The Shareholder Value Myth | Lynn Stout

Faculti
19 Jun 201812:44

Summary

TLDRThe video challenges the widely held belief that shareholders own corporations and that corporations should maximize shareholder value. This ideology, which emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s, replaced the earlier view of corporations as social institutions serving various stakeholders. The speaker argues that the shareholder value approach has led to negative outcomes, such as fewer public companies, reduced corporate longevity, and lower reinvestment and innovation. Additionally, legal and economic analyses do not support the notion that corporations must prioritize shareholder value, highlighting the diverse and complex interests of real shareholders.

Takeaways

  • πŸ“œ The idea that corporations exist solely to maximize shareholder value is a relatively new concept, emerging in the late 1970s or early 1980s.
  • 🏭 Prior to this, corporations were viewed as social and economic institutions with a responsibility to serve various stakeholders, including customers, employees, creditors, and communities.
  • 🌐 The shift to shareholder value maximization influenced regulatory bodies like the Securities Exchange Commission and tax codes, giving shareholders more power and influence.
  • πŸ“‰ Despite the focus on shareholder value, the number of publicly listed companies in the U.S. has significantly decreased, and the life expectancy of public companies has also declined.
  • πŸ’‘ Companies are reinvesting less of their profits back into the business, which some believe is affecting innovation and the overall health of corporations.
  • πŸ€” The shareholder value maximization philosophy is questioned as it does not seem to have increased shareholder value, with returns being slightly less than in the managerial era.
  • πŸ“š The script argues that the shareholder value philosophy is more of an ideology without strong backing from corporate law or corporate economics.
  • πŸ“– Corporate law, as reflected in state codes and corporate charters, does not require maximizing shareholder value but allows corporations to be run for any lawful purpose.
  • πŸ‘¨β€βš–οΈ Case law is mixed, with some judges advocating for shareholder value maximization, while others, like Supreme Court Justice Alito, suggest that corporations are not required to maximize profits at the expense of everything else.
  • 🀝 Shareholders are not the owners of corporations; they own a contract with the corporation called a share of stock, which grants them limited rights.
  • 🌟 Real shareholders have diverse interests and are not solely focused on short-term stock price gains; many are concerned with the long-term sustainability and ethical conduct of corporations.

Q & A

  • What was the common belief about corporations before the late 1970s or early 1980s?

    -Before the late 1970s or early 1980s, corporations were viewed as social and economic institutions that were supposed to serve many different constituencies, including shareholders, customers, employees, creditors, local communities, and possibly society as a whole. This philosophy was known as managerialism.

  • What significant shift occurred in the business world around the 1970s and 1980s?

    -Around the 1970s and 1980s, the business world shifted from managerialism to the belief that shareholders owned corporations and that they should maximize shareholder value. This new ideology began to influence business practices, rules, and policies.

  • How did the Securities Exchange Commission respond to the shift towards shareholder value maximization?

    -The Securities Exchange Commission passed several new rules designed to give shareholders of the corporation more power and influence over their boards of directors, in response to the shift towards shareholder value maximization.

  • What change in the tax code in 1993 was influenced by the shareholder value ideology?

    -In 1993, a new rule was introduced stating that companies wanting tax deductibility must tie their executive pay to an objective performance metric, which often meant that share price became the determining factor in executive compensation.

  • Why has the shareholder value maximization approach been criticized?

    -The shareholder value maximization approach has been criticized because it doesn't seem to be working well for corporations. It has been associated with a decline in the number of publicly listed companies, reduced corporate life expectancy, less reinvestment, and even reduced shareholder returns.

  • What does the speaker claim about the legal basis for the shareholder value maximization ideology?

    -The speaker claims that there is no legal basis for the shareholder value maximization ideology. Corporate law, as reflected in state codes and corporate charters, does not require corporations to maximize shareholder value but allows them to be run for any lawful purpose.

  • According to the script, what does the business judgment rule protect directors from?

    -The business judgment rule protects directors as long as they operate in what they honestly believe is the best interest of the corporate entity, without requiring them to maximize shareholder profits or value.

