations made by the investigation after the accident?
-The investigation recommended increased Crew Resource Management (CRM) training for all pilots at Air Algerie, more focus on conformity of engine failure training, and the implementation of a better flight safety program to monitor and analyze flight data.
Outlines
🛫 Flight 6289: The Tragic Beginning
The script opens with a suspenseful narrative about the critical moments in a pilot's career, leading to a tragic incident on Air Algerie Flight 6289. The flight, operated by a Boeing 737-200, was scheduled for a domestic route with a crew of six, including two pilots. The aircraft, despite being nearly 20 years old, was in good technical condition. However, a delay due to a hydraulic pump issue and the absence of the captain from the pre-flight briefing set the stage for potential problems. The first officer, who had less experience on the 737 than the captain but was more senior, was left to handle pre-flight preparations alone, including calculating for the impact of high density altitude due to the airport's high elevation and increasing temperatures.
📞 Pre-Flight Preparations and Personal Distractions
The narrative continues with the first officer's diligent preparations, which included fueling the aircraft and calculating takeoff weights. Meanwhile, the captain's delayed arrival and subsequent engagement in unrelated conversations with the male purser, instead of assisting with preparations, raised concerns about the cockpit's focus on safety. The purser's decision to stay in the cockpit during takeoff, a deviation from standard procedures, is highlighted as a significant oversight. The script also touches on the purser's personal call home, which was misinterpreted by the media, and the boarding of passengers, one of whom would later be the sole survivor due to not fastening his seatbelt.
🛫 Departure and the Engine Failure
The script describes the commencement of the flight with the crew failing to adhere to standard operating procedures, including an incomplete pre-takeoff briefing. As the aircraft began its takeoff roll, an engine failure occurred in the left engine due to undetected cracks in the high-pressure turbine blades. The first officer's reaction to the yaw caused by the engine failure was to apply rudder correction, but the captain's delayed response and lack of situational awareness led to a series of critical errors.
🚨 Crisis Management and the Tragic Outcome
The engine failure led to a rapid series of events where the captain's decision to take control without understanding the situation, coupled with the crew's failure to retract the landing gear and manage the aircraft's configuration, resulted in a stall. The aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff, with the right wing and rear of the aircraft hitting the ground first, leading to a massive explosion and fire that claimed the lives of all but one on board. The sole survivor was the conscript who had not fastened his seatbelt and was ejected from the aircraft during the impact.
🔍 Investigation and Recommendations
The investigation into the accident revealed that the loss of engine thrust during a critical phase, failure to retract the landing gear, and the captain's unprepared takeover were the primary causes. Contributing factors included substandard flight preparation and poor crew resource management. The report recommended enhanced CRM training, standardized engine failure training, and the implementation of a robust flight safety program to monitor and analyze flight data to prevent similar incidents.
🌟 Conclusion and Call to Action
The script concludes with a personal reflection on the importance of following standard operating procedures, emphasizing their potential to save lives. It also encourages viewers to subscribe to the channel for updates, support the sponsor, or join the Patreon crew, highlighting the community aspect of the channel.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡GPWS
💡Density Altitude
💡Hydraulic Pump
💡JT8D-17A
💡First Officer
💡Engine Failure
💡CRM
💡EPR
💡V1, Rotate, V2
💡Stick Shaker
Highlights
The flight was delayed due to a hydraulic pump issue, highlighting the importance of pre-flight checks.
The aircraft was nearly 20 years old, emphasizing the need for rigorous maintenance on older planes.
The left engine's high hours and potential maintenance history played a crucial role in the incident.
The captain's late arrival and the first officer's solo pre-flight preparation underscored the impact of team coordination on flight safety.
The significance of density altitude and its effects on aircraft performance were discussed, indicating the need for accurate performance calculations.
The first officer's handling of pre-flight checks without the captain present raised concerns about procedural adherence.
The captain's inexperience on the 737 type compared to the first officer was noted, suggesting the importance of cockpit crew experience balance.
