平型关大捷真相｜抗日战争｜八路军｜林彪｜聂荣臻｜国共内战｜日军｜王局拍案20240321

Summary

本视频揭露了一张广为人知、关于中国抗日战争中平型关大捷的照片的真实背景。原以为该照片拍摄于1937年平型关战役期间，但实际上是战役结束后在太行山区重新拍摄的。视频通过对日本军事档案的研究，揭示了平型关大捷中双方伤亡数字被夸大的情况，并探讨了历史叙述与政治宣传之间的关系。日本档案显示，实际日方伤亡远低于宣传数字。视频强调，历史记载往往被用作政治宣传的工具，真实的历史细节在宣传过程中可能会被忽略或扭曲，呼吁观众以更批判的眼光审视历史叙述。

Takeaways

• 📷 一个广为人知的照片实际上是在平型关战役后，由八路军115师在太行山重新演绎的场景。
• 🕒 照片并非在1937年9月的平型关拍摄，而是在战役结束后的10月。
• 🏞️ 照片的拍摄旨在制作一部纪录片，展示平型关战役，但实际上并没有真实反映战场情况。
• 📚 江克石教授深入研究了平型关大捷背后的真实故事，揭示了历史和宣传之间的差异。
• 🔍 平型关战役的真实伤亡数字和参战兵力与历史宣传存在显著差异。
• 🇨🇳 中国官方历史叙述中的平型关大捷被过度夸大，实际上，日方的伤亡数字远低于宣传中的数千人。
• 📉 随着时间的推移，平型关战役中日军被消灭的数字被不断调整，反映出历史叙述的变化。
• 🎖️ 江克石教授的研究揭示了历史宣传中的英雄叙述和真实历史事件之间的差距。
• 📚 《平型关大捷在日本军事档案中的呈现》一书提供了基于日方档案的平型关战役详细考证。
• 🌏 江教授的研究强调了面对历史的重要性，揭示了政治宣传如何影响我们对历史事件的理解和记忆。

Q & A

平型关大捷的照片真实拍摄地点和时间是什么？

照片实际上拍摄于1937年10月，在平型关战役结束后，由一位来自国民党控制区的电影工作室导演在太行山区拍摄的。

为什么平型关战役的照片和录像并不真实反映战役情况？

因为在1937年，八路军还没有自己的战地记者，所以战役中的场景是通过重演来拍摄的，不是真实的战场画面。

江克石教授是谁？他为何对平型关大捷感兴趣？

江克石是一位在日本大学工作的中国教授，最初研究文学，并在获得博士学位后成为了岡山大学的教授。他对平型关大捷感兴趣，是因为他发现日本公布的战时军事档案与中共发布的历史材料存在显著差异，引起了他的好奇和进一步研究。

《平型关大捷如何在日军档案中出现》这本书主要揭示了什么内容？

这本书揭示了平型关大捷的真实情况，包括日军的实际伤亡数字远低于中共宣称的数目，以及战役的具体过程和战术布局，挑战了长期以来固化的历史叙述。

平型关战役中，中共和日军关于伤亡数字的叙述有何差异？

中共长期宣称在平型关大捷中消灭了1000名日军，而江克石教授的研究显示，整个平型关战役中日军的总伤亡约为162人，其中158人有确切的姓名、军衔和地址记录。

平型关战役的实际战术布局是怎样的？

平型关战役的战术布局并非完全是林彪的独创，而是根据地形和常识来设立伏击的。此外，战役期间，中央军已经多次在此地设伏，显示这是一种常规的军事布局而非特别的军事天才。

平型关大捷对后来的中日关系和历史叙述有何影响？

平型关大捷被多次利用于政治宣传，加深了对日本的历史仇恨叙述，影响了中日两国的关系和民众的历史认知。同时，这种基于政治宣传的历史叙述方式对真实理解历史和面向未来产生了不利影响。

为什么说历史叙述和政治宣传之间存在差异？

历史叙述往往被用作政治宣传的工具，通过夸大或编造事实来塑造民族英雄和激发民族主义情绪，这导致真实的历史事件被歪曲或被误解，从而影响了人们对历史的真实理解。

江克石教授的研究对我们今天理解和面对历史有什么启示？

江克石教授的研究提示我们，真实的历史常常被政治宣传所掩盖。面对历史，我们应该追求客观、真实的理解，而不是被政治宣传所左右，这对和解历史仇恨和共同面向未来尤为重要。