  • What is the speaker's argument against the economic theory that shareholders are the residual claimants of corporations?

    -The speaker argues that corporations, as legal persons, own themselves and that shareholders own a contract with the corporation called a share of stock, which gives them limited rights. Shareholders are not the residual claimants; the corporation itself is, and it is the Board of Directors that decides on dividend payments.

  • How does the speaker describe the typical shareholder according to the shareholder value maximization ideology?

    -The speaker describes the typical shareholder in the shareholder value maximization ideology as a hypothetical 'platonic shareholder' who only cares about the stock price of one company at one moment in time, which is an unrealistic and overly simplified model.

  • What are some of the interests that real shareholders have, according to the script?

    -Real shareholders have many differing interests, including long-term investment goals, diversified holdings, concerns about the company's impact on the environment and society, and ethical standards that they do not want their companies to violate.

  • What does the speaker suggest about the percentage of shareholders who might be considered 'psychopaths' in their investment approach?

    -The speaker suggests that while psychopaths exist, they usually account for only two to four percent of the population, and this is probably true for shareholders as well, implying that most shareholders are not solely focused on immediate profit at the expense of others or breaking rules.

Outlines

00:00

πŸ“Š The Myth of Shareholder Primacy

This paragraph discusses the misconception that corporations exist solely to maximize shareholder value, a concept that became prominent in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Prior to this, corporations were viewed as social and economic institutions serving various stakeholders, including customers, employees, creditors, and communities. The shift to shareholder value maximization influenced SEC rules and tax codes, leading to a focus on share price as a performance metric for executive pay. However, this ideology has not improved shareholder returns or corporate longevity, with a decline in public companies and reduced reinvestment. The paragraph suggests that the shareholder value philosophy lacks support from corporate law and economics and may be contributing to negative outcomes for corporations.

05:00

πŸ“˜ Corporate Law and Shareholder Value Misconception

The second paragraph delves into the legal perspective on the shareholder value maximization myth. It clarifies that corporate law, as reflected in state codes and corporate charters, does not mandate maximizing shareholder value. Instead, directors are protected by the business judgment rule, which allows them to operate in the best interest of the corporation without the obligation to maximize shareholder profits. The paragraph also refutes the economic argument that shareholders own corporations, explaining that corporations are legal persons that own themselves, and shareholders hold contracts (shares) with limited rights. The focus on shareholder value is criticized for being unrealistic and not representative of the diverse interests of actual shareholders.

10:01

🌐 The Diversity and Ethical Considerations of Shareholders

The final paragraph addresses the diversity of shareholders and their varying interests, which are often at odds with the concept of maximizing shareholder value. It highlights the differences between short-term and long-term investors, diversified and concentrated shareholders, and the broader implications of focusing solely on stock price. The paragraph emphasizes that most shareholders are also human beings with a conscience, who care about social, environmental, and ethical issues. It argues against the narrow view of shareholders as profit-maximizing entities, suggesting that a more balanced approach to corporate governance would better serve the interests of all stakeholders, including shareholders themselves.

Mindmap

Keywords

πŸ’‘Shareholder Value

The concept of 'Shareholder Value' refers to the idea that corporations exist primarily to maximize the wealth of their shareholders. It is a central theme in the video, which challenges this notion by arguing that it is a relatively new ideology that has not historically been the sole purpose of corporations. The script points out that maximizing shareholder value has not necessarily led to increased shareholder returns and has been accompanied by negative consequences such as reduced reinvestment and innovation.

πŸ’‘Managerialism

Managerialism is an economic theory that predates the focus on shareholder value, emphasizing that corporations should serve multiple stakeholders, including customers, employees, creditors, and communities. The video script explains how managerialism was replaced by the shareholder value ideology in the late 20th century, which has had significant impacts on corporate governance and policy.

πŸ’‘Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)

The SEC is a U.S. government agency responsible for enforcing securities laws and regulating the securities industry. The video script mentions how the SEC has passed rules that have given shareholders more power and influence over corporations, which is a direct result of the shift towards the shareholder value ideology.

