The Danger of Popcorn Polymer: Incident at the TPC Group Chemical Plant

USCSB

19 Jul 202314:44

Summary

TLDROn November 27, 2019, a catastrophic explosion at TPC Group's chemical plant in Port Neches, Texas, released flammable butadiene, causing extensive damage and injuries. The incident resulted from uncontrolled popcorn polymer formation in a 'dead leg' of piping, highlighting the need for better hazard recognition and control measures. The Chemical Safety Board's investigation identified key safety issues, including the lack of effective procedures to manage dead legs and popcorn polymer, and the absence of remotely operated emergency isolation valves, underscoring the importance of robust safety practices in the petrochemical industry.

Takeaways

🔥 On November 27, 2019, a catastrophic incident occurred at the TPC Group chemical plant in Port Neches, Texas, involving the release of highly flammable butadiene.
💥 The explosion was felt up to 30 miles away and resulted in significant damage to the facility, nearby homes, and businesses, as well as injuries to workers and the public.
🚨 The incident was caused by the accumulation of popcorn polymer, a known hazard, which was poorly managed and controlled within the facility.
🏭 TPC is a petrochemical manufacturing company that produces butadiene, a highly reactive chemical used in the production of synthetic rubber and other products.
🚧 The primary pump in the butadiene unit was shut down for maintenance, creating a 'dead leg' in the piping system, which allowed popcorn polymer to accumulate over 114 days.
🚨 The lack of proper procedures to identify and control dead legs in high-purity butadiene service contributed to the disaster.
🔍 The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigation identified four key safety issues: dead leg identification and control, process hazard analysis, action item implementation, and control and prevention of popcorn polymer.
📚 Existing industry guidance on managing popcorn polymer formation was found to be insufficient, leading to gaps in understanding and preventing such incidents.
🛠️ The CSB recommended that TPC develop and implement a process to identify and control or eliminate dead legs in high-purity butadiene service.
🚫 TPC failed to effectively control or prevent the buildup of popcorn polymer, despite experiencing its formation previously and conducting operational trials.
🛑 The lack of remotely operated emergency isolation valves in the butadiene process meant that the release could not be stopped quickly, exacerbating the incident's severity.

Q & A

What incident occurred at the TPC group chemical plant in Port Neches, Texas on November 27, 2019?
-A release of highly flammable butadiene led to a series of explosions that could be felt up to 30 miles away, causing the destruction of a portion of the TPC facility, damage to nearby homes and businesses, and mandatory evacuations within a four-mile radius.
What is butadiene and why is it significant in the TPC incident?
-Butadiene is a highly reactive chemical used as a building block in the production of various products, most commonly synthetic rubber. Its improper management can lead to serious hazards, such as the formation of popcorn polymer, which was a key factor in the TPC incident.
What is a 'dead leg' in the context of chemical plant operations?
-A 'dead leg' refers to an area of piping that is open to the process but does not have any material flowing through it. It can lead to the accumulation of substances like popcorn polymer, posing a significant hazard.
What happened on August 4th, 2019, that contributed to the TPC incident?
-A worker shut down a primary pump during a routine operation, which later failed to restart and was sent for repair. This created a significant dead leg, leading to the formation and accumulation of popcorn polymer over the next 114 days.
What was the immediate cause of the explosion at the TPC facility on November 27th?
-Excessive popcorn polymer buildup caused the dead leg piping to suddenly rupture, releasing approximately six thousand gallons of liquid butadiene, which vaporized and formed a flammable cloud that ignited, causing the explosion.
What were the four key safety issues identified by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) in their investigation of the TPC incident?
-The four key safety issues were: 1) Dead leg identification and control, 2) Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) action item implementation, 3) Control and prevention of popcorn polymer, and 4) The use of remotely operated emergency isolation valves.
Why was the primary pump's repair initially prioritized but later changed to routine?
-The repair was initially prioritized due to its importance in the butadiene production process. However, the presence of a spare pump led to a reassessment, changing the urgency and allowing a dead leg to exist for an extended period.
What recommendation did the CSB make to TPC Group regarding dead legs in high purity butadiene service?
-The CSB recommended that TPC Group develop and implement a process to identify, control, or eliminate dead legs in high purity butadiene service to prevent similar incidents.
What was the status of the PHA recommendation from 2016 regarding equipment out of service for maintenance?
-The PHA recommendation from 2016, which suggested flushing lines monthly when equipment is out of service, was accepted by TPC management but was never implemented, contributing to the popcorn polymer buildup.
What steps did TPC take prior to the incident that may have contributed to the popcorn polymer formation?
-TPC began a series of operational trials in April 2019, which included removing a problematic piece of equipment and reducing the amount of popcorn polymer inhibitor in the production stream, leading to increased popcorn polymer formation.
What was the role of the American Chemistry Council's butadiene product stewardship guidance manual in the TPC incident?
-The manual provided general information on popcorn polymer but lacked specific guidance on the potential consequences of dead legs and how to identify, control, or prevent them, which the CSB believes could have helped prevent the incident.
What was the final outcome of the fires caused by the initial explosion at the TPC facility?
-The fires burned for over a month, and it was not until January 4th, 2020, that the TPC incident command confirmed all fires were finally out.