如何看待平型关大捷在中国抗日战争叙述中的地位？

平型关大捷在中国抗日战争叙述中占据了重要地位，被视为八路军和整个中国军队在战争中的首次重大胜利。然而，随着更多历史资料的公开和研究，对其胜利的规模和意义的理解也在发生变化，呼吁人们更加客观地审视历史。

Outlines

00:00

📷 重写历史：一个照片的故事

1937年的一张照片，常见于中国抗日战争的教科书和历史博物馆，显示第八路军115师在平型关战役中的重机枪位置，实际上却是战役结束后在太行山区重拍的场景。这次重拍旨在制作纪录片，由来自国民党控制区的电影工作室导演完成。这件事揭示了历史叙述和实际发生的事件之间的差异，以及当时没有自己的战地记者的第八路军。该段落通过故事背后的研究，引出了江克石教授对平型关大胜利的深入研究和在日军档案中发现的不同叙述。

05:03

🏞 平型关战役：战略与结果

第五师团的平型关战役实际上是分为三个阶段进行的，本意并非占领太原，而是对晋绥军的惩罚。在战役进程中，尽管第八路军只是进行侧翼骚扰，但最终的反击导致了对日军的重大损失。此段强调了实际上由于国军的先前伏击和林彪在战略地点设伏的普遍军事常识，并非如传说中的军事天才所为。江克石教授的研究揭示了林彪真正的战略意图是利用山西军的胜利，以较小的代价清理战场，从而扩大其军事成就。

10:06

🔍 真相揭露：平型关战役的实际损失

通过深入研究日军档案，发现平型关战役中，日军的真实损失远小于中国方面宣称的。两场主要战斗揭示了日军与八路军的实际对抗情况，以及战斗的结果。其中，一支日军后勤部队被八路军伏击，造成了一定的损失，但与宣传中的数字相比差距巨大。江克石教授的研究通过详细的档案记录，对战斗的每一个细节进行了核实，展现了平型关战役的真实面貌。

15:08

📚 历史与宣传：东亚国家的历史解读问题

江克石教授的研究不仅揭示了平型关战役的真实情况，还探讨了中国、日本、韩国如何基于各自的政治立场解读历史，这种方式使得真正的历史和和解变得困难。通过比较三国在处理战时档案和历史叙述的方式，教授指出，真实的历史场景正在逐渐被揭露，但在中国，某些历史事件被过度利用或夸大，用于政治宣传和塑造民族主义情绪，这与真实的历史事实存在偏差。

20:10

✊ 挑战历史叙述：反思与前瞻

江克石教授的书籍不仅挑战了官方历史叙述，还提出了关于如何面对历史和未来的深刻反思。他指出，历史叙述和政治宣传之间存在巨大的鸿沟，真实的历史细节往往在宣传过程中被忽略或曲解。此外，他还讨论了如何政治化的历史叙述影响了现今对历史的理解以及东亚国家之间的关系，强调了面对历史真相的重要性，并呼吁更加科学和客观的历史研究态度。

Keywords

💡平型关战役

平型关战役是中国抗日战争中的一场重要战役，发生在1937年。在这段视频中，平型关战役被描述为中国军队在抗日战争初期的一次重要胜利，尤其是八路军在该战役中的表现被广泛宣传。然而，视频也提到，真实的战斗情况和后来的宣传有很大的差距，八路军的胜利可能被夸大了。

💡历史叙事

历史叙事是指对历史事件的描述和解释方式。在这段视频中，历史叙事的主题反映在如何记述和理解平型关战役以及整个抗日战争的历史。视频指出，不同的政治立场会影响历史叙事，可能导致对某些事件的夸大或歪曲。

💡宣传与真实

宣传与真实是指政治宣传中的描述与历史真相之间的关系。视频中强调，抗日战争的许多叙述可能更多地基于宣传而非实际发生的历史事件。例如，平型关战役的胜利被大幅夸大以满足政治需求和民族主义情绪。