πŸ’‘Tax Deductibility

Tax deductibility refers to the ability of a corporation to deduct certain expenses from its taxable income. The script discusses a 1993 tax rule change that required companies to tie executive pay to performance metrics, often interpreted as share price, to qualify for tax deductions, thereby reinforcing the focus on shareholder value.

πŸ’‘Business Judgment Rule

The Business Judgment Rule is a legal principle that protects directors from personal liability for actions taken in what they believe to be the best interests of the corporation. The video explains that this rule, rather than a requirement to maximize shareholder value, is what guides the actions of corporate directors.

πŸ’‘Residual Claimants

In the context of the video, 'Residual Claimants' refers to the argument that shareholders are entitled to the remaining profits of a corporation after all other obligations have been met. The script refutes this by stating that corporations are their own residual claimants and that shareholders only receive dividends at the discretion of the Board of Directors.

πŸ’‘Universal Investors

Universal Investors are individuals who have a wide range of interests and investments, and who want corporations to be run in ways that align with all of their interests, not just maximizing share price. The video script argues that most real shareholders fall into this category, caring about more than just short-term stock performance.

πŸ’‘Short-term vs. Long-term Shareholders

The video script distinguishes between short-term and long-term shareholders based on their investment horizon and interests. Short-term shareholders, such as activist hedge funds, may prioritize immediate stock price increases, while long-term shareholders are more concerned with sustainable business practices and future growth.

πŸ’‘Diversified Shareholders

Diversified shareholders are those who have investments spread across multiple companies. The video script explains that these shareholders may be more concerned with fair competition and the overall health of the market, as opposed to those with concentrated holdings in a few companies who might prioritize short-term gains at the expense of other investments.

πŸ’‘Pro-social Shareholders

Pro-social shareholders are those who are concerned about the social and ethical implications of a corporation's actions. The video script suggests that most shareholders fall into this category, valuing corporate behavior that is ethical and beneficial to society, the environment, and future generations.

πŸ’‘Psychopath

In the context of the video, a 'Psychopath' is used to describe a hypothetical shareholder who is solely focused on maximizing personal gain in the short term, even at the expense of others or by breaking rules. The script argues that such individuals are rare among the general population and likely represent a small minority of shareholders.

Highlights

The concept that shareholders own corporations and should maximize shareholder value is a relatively new idea, emerging in the late 1970s or early 1980s.

Prior to this, corporations were viewed as social and economic institutions serving various constituencies, not just shareholders.

The shift in philosophy from managerialism to shareholder value maximization influenced corporate governance, SEC rules, and tax codes.

Despite widespread adoption, shareholder value maximization has not increased shareholder value or improved corporate performance.

The number of publicly listed companies in the U.S. has significantly decreased since the 1990s.

The life expectancy of public companies has also declined, with Fortune 500 companies lasting much shorter periods on the list.

Corporations are now reinvesting less of their profits back into the business compared to historical rates.

There is a belief that companies are becoming less innovative under the shareholder value maximization model.

The shareholder value philosophy is criticized as an ideology without factual, legal, or economic backing.

Corporate law does not mandate maximizing shareholder value; it allows corporations to be run for any lawful purpose.

Case law shows courts do not require directors to maximize shareholder profits, but rather protect them under the business judgment rule.

Economic theory does not support the notion that shareholders own corporations or are entitled to residual profits.

Shareholders are not the same; they have differing interests, particularly in terms of short-term vs. long-term focus.

Diversified shareholders may have different concerns compared to those invested in a single or few companies.

Real shareholders often have a conscience and ethical standards, opposing profit at the expense of others or breaking rules.

Most shareholders are 'pro-social,' concerned about the interests of others, the planet, and future generations.

The shareholder value maximization model oversimplifies the complex interests and roles of real shareholders.

The transcript challenges the shareholder value myth and calls for a reevaluation of corporate purpose and responsibility.