Outlines

00:00

🔥 Catastrophic Explosion at TPC Group Chemical Plant

On November 27, 2019, the TPC Group's chemical plant in Port Neches, Texas, experienced a series of explosions caused by the release of highly flammable butadiene. The blasts were felt up to 30 miles away and resulted in the destruction of a portion of the TPC facility, damage to nearby homes and businesses, and mandatory evacuations within a four-mile radius. The incident was traced back to the formation of popcorn polymer within poorly managed equipment, highlighting gaps in industry guidance on managing such hazards. The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigation revealed that a primary pump failure and subsequent use of a spare pump led to the formation of a 'dead leg' in the piping system, where the popcorn polymer accumulated over 114 days. The lack of recognition of this hazard and failure to implement safety recommendations from a 2016 process hazard analysis contributed to the catastrophic event that disrupted life in the local community and the facility itself.

05:00

🚨 Inadequate Dead Leg Management and Safety Protocols

The TPC Port Neches facility had a procedure in place to minimize popcorn polymer formation in high-purity butadiene service, which involved running spare pumps to circulate material through idle piping. However, this procedure failed to address the potential for a dead leg to form if the primary pump was out of service for an extended period, as occurred prior to the incident. Despite the initial urgency to repair the primary pump, it was downgraded to a routine task, leading to a 114-day dead leg that allowed dangerous levels of popcorn polymer to accumulate. The CSB found that TPC did not effectively control or prevent popcorn polymer buildup, even after experiencing increased formation in April 2019. Operational trials, including the removal of problematic equipment and changes in inhibitor injection, exacerbated the issue. Despite recognizing the need for an unscheduled shutdown to address the buildup and improve safety standards, TPC delayed this until 2020, which was too late. The CSB recommended that TPC develop a process to identify and control or eliminate dead legs and urged the American Chemistry Council to revise its guidance manual to include specific guidance on this issue.

10:02

🛠️ Safety Gaps in Popcorn Polymer Control and Emergency Isolation

The CSB identified several safety issues at TPC, including the lack of effective control and prevention measures for popcorn polymer buildup. Despite a history of experiencing such issues, TPC did not take adequate steps to address them. The decision to delay a necessary shutdown for cleanup and improvements led to serious operational problems. The CSB also found a gap in the American Chemistry Council's butadiene product stewardship guidance manual, which did not provide conditions justifying a shutdown for cleaning. The CSB recommended revisions to the manual to include guidance on identifying excessive popcorn polymer and mitigation strategies. Additionally, the CSB highlighted the absence of remotely operated emergency isolation valves in the butadiene process, which could have minimized the initial vapor cloud and subsequent explosions. The lack of such valves meant that process releases could not be stopped from a safe location, contributing to the severity of the incident. The CSB recommended that facilities handling large quantities of butadiene implement robust policies for popcorn polymer control and equip their processes with remotely operated emergency isolation valves to prevent similar incidents.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡TPC Group

TPC Group is a petrochemical manufacturing company that operates several facilities along the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana. It is central to the video's theme as the company's chemical plant in Port Neches, Texas, was the site of a catastrophic incident involving butadiene in November 2019. The video discusses the series of events and safety issues that led to the explosion and subsequent fires at the TPC facility.