💡江克石教授

江克石教授是一位研究中国抗日战争历史的学者。在视频中，他通过对日本军事档案的研究，揭示了关于平型关战役的一些真实情况，这与中国官方叙述存在差异。通过他的研究，我们可以看到历史叙述中的某些部分可能经过修改或夸大。

💡国民党和共产党

国民党和共产党是中国内战期间的两个主要政治力量。视频中提到，在抗日战争期间，两党虽然共同面对外敌，但各自有不同的政治目的和宣传需求。战役叙述的差异反映了它们之间的政治斗争和历史记忆的塑造。

💡武器装备

武器装备在视频中指的是抗日战争中各军队使用的军事装备。视频提及，在平型关战役中，八路军的武器和装备在某些方面比日军更为先进，这与通常的叙述不同，后者常强调中方装备的落后。

💡战争档案

战争档案是指收集和保存有关战争的文档和记录。视频中强调了日本战时档案的重要性，因为它们提供了与中国官方历史叙述不同的视角和信息，特别是关于平型关战役的实际情况。

💡历史修正主义

历史修正主义是一种对既定历史叙述进行重新评估和解释的方法，旨在揭示新发现的事实或被忽略的视角。视频中的内容涉及对平型关战役以及抗日战争历史的修正主义观点，挑战了官方和传统的历史叙事。

💡政治宣传

政治宣传是指通过媒体或其他手段传播特定政治信息或观点的行为。在视频中，政治宣传被用来描述如何在抗日战争中，特别是关于平型关战役的叙述，被用来服务于政治目的和塑造国家意识形态。

💡民族主义情绪

民族主义情绪是指强烈的国家主义或民族自豪感。视频探讨了如何通过战争叙述，特别是像平型关战役这样的事件，来激发和利用民族主义情绪，以增强国内的团结和民族认同。

Highlights

一个关于中国抗日战争中平型关战役的照片实际上是在战役结束后重现的场景，而不是真实战场画面。

中国教科书和历史博物馆中广泛展示的这张照片，并不反映了平型关战役的实际情况。

江克石教授通过研究发现，抗日战争中的许多历史叙述与日本军事档案中的记录存在重大差异。

平型关大捷在中共历史叙述中被誇大其词，而实际上，日本方面的档案显示日本军队的损失远低于宣称的数字。

在平型关战役中，所谓的消灭1000日军的说法被严重夸大了。

平型关战役实际上是一系列复杂战斗的集合，而非单一的大胜利。

八路军并未直接参与对日本主力的正面冲突，而是通过骚扰日军侧翼等策略参与战斗。

江克石教授的研究揭示了历史叙述中的许多误区和夸张，挑战了官方历史的权威性。

抗日战争中的许多历史事件，如五壮士跳崖、刘庄保卫战等，被发现与事实有很大出入。

政治宣传导致战争成就被无意中夸大，这一现象不仅存在于中国，日本也存在同样问题。

通过战争的政治利用，平型关战役被中共多次利用来加强民族主义和爱国主义情绪。

战后，中日韩三国由于基于各自政治立场对历史的不同解读，使得真正的和解变得困难。

日本对战争历史的全面披露与研究，与中国对于抗日战争记忆的处理形成鲜明对比。

历史叙述和政治宣传之间存在巨大差异，这对于我们今天真正理解历史、面向未来具有重大影响。

江克石教授的书籍不仅是对抗日战争历史的一次深入研究，也提出了如何面对历史、如何面向未来的重要思考。

Transcripts

The photo you are now seeing

is very familiar to those with even a slight understanding of China's War of Resistance

It widely appears in Chinese textbooks and in the exhibition halls of history museums

Its caption notes that this is from 1937

a heavy machine gun position of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army during the Pingxingguan campaign

In the photo, a soldier is shooting in front of a heavy machine gun, with a commander standing behind

But today, I want to tell you about this photo

Actually, the shooting location is not Pingxingguan, nor was it taken in September 1937

In fact, this photo was taken in October 1937

after the Pingxingguan campaign had ended

The 115th Division, led by Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen, hid in the Taihang Mountains

In October, a director from a film studio in the Nationalist-controlled area

came to the Taihang Mountains to shoot a documentary on the Pingxingguan campaign

So, they reenacted a Pingxingguan battle scene

in this area of the Taihang Mountains

To coordinate the operation, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai on September 23

sent a telegram to Lin Biao, the commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and informed the deputy commander, Nie Rongzhen