Transcripts

play00:00

I'd like to talk about a very common but

play00:03

mistaken idea and that is the idea that

play00:07

shareholders own corporations and that

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all corporations are supposed to do is

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quote maximize shareholder value close

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quote

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now the first thing that is important to

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realize about this idea is that it's

play00:21

pretty new up until the late 1970s or

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early 1980s people in business had a

play00:27

very different idea about what

play00:29

corporations were and what they were

play00:30

supposed to do corporations were viewed

play00:33

as great social institutions social and

play00:35

economic institutions that were supposed

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to serve many different constituencies

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including not only shareholders but also

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their customers their employees their

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creditors and their local communities

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maybe even society as a whole and this

play00:50

philosophy was called managerialism but

play00:52

managerialism gets replaced around the

play00:56

1970s early 1980s by this new idea that

play01:00

shareholders owned corporations and that

play01:02

they should maximize shareholder value

play01:03

and this idea actually starts to change

play01:06

the business world it influences the

play01:09

rules that the Securities Exchange

play01:10

Commission passes so that the Securities

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Exchange Commission passes several new

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rules that are designed to give the

play01:17

shareholders of the corporation more

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power and more influence over their

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boards of directors it influences the

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tax code where in 1993 we get a new rule

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that says that companies that want tax

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deductibility must tie their executive

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pay to a so-called objective performance

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metric which means that share price

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becomes the determining factor in how

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much executives are paid and this idea

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gets embraced by an entire generation of

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professors and political leaders and

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policymakers and especially business

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leaders who all collectively come to

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believe that corporations belong to

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shareholders and that they should be run

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to maximize shareholder value and here

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is the problem although this idea now

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drives much of the American business

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sector it doesn't seem to be working out

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that well

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it doesn't work out that well for

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corporations the number of publicly

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listed companies in the United States

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has dropped for more from more than nine

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thousand at the beginning of the 1990s

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too fewer than four thousand today the

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life expectancy of public companies has

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declined even more severely the average

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member of the fortune 500 was on that

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list for 75 years a few decades ago

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today the average fortune 500 company

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can only be expect to be on that list

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for about 15 years companies are cutting

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back on their reinvestment it used to be

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that companies reinvested 40% or more of

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their profits back in the business now

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it's less than 10% a lot of people

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believe that our companies are becoming

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less innovative and when you look at

play02:57

shareholder returns the odd thing is

play03:00

that maximizing shareholder value

play03:01

doesn't seem to have increased

play03:03

shareholder value shareholder returns

play03:05

are if anything slightly less than they

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were in the managerial estera

play03:10

what's going wrong the problem with this

play03:13

shareholder value philosophy is that

play03:15

it's really just an ideology almost a

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religion it's not backed up by the facts

play03:21

it's not backed up by corporate law and

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it's not backed up by corporate

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economics once you understand what

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corporations really are we've already

play03:30

looked at some of the evidence and we've

play03:32

seen how the embrace of shareholder

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value thinking has been accompanied by

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declining numbers of corporations

play03:37

declining corporate less life expectancy

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reduced innovation reduced investment

play03:42

and even reduced shareholder returns but

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when we look at the law of corporations

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it really doesn't make sense so first of

play03:51

all let's see what corporate law as

play03:53

reflected in state codes and the

play03:56

charters of corporations themselves says

play03:58

about what corporations are supposed to

play04:00

do codes and charters don't say

play04:02

corporations have to maximize

play04:03

shareholder value what they say is that

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corporations can be run for any lawful

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purpose no requirement of maximizing

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shareholder value even though someone

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creating a company could put that in the

play04:15

Charter if they wanted to I've been

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looking for that in charters for years

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I've never seen it now when we look at

play04:22

case law it's a little bit more

play04:24

confusing

play04:25

because judges say different things

play04:28

about what corporations are supposed to

play04:29

do some judges in some cases say they

play04:32

should pursue profits or shareholder

play04:33

value other judges in other cases say

play04:36

differently for example Supreme Court

play04:38

justice alito recently said in the Hobby

play04:40

Lobby decision that modern corporation

play04:43

law does not require companies to

play04:44

maximize profits at the expense of

play04:46

everything else and many do not

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so what judges say is kind of all over