The purser's decision to stay in the cockpit during takeoff was criticized, highlighting the necessity of crew following their designated roles.
The departure briefing was interrupted, pointing to a lack of focus on critical pre-flight procedures.
The aircraft's takeoff weight was close to maximum, nearly 800 kilos away, which could have implications on performance.
The captain's decision to allow the purser to stay in the cockpit for takeoff was questioned, reflecting on the cockpit's sterile environment during critical phases.
The left engine's failure during takeoff due to turbine blade fractures was a pivotal moment in the flight's tragic outcome.
The crew's lack of preparedness for engine failure procedures was evident, showing the necessity of regular and effective training.
The captain's takeover of controls without understanding the situation was a critical error, demonstrating the importance of clear communication and role understanding in the cockpit.
The aircraft's configuration and handling post-engine failure indicated a stall, highlighting the crew's failure to manage the crisis effectively.
The sole survivor, ejected due to not wearing a seatbelt, illustrated the life-saving importance of following all safety protocols.
The investigation's recommendations for improved CRM training and flight safety programs underscored the need for ongoing aviation safety enhancements.
Transcripts
(suspenseful music)
- [Petter] As a pilot, you train your entire career
for that one moment, that one time
when fate, circumstance and bad luck comes together
to force you to save the day.
- [GPWS] Don't sink.
- But what happens if you, in that moment,
haven't prepared at all
and instead is completely caught off guard?
Stay tuned.
On the 6th of March, 2003, an Air Algerie crew
consisting of two pilots and four cabin crew
were preparing for a two-leg domestic flight
starting in Tamenghasset, Algeria
and then continuing via a short stop
in Ghardaia to their final destination, Algiers.
The flight had been delayed almost three hours
due to a problem with a system B hydraulic pump
but the Boeing 737-200 that they were gonna fly
was in an otherwise seemingly good technical shape.
It was a reasonably old bird
which had been delivered new to Air Algerie
back in December of 1983,
meaning that it was almost 20 years old
but it was maintained according to the maintenance handbook
and had no open defects on the day of the flight.
It was equipped with two
JT8D-17A ducted low bypass turbofan engines
which were both also in check
but had a lot of time on them
with the left engine having clocked over 30,000 hours
and the right close to 23,000.
And the status of that left engine
will come to play a really important role in this story.
Anyway, because of that delay,
the captain had not turned up
to the briefing along with the rest of the crew.
Instead, he would arrive a little bit later when the issue
with the hydraulic pump had been solved.
This meant that the first officer,
who had turned up on time, was left to complete all
of the pre-flight preparations by herself.
This included checking the weather for the two flights
which was fine but the temperature
was steadily getting higher
and since Tamanrasset Airport was situated quite high up
at an altitude of around 4,500 feet,
the density altitude was now becoming a factor.
Density altitude is the altitude
the aircraft performance is calculated on,
corrected for temperature
and it can have a major impact on,
for example, the climb or takeoff performance
as well as the landing distance required.
Because since air with higher temperature
has less density, it means that,
effectively, there's less air molecules
moving around the wings as well as through the engines,
causing less lift at a given speed
as well as less thrust.
This means that the aircraft in hot weather will need
to accelerate to a higher speed
using less available thrust before it can take off,
which will mean a longer takeoff distance
or less ability to carry weight.
With a delay, the aircraft would now depart
around 14:00 which was the hottest time of the day
with temperatures around 25°C.
Now that might not sound like much
but at this higher airport altitude,
it can actually make a big difference,
especially with a heavy aircraft.
But these calculations would have to be checked
before departure anyway and if the aircraft
was too heavy, well then, there was always the possibility
of just offloading some bags or cargo
so the first officer wasn't too worried about that.
She instead continued to look through
the briefing material and there was nothing in the NOTAMs
or flight plans that stood out to her.
The first officer was 44 years old
at the time of this flight and had amassed
a total flying time of 5,219 hours
of which 1,292 had been flown on the 737-200.
The captain that she was now waiting for
was 48 years old and had 10,760 hours
but he had only been a captain
on the 737 for around 1,100 hours.