The 115th Division was then deployed between Pingxingguan and Lingqiu

At that time, commanders of the Eighth Route Army, including Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen,

were gathered for a meeting, and a series of photos were taken

Then, they called the soldiers to the mountain, firing guns into the valley, creating a "bang bang bang" sound

took some photos, and also shot some cinematographic works

This movie later became

a key historical document referenced in narratives of the Pingxingguan campaign

But actually, neither this photo nor the captured footage

depict the real historical scenes that occurred during the Pingxingguan campaign

Because at that time, in 1937,

the Eighth Route Army did not have their own war correspondents

So why am I talking about this photo?

It's because the story behind this photo evokes quite a bit of emotion in me

Sometimes history

sometimes, you really can't tell if it's real history or a movie

The person who thoroughly researched the story behind this photo is a Chinese professor

His name is Jiang Keshi, and he is Chinese

but works as a professor in a Japanese university

In Japan, he originally studied literature, and after obtaining his PhD,

he became a professor at Okayama University in Japan. But in his spare time, he discovered

that Japan had released a lot of wartime military archives

These military archives, compared with the historical materials released by the CCP

including the narratives of history, had significant discrepancies

So, he became curious

and in his spare time, started to research the history of China's War of Resistance against Japan

Today, I'm going to talk about a book he researched

titled "The Pingxingguan Great Victory as Appeared in Japanese Military Archives"

Speaking of Pingxingguan, everyone knows, in the narratives of CCP history,

it was the first major victory of the Eighth Route Army during the War of Resistance against Japan,

and also the first major victory for the entire Chinese military during the war

At that time, it was said that the 115th Division, commanded by Lin Biao at Pingxingguan,

eliminated over 4,000 Japanese troops

And then, over the years, this number seems to have "shrunk"

from 4,000 to 3,000, 3,000 to 2,000, and finally to 1,000

This force was changed from the main force to the follow-up force, then to the reinforcement force,

and then including the supply troops, changing back and forth

But basically, the current historical narrative has stabilized at 1,000 killed

And then, the description of this battle is very exciting

Talking about Lin Biao, as the commander,

went to Qiaogou near Pingxingguan three times for reconnaissance

Then, he planned an ambush in Qiaogou

At 7 a.m. on September 25, the enemy forces had all entered the ambush zone

The battle officially started, and the Eighth

Route Army surrounded and divided the confused Japanese troops.

After assessing the situation, the Japanese attempted to seize the high ground.

A fierce close combat ensued between the two sides.

But actually, what really happened in the Pingxingguan campaign?

I want to tell everyone that the claim of annihilating 1,000 Japanese troops is also greatly exaggerated.

Because in the entire Pingxingguan campaign, not the so-called great victory,

the total Japanese casualties throughout the campaign were about 1,000.

Here, I need to first explain the relationship between the Pingxingguan campaign and the so-called great victory.

The so-called Pingxingguan campaign started on September 21,

1937, initiated by Japan's 5th Division.

The 5th Division of Japan launched the Pingxingguan campaign merely to punish the Jin-Sui Army

because of the setback they suffered in the Suiyuan incident a year earlier.

So, a year later, they wanted to take revenge and deal with the Jin-Sui Army.

At that time, the 5th Division wasn't a full-strength division,

it had only three companies, totaling 4,500 men.

Their strategic goal wasn't to reach Taiyuan,

but unexpectedly, as the battle progressed, Taiyuan was captured.

But that was a result, not the initial strategic goal.

On September 21, Japan's 5th Division issued such a mobilization order.

The entire Pingxingguan campaign lasted for about three phases.

From September 22 to September 24, was the first phase.

The Japanese began their attack, facing the Jin-Sui Army at that time,

including Fu Zuoyi's 7th Group Army and Yan Xishan's Shanxi Army,

with both forces totaling about 60,000 men.

In terms of military strength, the Nationalist forces had the absolute advantage,

including the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, which had about three to four thousand men.

However, due to the superior equipment and combat effectiveness of the Japanese,

these 4,500 men, starting from September 22, launched the attack

and maintained the initiative on the battlefield until September 24.