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the law but good lawyers don't pay

play04:53

attention to what judges say about their

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thinking good lawyers pay attention to

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the part of the case we call the holding

play05:00

that is what will the court actually

play05:03

require a corporation to do and when you

play05:06

look at the holdings of corporate law

play05:07

cases instead of what judges say what we

play05:10

call mere dicta the holdings are very

play05:12

clear courts simply will not require the

play05:16

directors of corporations to try to

play05:17

maximize shareholder profits or

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shareholder value instead directors are

play05:22

protected by something called the

play05:23

business judgment rule which says that

play05:25

as long as the directors are operating

play05:27

in what they honestly believe is the

play05:28

best interest of the corporate entity

play05:30

then they are protected there are a

play05:34

couple of cases where the directors of

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companies have been required to pay out

play05:40

dividends to shareholders but if you

play05:41

look at those cases you'll see very

play05:43

quickly those are actually not cases

play05:46

about what corporations are supposed to

play05:48

do there are cases that involve a

play05:49

conflict between a majority controlling

play05:51

shareholder and a minority shareholder

play05:52

and the payouts were made to the

play05:55

minority as a matter of fairness in

play05:57

those particular closely held companies

play06:00

so corporate law does not support the

play06:02

shareholder value myth when you look at

play06:05

economics economic theory doesn't

play06:08

support the notion that you have to

play06:09

maximize shareholder value either let's

play06:12

start with the idea that shareholders

play06:13

own corporations legally that's just

play06:16

plain wrong corporations as legal

play06:19

persons own themselves what shareholders

play06:22

own is a contract with the corporation

play06:24

called a share of stock that gives

play06:26

shareholders very limited rights just as

play06:29

creditors have debt contracts with

play06:32

corporations and employees have

play06:33

employment contracts shareholders don't

play06:35

own companies companies own themselves

play06:38

a more sophisticated version of this

play06:40

economic argument says that shareholders

play06:43

are the so called residual claimants in

play06:46

corporations entitled to every penny

play06:49

that's left over after the corporation

play06:51

has met its obligations to other

play06:53

stakeholders like creditors or taxing

play06:56

authorities or employees again that's

play06:59

legally erroneous a corporation is its

play07:03

own residual claimant shareholders don't

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get anything from the corporation except

play07:09

dividends and it's the Board of

play07:11

Directors that decides whether or not

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the company will pay dividends now at

play07:16

this point people who have taken

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corporate finance are likely to object

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but if the corporation doesn't pay

play07:21

dividends then the money will be saved

play07:23

and it will increase the value of the

play07:25

stock so isn't the money the

play07:26

shareholders anyway to which I say no

play07:29

actually it's not because remember it's

play07:32

the Board of Directors that decides what

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to do with corporate profits they could

play07:36

retain them and increase the value of

play07:38

the company's shares but they can also

play07:40

use those profits to pay employees

play07:42

higher salaries to make philanthropic

play07:44

contributions to invest more in research

play07:47

and development to provide better

play07:49

customer support or even to pay taxes

play07:52

instead of moving their companies

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offshore to eliminate their US tax