So he actually had less experience
on the type than the first officer did.
And curiously, he was also operating
as a first officer on the Boeing 767
within the same company
and had been flying around 31 hours on that type
during the 30 days before this flight.
The first officer and the cabin crew
eventually started walking out to the aircraft
and also started preparing it for departure.
Naturally, since she was the only pilot there,
the first officer prepared herself
to operate as pilot flying for the first flight
and completed all of the initial setup
and walk around by herself.
She also asked the fueler to uplift 4.6 tons of fuel,
bringing the departure fuel up to close to 10 tons.
And this fuel, together with the 97 passengers
would bring the aircraft up to a takeoff weight
of 48,708 kilos which was only
about 800 kilos away from
the aircraft's maximum take-off weight.
That's worth keeping in mind.
Eventually the captain turned up
and agreed to allow the first officer to fly the first leg.
And while she continued to prepare everything,
instead of helping out, he instead started talking
to the male purser about some other unrelated stuff.
The purser had, by the way,
called home a bit earlier and told his 17-year-old son
that he would be home late due to some technical issues
they were having with the aircraft.
And this call would later be very misinterpreted
by the local press.
Anyway, eventually the maintenance team
had completed the work on the hydraulic pump
and the cabin crew started boarding the 97 passengers
who were scheduled for the flight.
In reality, there had actually been 100 passengers booked
but three of them had encountered
some type of document issues
during the checkin process
and had therefore been denied to travel.
Among the passengers who were allowed to board
were a 28-year-old conscript who had been assigned a seat
in the very last row in front of the aft galley.
He was not paying much attention
to the safety briefing that the cabin crew were giving
and instead decided to just relax
without fastening his seat belt,
something that will have
profound consequences for him later on.
In the cockpit, the first officer
had now completed the setup
and the performance calculations as well.
When the load sheet arrived, she had spotted several mistakes
including a one-ton discrepancy
between the calculated and actual fuel as well
as some passenger number mistakes
but that had now been corrected.
Since everything was now done,
she started the departure brief
by calling out the takeoff speeds
which included a V1 decision speed of 144 knots,
a rotation speed of 146 knots
and the single-engine climb speed, V2 of 150 knots.
Now these were quite high speeds
for a 737-200 but like I mentioned before,
that was due to both the high-density altitude
and weight of the aircraft.
Because of this, she also briefed
the captain that they would need to use
an engine-pressure ratio,
EPR of 2.18, which basically meant full thrust.
After she had called that out,
she tried to continue the brief but was interrupted by the captain
who wasn't interested in hearing the rest at all.
And instead he just continued
his conversation that he was having with the purser
who was still present in the cockpit for some reason.
This meant that the rest of the briefing
was never done and instead, the before-start checks
was eventually completed
and the first officer called up the tower
to advice that they were now ready for push and start.
And at some point around here,
the captain had also decided
that he wanted his friend, the purser,
to stay in the cockpit for the takeoff
so that they could continue their conversation.
This meant that the purser would now be occupying
the middle jump seat in the cockpit
instead of his cabin jump seat
as the aircraft started taxiing out.
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At time 14:08:36, the crew
had completed their push back and startup procedures
and received an instruction from the tower to start taxiing out
towards the holding point for Runway 02.
The surface wind was reported as 330°
at 12 knots, meaning a slight cross wind from the left
but otherwise the weather was absolutely perfect.
As the aircraft started taxiing out,
the first officer continued to try and follow
the standard operating procedures
but the captain and the purser
were seemingly not interested in that at all
and this just makes my blood boil.
Because first of all, in a Boeing 737,
there are four cabin crew members for a reason.
The idea is that they should guard
all of the main emergency exits
in case of an evacuation and also
to help organizing and deal
with any issues that might arise in the cabin.
The one in charge of that work is the purser
who is the most senior cabin crew
and he's also the number three
in the chain of command after the captain and the first officer.
So for the purser to choose
to stay in the cockpit during one of the most critical phases
of any flight is just completely unacceptable.
