"Ordered To DESTROY 9/11 Data" – Able Danger Whistleblower EXPOSES Classified Intel Deletion Scandal

Summary

This video delves into the pre-9/11 intelligence efforts, particularly focusing on the Able Danger program and the challenges of inter-agency cooperation. Kurt Weldon and retired intelligence officer Tony Schaefer share insights into their efforts to create a centralized data fusion center to better combat transnational terrorism. Despite support from the FBI, the CIA resisted these efforts, a decision that became a significant point of criticism after the attacks. The discussion highlights missed opportunities and the failure to act on critical intelligence leading up to 9/11.

Takeaways

• 😀 The Able Danger program was an intelligence operation targeting individuals linked to transnational terrorism, including monitoring mosques.
• 😀 Kurt Weldon proposed creating a National Operations and Analysis Hub (NOAH) for intelligence fusion across government agencies, including the FBI and CIA.
• 😀 Despite the FBI’s support, the CIA rejected participation in the proposed fusion center, citing their own initiative, CI21, leading to missed opportunities for intelligence sharing before 9/11.
• 😀 The inability of intelligence agencies to collaborate effectively before 9/11 was a significant critique after the attacks.
• 😀 The fusion center proposal, which aimed to integrate intelligence data from different services, was first raised in November 1999, two years before 9/11.
• 😀 John Hamry, Deputy Secretary of Defense, supported the fusion center and suggested its management at either the White House or Pentagon.
• 😀 Kurt Weldon was an advocate for funding and supporting intelligence programs related to national security during his time in Congress, especially through his work with the R&D subcommittee.
• 😀 The fusion center was intended to help address emerging transnational terrorist threats, including analyzing large-scale data from multiple sources.
• 😀 Weldon describes the challenges of getting the CIA to cooperate with intelligence-sharing initiatives, raising questions about the agency's reluctance to collaborate.
• 😀 Tony Schaefer, with over 30 years of operational intelligence experience, highlighted the lack of knowledge within the government about certain intelligence programs like Able Danger before 9/11.

Q & A

What is the primary focus of Kurt Weldon's discussion in this transcript?

Kurt Weldon's discussion primarily focuses on his involvement in intelligence initiatives before 9/11, specifically efforts to establish a national data fusion center and the Able Danger program, which aimed to improve intelligence coordination and counterterrorism efforts.

What was the Able Danger program, and why is it significant?

The Able Danger program was a classified intelligence operation that identified key terrorist figures before 9/11. It is significant because it demonstrated early warnings about terrorist threats, but the program was hindered by bureaucratic resistance, and its findings were not acted upon effectively.

Why did the CIA reject the proposal for the National Operations and Analysis Hub (NOAH)?

The CIA rejected the proposal for NOAH because it was already working on its own project, CI21. The CIA's resistance to participating in the fusion center ultimately led to missed opportunities for improved intelligence coordination.

How did the FBI respond to the creation of the National Operations and Analysis Hub?

The FBI supported the creation of the National Operations and Analysis Hub, recognizing the need for better intelligence coordination and collaboration across different government agencies.

What role did John Hamry play in the proposed data fusion center?

John Hamry, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, supported the idea of a national data fusion center and was instrumental in convincing others of its necessity. He also offered to manage the initiative either at the White House or Pentagon.

What was Kurt Weldon's role in the intelligence initiatives discussed in the transcript?

Kurt Weldon was the chairman of the R&D subcommittee and played a central role in proposing and funding initiatives aimed at improving intelligence gathering and coordination, including the National Operations and Analysis Hub and efforts related to the Able Danger program.

Why was the fusion of intelligence data criticized after 9/11?

After 9/11, the lack of fusion of intelligence data was criticized because intelligence agencies, such as the FBI, CIA, and others, were not effectively sharing raw data or coordinating their efforts, which contributed to the failure to prevent the attacks despite early warning signs.

What was the main difference in how the FBI and CIA responded to intelligence fusion efforts?

The FBI supported intelligence fusion efforts and recognized their importance for counterterrorism, while the CIA rejected the idea, opting instead to pursue its own project, CI21, which led to missed opportunities for interagency collaboration.

What is the significance of Kurt Weldon’s proposal to create a data fusion center?

The significance of Weldon's proposal lies in its foresight and the potential it had to prevent 9/11 by creating a centralized hub for intelligence sharing across agencies. Despite support from the FBI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, it was ultimately not implemented due to bureaucratic resistance.

How does Tony Schaefer contribute to the discussion in the transcript?

Tony Schaefer, a retired intelligence officer, contributes by providing his expertise on operational intelligence and his personal experience with the Able Danger program. He also discusses his role as the national security adviser for the Trump 2020 campaign and his work as an elected official.