play07:55

burden so neither in the law nor in the

play07:59

economics is there any basis for this

play08:01

notion that somehow shareholders owned

play08:04

corporations and corporations are

play08:05

supposed to maximize shareholder value

play08:07

and if you start to think about whose

play08:09

shareholders really are you'll quickly

play08:11

realize that idea doesn't even make

play08:14

sense perhaps the biggest flaw in the

play08:16

shareholder value myth is it's

play08:19

fundamentally mistaken idea about whose

play08:21

shareholders really are shareholder

play08:24

value maximization talk assumes that all

play08:27

shareholders are the same and that all

play08:30

they care about is what's happening to

play08:32

the company's stock price actually all

play08:35

they care about under this theory is

play08:36

what's happening to the stock price

play08:38

tomorrow they're not even worried about

play08:39

the stock price five or ten years from

play08:41

now and this very simplified model of

play08:45

what you might almost call a platonic

play08:46

shareholder a hypothetical platonic

play08:49

shareholder who only care

play08:50

about the stock price of one company at

play08:52

one moment in time is completely

play08:55

unrealistic real shareholders are people

play08:59

and they have many differing interests

play09:03

they're not all the same for example one

play09:07

big difference among shareholders is

play09:08

whether they're thinking short-term or

play09:10

long-term most people who are investing

play09:13

in the stock market are investing for

play09:14

retirement or perhaps a child's college

play09:17

tuition or some other long term project

play09:19

but there are some shareholders

play09:21

especially for example activists hedge

play09:24

funds that buy shares intending to hold

play09:26

them for a year or maybe two years at

play09:28

most those two groups have very

play09:31

different interests long-term

play09:32

shareholders want the company to invest

play09:34

for the future and take care of its

play09:36

employees and customers so it'll operate

play09:37

sustainably over time

play09:39

short-term hedge funds don't care

play09:41

anything that gets the stock price up in

play09:43

the next year is good enough for them

play09:45

and there are lots of ways to get the

play09:47

stock price up by taking on leverage by

play09:49

cutting research and development by

play09:51

firing employees lots of ways to get the

play09:54

stock price up in the short term but

play09:56

many of them end up hurting the company

play09:58

in the long term which is a problem for

play10:00

long-term shareholders another key

play10:03

difference among shareholders is whether

play10:04

they're diversified that means they own

play10:06

stock and lots of different companies or

play10:08

whether they only own stock and one or

play10:10

two companies if you're a diversified

play10:12

shareholder you care whether your

play10:15

corporation is making money by doing

play10:18

something anti-competitive that's

play10:20

hurting the profits at another

play10:21

corporation you also own if you own

play10:24

stock and bonds you don't want your

play10:26

company leveraging in a fashion taking

play10:28

on debt that is in a fashion that drives

play10:30

up the share price but makes it less

play10:32

likely your bonds will be paid off but

play10:35

if all you own is stock in a single

play10:37

company or maybe stock in two or three

play10:39

companies which is typical for many

play10:41

hedge funds then you don't care about

play10:43

the consequences for other investments

play10:45

you just care about getting that share

play10:46

price up at that one company preferably

play10:49

tomorrow and remember real shareholders

play10:52

are not just shareholders they're also

play10:54

employees and customers and citizens and

play10:57

taxpayers they want their corporations

play11:00

to make money

play11:01

not by ruining the environment or firing

play11:05

them and causing them to lose their job

play11:07

or producing shoddy products that they

play11:09

regret buying or failing to pay taxes

play11:12

corporate taxes so that individual tax

play11:15

rates go up

play11:15

most people are what we call universal

play11:18

investors who have a wide range of

play11:20

interests and want our companies to be

play11:22

run in ways that are consistent with all

play11:24

of our interests not just this focus on

play11:26

share price finally and really this is

play11:30

good news most real shareholders are

play11:33

also real human beings who have a

play11:36

conscience and who care about others and

play11:39

have ethical standards they don't want

play11:42

their companies to profit from polluting

play11:44

or laying off people unnecessarily or

play11:48

cheating or abusing their customers as

play11:52

in the case of for example Volkswagen

play11:54

that was cheating on its emission

play11:55

standards or United which was just

play11:57

embroiled in a controversy over

play11:59

maltreatment of passengers most

play12:02

shareholders are what we call pro-social

play12:05

meaning they understand and they are

play12:08

happy to be concerned about the

play12:12

interests of other people the planet and

play12:15

future generations what do we call a

play12:17

shareholder or for that matter what do

play12:19

we call anyone who only focuses on

play12:22

making as much money for themselves in

play12:24

the immediate future even if this

play12:26

involves harming others or breaking the

play12:28

rules we call that person a psychopath

play12:31

and the evidence suggests that while

play12:34

psychopaths exist

play12:35

they usually account for only two to

play12:38

four percent of the population and

play12:39

that's probably true for shareholders as

play12:42

well

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