And secondly, from the start of the pre-flight briefing
and until we pilots complete
the last shutdown checklist of the day,
our focus must be solely on the safety of the flight.
Now can we chat a little bit
about unrelated stuff during the flight?
Well, of course we can, especially up in the cruise
but during the briefing and during
the sterile phases of flight, absolutely not.
And there are very good reasons for this.
If we look at what happened so far,
in this example, the fact that the departure briefing
was interrupted by the captain indicates that he didn't see
that briefing as having any great significance
but the problem is no matter how used
you might be with flying a specific departure,
dealing with an airport, the briefing forms
a hugely important role in providing focus
and facilitating crew resource management.
During the first light of the day,
we tend to always conduct an emergency brief
and touch drill all of the items
that needs to be done in case something goes wrong.
This will wake up the muscle memory
and bring any rusty procedures back into focus
and it will clarify the roles of each crew member
in case something unexpected happens.
This emergency briefing is then repeated again
in a shortened form during the taxi out
to make sure that this is the last briefing
that we hear before departure.
And on top of all of that,
there is also often special engine failure procedures
that differ between each airport
and must be followed in case an engine failure occurs.
These can be either company-specific
or airport-defined and in case
of Tamanrasset Airport, the procedure from Runway 02
was to climb straight ahead
to the TMS VOR
and then turn left to a heading of 239°
and climb to above the minimum sector altitude
of 5,036 feet.
None of that had been briefed
prior to the engine start
and as the aircraft was now taxiing out
towards the holding point,
the captain and the purser again ignored it
and instead just continued their private chat.
Obviously, we don't know
what the first officer was thinking at this point
as the aircraft was taxiing out
but I doubt that she was very impressed with it.
And even if she was mentally briefing herself
about how to fly the departure
and what to do in case of an emergency,
this would be of little help
if the captain who was the pilot in command
was not prepared and we will see
what I mean by that very soon.
Eventually, the aircraft reached the holding point
and at time 14:12:30, the first officer called up
the tower and advised them
that they were now ready for departure.
The tower controller responded
that they were cleared to line up and take off Runway 02
with a surface wind of 330° at 12 knots
and as soon as this was heard,
the crew verified that flaps one
was set for takeoff and the first officer
read back the clearance as they
started lining up on the runway.
Now what no one knew at this stage
was that inside of the left engine,
a big problem had already started developing.
Several small cracks had started
to form on the blades of the high pressure turbine
situated just behind the combustion chambers.
These cracks had been forming due to thermal fatigue
and had been covered with a layer of old coke
which is a type of black solid residue
formed when oil oxidizes and breaks down
from extreme temperatures.
And this had allowed the cracks to go unnoticed
and it is possible that they had started
to form after the last engine overhaul.
No one will ever really know.
In any case, the pilots knew nothing about that
and the captain now finished lining up
the aircraft with the center line
and moved the engine thrust levers
up to around 1.2 EPR to stabilize them.
The first officer called out stabilized
which prompted the captain
to then set take off thrust and the two engines
now roared into full thrust as the first officer called out,
"I have controls."
The aircraft started accelerating down the runway
and initially, everything looked completely normal.
The captain called out, "You have uh, 90, uh 100."
And then a few seconds later, "V1, rotate."
The first officer responded by rotating the aircraft
nice and slowly with around 3° per second
up to an initial attitude of around 18°.
The aircraft had accelerated
to a speed of 160 knots at this point
and about five seconds into the flight,
the first officer asked for gear up.
But almost exactly at the same time as she did that,
several of the blades inside of the left, number one engine,
high-pressure turbine, suddenly fractured.
When they did so, it led to an immediate loss of thrust
from engine number one
as the turbine slowed down dramatically.
This also meant that the second stage turbine blades
behind the first, sustained severe damage from the debris
and since there was now no first stage
to push the air out, the second stage
received all of the hot air coming directly out
of the combustion chamber with now nowhere to go.