💡Butadiene

Butadiene is a highly reactive chemical used as a building block in the production of a wide range of products, most commonly synthetic rubber. It is a key concept in the video as the chemical's improper management led to the formation of popcorn polymer, which in turn caused the explosions at the TPC plant. The video emphasizes the dangers of butadiene when not handled properly.

💡Popcorn Polymer

Popcorn polymer is a solid substance that forms when butadiene reacts in the presence of oxygen, particularly in areas of low or no flow within process equipment. The video explains how the accumulation of popcorn polymer led to high pressure and the eventual rupture of equipment at the TPC plant, resulting in a major explosion and fires.

💡Dead Leg

A 'dead leg' refers to a section of piping that is open to the process but does not have any material flowing through it. In the context of the video, the formation of a dead leg due to an inoperable primary pump allowed popcorn polymer to accumulate, which was a significant factor in the explosion at the TPC plant.

💡Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a method used to identify and manage potential hazards in industrial processes. The video discusses a 2016 PHA that identified the risk of popcorn polymer accumulation due to low or no flow conditions but notes that the recommendation to address this issue was never implemented by TPC, contributing to the incident.

💡Mandatory Evacuation

Mandatory evacuation refers to the forced removal of residents from an area due to an imminent danger. The video mentions that residents living within four miles of the TPC plant were evacuated following the explosions, illustrating the severity of the incident and its impact on the local community.

💡Chemical Safety Board (CSB)

The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is an independent U.S. federal agency that investigates chemical incidents. The video describes the CSB's investigation into the TPC incident, identifying key safety issues and making recommendations to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

💡Remotely Operated Emergency Isolation Valves

These valves are designed to stop process releases remotely from a safe location in the event of an emergency. The video points out that the lack of such valves in the butadiene process at TPC could have contributed to the severity of the incident, as it was not possible to stop the release of flammable material quickly enough.

💡Product Stewardship Guidance Manual

The Product Stewardship Guidance Manual, developed by the American Chemistry Council, provides general information for companies handling or storing butadiene. The video criticizes the manual for not including guidance on identifying and controlling dead legs in high-purity butadiene service, which the CSB believes could have helped prevent the TPC incident.

💡Incident Command

Incident Command refers to the structure and management system used to organize response to emergencies. The video mentions the TPC incident command confirming that all fires were finally out on January 4th, 2020, marking the end of the immediate crisis but highlighting the prolonged nature of the disaster.

Highlights

On November 27, 2019, a highly flammable butadiene release led to a series of explosions at the TPC Group chemical plant in Port Neches, Texas.

The explosions were felt up to 30 miles away and resulted in the mandatory evacuation of residents within a four-mile radius.

The incident was caused by poorly managed popcorn polymer growth inside equipment, leading to a catastrophic event.

Gaps in industry guidance on popcorn polymer management contributed to the incident.

TPC is a petrochemical manufacturing company with facilities along the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana.

Butadiene, a highly reactive chemical, is commonly used to produce synthetic rubber.

A primary pump failure and subsequent use of a spare pump created a significant dead leg, allowing popcorn polymer to accumulate.

The CSB found that TPC did not recognize the hazard created by the dead leg over 114 days.

On November 27, excessive popcorn polymer buildup caused equipment to rupture, releasing butadiene and forming a flammable cloud.

The initial explosion injured workers and caused extensive damage to the facility and nearby structures.

Fires at the facility burned for over a month before being extinguished on January 4th, 2020.

The CSB investigation identified four key safety issues that contributed to the incident.

Dead leg identification and control were inadequate, leading to the formation of popcorn polymer.

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) recommendations were not implemented, contributing to the incident.

TPC failed to effectively control or prevent popcorn polymer buildup despite experiencing it previously.

The American Chemistry Council's guidance manual lacked information on managing dead legs in butadiene units.

Remotely operated emergency isolation valves were not in place, which could have mitigated the incident's severity.

The CSB's recommendations aim to help facilities better control popcorn polymer and prevent similar incidents.