But from September 25 to September 26, the Jin-Sui Army launched a counterattack,

starting to encircle and cut off the Japanese forces, including their supply lines.

During this counterattack phase, the strategic goal was to eliminate the 5th Division,

these 4,500 men, because after all, they were at a numerical disadvantage.

However, from September 26 to September 28, the Japanese reopened their supply lines

as reinforcements arrived from Lingqiu.

After reopening the supply lines, from September 29 to 30, they began

a comprehensive strategic counterattack, which outlines the course of the Pingxingguan campaign.

During the eight days of the Pingxingguan campaign,

the main battles took place between the Jin-Sui Army and the Japanese forces,

with the Eighth Route Army only harassing the flanks.

On September 25, when Yan Xishan was planning a full counterattack,

he issued combat orders to the Eighth Route Army,

requesting the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army to attack the Japanese flanks on the battlefield.

In fact, the so-called great victory at Pingxingguan occurred on September 25,

during the counterattack process of the entire Pingxingguan campaign,

the Eighth Route Army conducted an ambush on the flank.

This ambush took place near Pingxingguan

at a place called Qiaogou

To the Japanese Army's 5th Division combat headquarters in Guan Gou Village, a necessary path in between.

This road is about 3 kilometers long, with cliffs on both sides about 10 meters high.

At that time, this Guan Gou was the road that was being used.

Because at that time, whether it was the Japanese Army marching

or including the subsequent supplies, all had to go through this ditch.

So, was this ditch solely Lin Biao's own strategy at that time?

Actually, after Professor Jiang Keshi's verification, it was found not to be the case.

Why? Because, in fact, with this ditch, as soon as you see the site,

you would realize, if you have a bit of military common sense, you would set up an ambush here.

Moreover, from September 22 to September 24,

the National Army had already set up ambushes here several times.

It's just that at that time, the combat capability of the National Army was relatively poor.

When a battalion of troops met with the main force of the Japanese Army, they would collapse at the first contact.

Therefore, the Japanese Army didn't take the National Army's ambush seriously.

So Lin Biao setting up an ambush here on September 25 was actually common military sense,

not what you'd call a stroke of military genius.

That's the first point, the second point

is about how many Japanese soldiers were killed during the whole Pingxingguan campaign.

What exactly happened on the battlefield, Professor Jiang Keshi did a detailed verification.

His discovery, Lin Biao setting up an ambush in this bridge ditch,

actually had a real stroke of genius, what does this mean?

Because this bridge ditch, at that time, was located at the rear of the Japanese Army,

between their frontline combat troops and Lingqiu County.

So why set up an ambush here?

And the opening of his trumpet was facing the direction of the Japanese Army's frontline positions.

Therefore, Professor Jiang Keshi, after verification, believes that Lin Biao's intentions were here,

He did not want to actively attack those main forces,

he hoped that after Yan Xishan's Jinsui Army defeated the Japanese Army,

if the Japanese Army retreated from the front line, they would enter this pocket formation,

at that time, it would be possible to eliminate the remnants of the Japanese Army, without needing to pay a high price,

while also being able to expand the military achievements.

And Lin Biao's idea was very good, on one hand, to conserve strength and not engage in tough fights,

meanwhile, if the Jinsui Army really won, these defeated troops passing by here

I could still clean them up, smart, really strategic.

The real strategy is here.

Just coincidentally, after Lin Biao set up an ambush on September 25,

that day, really two battles occurred in this Qiao Gou.

These two battles, Professor Jiang Keshi did detailed verification in his book.

First, on that morning at 9:30, from the direction of Guan Gou Village,

about 50 vehicles came, a so-called Japanese Army logistic troop.

So why did they dispatch this logistic troop?

Upon checking the archives, it was very clear,

because from September 22 to September 24, after fighting for three days,

By September 24, they were somewhat unable to continue fighting, especially as the Shanxi forces began to counterattack.

On September 25, the Japanese Army requested this logistic unit

to return in the direction of Lingqiu County, to bring reinforcements.

Because they were unable to advance at the front, and the battlefield situation was unfavorable for them.

Thus, all 50 vehicles were empty, carrying nothing.

They were prepared to go there to bring back reinforcements. The person commanding this logistic unit

was Lieutenant Colonel Shizuka, a lieutenant colonel of the Japanese Army's logistic unit.