Without the normal cooling from the airstream,
those blades now started melting down from
the incredible heat and this whole process
all happened within a few seconds.
Now this was not great
but it was far from catastrophic either.
The failure was contained inside of the left engine
and there was no fire and the right engine
was still providing full take-off thrust.
This is a scenario that all pilots
train to handle every six months and although extremely rare,
it is well within the performance of the aircraft
as long as it's handled promptly
and in the correct way
but here the results of the crew's poor preparation
would start to really show its true effects.
As the engine failure happened, the aircraft veered about 12°
to the left due to the effect
of asymmetric thrust from the still working right engine
and the now dead left engine.
The first officer reacted to this
by pushing right rudder and correct the aircraft
back to the right again and remember,
she had already called for the gear
to be retracted just a second
before the engine failure occurred
but the captain had either missed this completely
or become so surprised by the sudden loud bang
and the yaw that he completely forgot about it.
The first officer let out a few exclamations
as she was now struggling with the crippled aircraft
and she also called, "What's going on?"
Now in a functioning cockpit,
this failure is supposed to be followed
by some very defined actions.
The pilot flying needs to concentrate
on flying the aircraft and getting it climbing safely
away from the ground.
The pilot monitoring, on the other hand,
should be making sure that the aircraft is climbing safely
and then support the pilot flying
by retracting the gear once a positive rate of climb
has been confirmed and then cancel
any warnings who might be distracting.
The first 400 feet after takeoff
should be dedicated to only fly the aircraft
and making sure that the configuration is correct
and that the aircraft is climbing safely.
Once above 400 feet, the pilot flying should call
for heading select and state
the malfunction while still concentrating
on handling the aircraft.
The pilot monitoring should then start trying
to diagnose the failure and do any memory items
that might need to be done
in a quick but controlled way
whilst also verifying these actions
with his colleague.
This case is actually a great example of why
we have memory items as a severe damage like this
where the engine is essentially melting down,
can be stopped from getting worse
by moving the engine start lever to cut out
to stop the flow of fuel but did this happen, you think?
No, unfortunately it did not.
Instead, the captain, only five seconds
after the failure occurred took controls from the first officer
and continued to pitch up towards 18°.
So here some of you might think
that this would be a logic thing to do by the captain,
after all he is the pilot in command
so it is his prerogative to take controls
especially if the first officer is struggling
but it is important to remember a few things first.
Number one, the captain had no idea, at this point,
what was actually causing the handling problems
for the first officer.
Now he'd heard a bang and felt a yaw but he had not
had enough time to actually assess the situation.
Number two, the first officer who was asking what was going on
was actually handling the situation
according to her training and in a quite good way.
It is profoundly hard to take controls
during an emergency which is including handling difficulties
when you haven't been handling
the aircraft from the very beginning.
An engine failure or flight control problems
can manifest themselves in very different ways,
depending on what's causing them.
So trying to shift controls at a very low altitude
can be hard even if you know what's going on and this captain
did not know that.
The aircraft was still climbing at this point
and the first officer had called for gear up
so the best thing to do here would have been for the captain
to follow the procedures who had been created
for exactly this scenario but, unfortunately, as we know
these procedures had not been briefed earlier
so the captain now found himself in control of a situation
he had not mentally prepared for,
flying an aircraft with an unknown fault
at an altitude of only 300 feet.
He just continued pitching for the normal takeoff attitude,
which with a failed engine and a fully-loaded aircraft
with the gear still hanging out,
meant that the speed now started decreasing rapidly.
During the next few seconds,
the captain shouted to the first officer several times
to let go of the controls which she read back
that she had already done.
She also offered to retract the landing gear but got no reply
from the captain who was likely
now so deep down into the stress cone
that he didn't didn't even hear her.
This meant that the gear was never retracted
and with the configuration they were now in,
they would have needed to pitch down substantially
to keep the speed and to still climb.
The normal pitch attitude after an engine failure
once the gear is up would be around 12°
but the aircraft was still maintaining
around 18° at this point.