Logistic units, in Japanese military training, are considered a formal part of the order of battle,

but they are definitely not considered the main force.

This Lieutenant Colonel Shizuka was a lieutenant colonel of a logistic unit.

How many people were in this unit? Not quite 200, just over 100 people.

These hundred-plus people were the drivers, the porters,

plus some of their own combatants, roughly that number.

And they had no heavy weapons, only two machine guns in total.

Think about it, over a hundred people,

then at 9:30, they started fighting upon entering here. At that time, the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army here

was led by Li Tianyou of the 686th Regiment.

This Li Tianyou later became a general after the founding of the PRC.

They began the attack, and the Japanese, wielding heavy machine guns, began to fire.

In fact, at that time, the Eighth Route Army's weapons and equipment were significantly better than the Japanese's.

Initially, after a brief moment of panic,

the Japanese quickly rushed to the mountains on both sides.

After occupying the high ground, they began to exchange fire with the Eighth Route Army.

In this, a Japanese squad of about twenty to thirty men

occupied a high ground called Laoye Temple.

Both sides engaged in a very intense fight for Laoye Temple's high ground.

If you look at the CCP's book on the Great Victory of Pingxingguan,

it contains a very important description about Laoye Temple.

This description is somewhat exaggerated,

claiming there were airplanes in the sky, tanks on the ground, and artillery.

As a result, after repeated bloody charges, the Eighth Route Army finally annihilated the enemy.

But actually, at that time, the Japanese only had twenty to thirty men with a light machine gun,

and they fought a fierce battle with the Eighth Route Army for 4 hours. Soon after the battle began,

Lieutenant Colonel Shizuka was shot and killed.

So, around 12:40, a lieutenant from Shimura at that time announced

they began to retreat upon receiving the order.

In the process, around 11:30, a rescue team arrived from the rear,

a squad of about 100 people.

So, the total Japanese combat forces in this area amounted to about 350 people.

And how many were there on the Eighth Route Army side? About 3,000, almost ten times the number of the Japanese forces.

But despite being ten times the number of the Japanese, this situation of the Eighth Route Army against the enemy

resulted in a fierce battle lasting 4 hours.

Moreover, the pocket formation on their side was not secured; the rear was always open.

At that time, the Eighth Route Army attempted to secure the rear pocket formation,

but a bayonet charge by the Japanese scattered the Eighth Route Army's forces.

Ultimately, the so-called pocket formation remained open.

So later, from 12:40, the Japanese began to retreat,

all the way from this bridge ditch back to their starting point.

Before leaving, they burned those vehicles.

By 3:30 pm, the Japanese had regrouped back in Guan Gou Village.

Then they began to tally the casualties of this battle, with the Japanese losing a total of 62 people.

For this battle, about 30 people were killed or wounded.

This was one of the main battlefields of the Pingxingguan campaign,

namely the main battlefield in the area around Laoye Temple.

The current location of the Pingxingguan Memorial is right here.

Coincidentally, while fighting near Laoye Temple,

around 11 am, another group of Japanese troops came from the northern part of the bridge ditch.

What were these Japanese troops doing?

They were coming from the Lingqiu direction, a Japanese luggage unit.

This luggage unit, with about 100 horses pulling carts loaded with luggage,

carried mainly dry bread and some cotton clothes,

intended for the front-line troops to deliver these supplies.

There were also a few pieces of combat supplies.

This unit had about seventy to eighty "special duty soldiers,"

plus 15 regular infantrymen.

What are "special duty soldiers"? Let me explain here:

In the Japanese army, "special duty soldiers" were actually non-combat personnel.

"Special duty soldier" is a euphemism.

Originally they were called "ronin."

"Ronin" sounds very discriminatory.

In essence, they were the labor force of the Japanese army.

These people did not need to fight and did not undergo military training

because they were meant to perform laborious tasks.

They transported the wounded, food, military doctors, and ammunition.

Thus, these people had no combat capability.

About 70 of these people, plus 15 escort soldiers, made up this unit.

That's this unit.

Then, before this unit entered the bridge ditch village,

they happened to encounter a group of seven people.

This group of seven, coming from Lingqiu and the headquarters,

included a staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hashimoto.

He was originally going to the frontline headquarters in a car,

but coincidentally, it rained heavily on the 24th,

and when they drove on the 25th, the car got stuck in the mud and couldn't move.

So after Lieutenant Colonel Hashimoto got down,

he and his men began to proceed on foot.

Upon reaching the entrance of the bridge ditch, they joined up with the luggage transport unit.

Then they proceeded into the bridge ditch,

and upon entering, they encountered an encirclement by the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

This unit was almost entirely wiped out,

with nearly 100 people, only six survived.

At the beginning of the attack,

since these special duty soldiers had no combat experience,

they panicked amidst heavy machine guns, mortars, and grenades from above.

These men began to scatter in confusion.

Lieutenant Colonel Hashimoto was a staff officer,

he was commanding on the spot, but he had hardly any troops to command.

He also rushed up the cliff and engaged in a firefight with the Eighth Route Army.

During the exchange of fire, their firepower gradually diminished.

Thus, only 6 people from this unit survived in the end.

These six hid in small caves,

or pretended to be dead, lying under dead horses.

They were later rescued by the Japanese returning to the battlefield.

The Pingxingguan campaign, in essence, unfolded like this,

it was not just a battle of Pingxingguan but a great victory.

The total number of Japanese casualties in the northern and southern battlefields has very precise numbers,

because the Japanese archives are very comprehensive.

After the war, they made battlefield summary reports,

and the deceased soldiers have death records.

Based on these death records, compensation was distributed to the families,

and the compensation from the Japanese Army was quite high.

It amounted to 20 times the annual income of the military.

You see, that's a lot.

The Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare also retains complete records of this.

So, Professor Jiang Keshi compiled these numbers,

and the total number of Japanese casualties in the great victory of Pingxingguan was about 162.

For 158 of them, there are precise records of their names, military ranks

and addresses

This is very well preserved in the Japanese archives.

About 100 people were injured,

so adding up, it's a great victory in the Pingxingguan campaign.

The CCP's proclaimed great victory at Pingxingguan, the total casualties on the Japanese side were also about 200 people.

That's roughly the situation.

Think about it, compared to the CCP's propaganda of annihilating more than 1,000 enemies, the difference is quite significant.

It's seven or eight times less, right?

Why do I spend a whole day talking about this book?

I find Professor Jiang Keshi's point in this book particularly interesting.

He says that during the war, the political propaganda from both sides

inadvertently exaggerates military achievements.

Because political propaganda is about creating extreme national heroes.

It's not just the CCP; Japan did it too.

For example, Japan's propaganda during the Russo-Japanese War included a military god,

Yamaguchi, who was later proven to be fabricated.

And then during the Pacific War, wasn't Pearl Harbor attacked?

The Japanese propaganda of nine military gods bombing the American base,

later it was found they intentionally left one out,

one downed Japanese pilot.

This Japanese pilot landed on Roy Island, right?

After landing on Roy Island, it led to conflicts between the Japanese descendants and the natives later,

which directly resulted in all Japanese Americans being interned in camps.

But in Japanese propaganda, this part was completely removed,

that is, through such deliberate creation of extreme heroes,

to make ordinary people sacrifice themselves as cannon fodder for Japanese militarism.

That's how Japan did it, and the CCP did the same.

After the Pingxingguan great victory was first announced by the CCP,

Chiang Kai-shek really awarded commendations.

Why? Because at that time, there was the myth of the invincible Imperial Japanese Army.

So all of China was longing for a victory over the Japanese army.

The Pingxingguan great victory announced by the Eighth Route Army indeed boosted morale,

and Chiang Kai-shek was also cautious.

He encouraged the Eighth Route Army to fight the Japanese because at that time, the KMT and the CCP were at odds.

Although the Eighth Route Army went to the battlefield,

it was basically not controlled by the military group and operated independently.

So Chiang Kai-shek hoped to encourage the Eighth Route Army to really fight the Japanese.

This was the first time it was utilized.

So his view is that the three countries, China, Japan, and Korea,

actually explain history based on their own political stance,

rather than facing the true history, which makes reconciliation difficult.

But after the war, Japan, with its peace constitution,

these so-called extreme heroes

disappeared from textbooks and history.

Gradually, we are returning to a real historical scene.