Now even with the gear out,
the performance of the aircraft
would have allowed for a climb of around 150 feet per minute
if the speed was capped at V2.
This would have increased to around 450 feet per minute
if the gear was actually retracted
but, unfortunately, there was now also another issue
because at some point, during the initial seconds
after the failure, the thrust on the remaining engine
on the right side had also been reduced.
We don't know if this happened
when the captain took over the controls
or if it was a knee-jerk reaction
to the yaw by the first officer
but the combined effect of the fully-loaded aircraft
with one failed engine and the other working
below full thrust and the gear still hanging out
was that this aircraft was now quickly approaching a stall.
The captain continued to call
for the first officer to remove her hands
which she responded that she had already done.
Now it is possible that he felt some resistance in the controls
and assumed that this was caused
by inputs from the first officer
or she might have just instinctively
kept her hands on the yoke.
We don't really know but we do know
that the first officer now took up her hand mic
and called air traffic control saying,
"We have a small problem."
And only one second after that call,
the first stick shaker activation
could be heard on the cockpit voice recorder,
lasting for about one second.
Now the first officer should not have concentrated
on communicating with air traffic control at this point.
Instead she should have been monitoring
and calling out the speeds and altitude tendencies
that she could see from her instruments.
But the fact that she had been turned
from pilot flying to pilot monitoring
without any type of formal handover
had likely disoriented her and, at least, she was trying
to do something by calling air traffic control
and suggesting the gear to be retracted.
The aircraft reached its highest altitude
of 390 feet about 12 seconds after the engine failure occurred
and at that point, the speed had degraded so much
that the stick shaker now started working continuously
and it continued doing so for the rest of the flight.
The captain did not verbaIize this warning in any way.
He just continued to pitch with the same attitude
as the aircraft now started
descending rapidly towards the ground.
In the tower, the controller had seen the initial yaw
of the aircraft and had recognized
that they were in some deep trouble.
He immediately pushed the accident alarm
which alerted the airport firefighters
who now started rushing out towards the runway end.
In the cockpit, the stick shaker was now also accompanied
by a GPWS, "Don't sink," warning
and the right wing now started to slowly drop,
likely due to the impending stall.
At time 14:15:18, Air Algerie Flight 6289
touched down just beyond the end of Runway 02
with the back of the aircraft
and right wing hitting the ground first.
The huge amount of fuel inside of the wing
was almost immediately ignited
turning the aircraft into a fireball
as it broke into several pieces
sliding through an airport perimeter fence
and over a road before it finally came to a halt.
The majority of the aircraft was almost immediately
consumed by the fire and there was not much
the firefighters could do when they reached the wreckage
only about three minutes after the alarm had been sounded.
Out of 97 passengers and six crew members,
102 of them perished immediately
which meant that there was only one survivor.
This was the 28-year-old conscript
that I mentioned earlier.
Because he hadn't fastened his seat belt,
he was ejected from the aircraft
as it started break breaking apart
and that likely saved his life.
He was still seriously injured and lay in a coma for several days
before eventually waking up and that means that he
and the three passengers who missed their flight,
should consider themselves very, very lucky.
The investigation concluded that the accident was caused
by a loss of engine thrust during a critical phase of flight
followed by a failure to retract the landing gear
and the captain taking controls
without being properly prepared or having identified the problem.
The below-standard flight preparation,
the fact that the failure happened
just as they were about to retract the gear
and the non-existing CRM
after the failure also contributed to the accident.
There were four different recommendations
as a result including increased CRM training
for all pilots at Air Algerie, more focus on conformity
of engine failure training as well as the implementation
of a better flight safety program
who could monitor and analyze flight data
to identify dangerous trends.
And from a very personal note,
this is exactly why following
and respecting standard operating procedures
is so important.
You never know when they might save your life
just like you will never know
when I release my next video
unless you have subscribed to the channel.
You can support me by supporting my sponsor,
getting an awesome t-shirt
or joining my fantastic Patreon crew.
Have an absolutely fantastic day
and I'll see you next time, bye-bye.
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