From the complete disclosure of archives during the war by Japan,

and research in this area, you can see.

But it's different on the Chinese side; the Pingxingguan campaign was actually exploited

It was utilized three times, the first time as Professor Jiang Keshi mentioned

At that time, the entire Chinese nation hoped for a victory, so such a military achievement was exaggerated

Not only the Pingxingguan campaign but the Battle of Taierzhuang was also exaggerated

In the Japanese records, whether it was the Battle of Taierzhuang or including the Pingxingguan campaign

Both were very ordinary battles

And during the war, other feats by the Eighth Route Army were also crafted

We'll talk about that in a moment

The second exploitation was actually in 1945 when the KMT and CCP were going to fight

When the KMT and CCP were about to fight, the Communist Party had a theory

What was the theory?

It said that during the eight years of the War of Resistance, it was the CCP troops that were fighting

The KMT was actually hiding in the mountains, so now they want to reap the benefits

Didn't Mao write an article?

If you want to argue that the CCP was the mainstay in the resistance process

Then you must have examples, right? What are the examples?

Actually, during the entire eight years, the CCP could only showcase two battles against the Japanese

One is the Pingxingguan campaign, and the other is the Hundred Regiments Offensive

Therefore, the Pingxingguan campaign must be portrayed as a tremendous victory at that time

This was a political necessity

The third exploitation actually happened after the founding of the PRC

After the founding, Sino-Japanese relations have been fluctuating

As everyone knows, there was once a honeymoon period

But in the last two decades, Sino-Japanese relations have generally been discordant

The discordant result has led to

all kinds of war memories with Japan being repeatedly reinforced

Even repeatedly dramatized and storied

This is based not only on Sino-Japanese relations

But also on considerations of patriotism and nationalism

To shape a new common memory through

dramatization and storytelling of these wars

This common memory has nothing to do with the so-called historical facts.

Professor Jiang Keshi, through research, found that, in fact, several so-called common memories of the Anti-Japanese War

are false.

For example, the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain.

The Five Heroes of Langya Mountain, these five individuals, were actually trapped and then made a martyrdom act.

While it's quite heroic, the narrative process claims

they killed more than a hundred Japanese soldiers, and the five of them jumped off the cliff after running out of ammunition.

But Japanese archives have clear records

that during the entire battle involving the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain, the Japanese army only had one person wounded.

So, you see, this narrative actually has nothing to do with historical facts.

And then there's the defense of Liu Zhuang.

At that time, Liu Zhuang had 82 members of the New Fourth Army.

This platoon, all martyred in the end, claimed to have killed several hundred Japanese soldiers at the time.

But upon checking Japanese archives, it was found that the Japanese army only had two people killed.

To say that these 82 people collectively achieved martyrdom is also quite remarkable.

But then, to exaggerate it to the extermination of several hundred Japanese soldiers

is utterly absurd.

So, you can see that historical narrative and political propaganda

actually have nothing to do with each other.

History has only become a carrier, just a tool.

But the problem is that such a narrative system that instrumentalizes history

is really harmful to us today, seriously understanding history and facing the future.

Think about it, the Sino-Japanese War has been over for more than 70 years.

But then, think about it, these countries in East Asia have not reconciled,

and everyone is still arguing every day.

One very important reason is that

we have not approached the true content of this historical event

with a historiographical attitude.

It's all based on a propagandistic attitude to explain history,

and this propaganda is actually stance-first, conclusion-first

All these Sino-Japanese historical narratives ultimately point towards a history of hatred, hating Japan,

rather than pointing towards a true history.

But, when all of this encounters a real historical detail,

such as these archives from the Japanese side,

you will find that all those historical constructs are utterly untenable.

But then, you realize that the truth of history

really doesn't matter much in the process of propaganda.

Wasn't there someone who spoke about the historical facts of the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain?

And as a result, they were judged by a court in Beijing,

saying this is the national common memory, this is the core value of socialism.

If you violate it, you're breaking the law, you're infringing on the honor of the Five Heroes of Langya Mountain.

But what's truly sad is, this so-called narrative propaganda

can only be sustained within a specific, closed information environment.

Once this barrier of information is opened,

people will find out that all these propagandas are false.

The entire narrative system is false.

Can it really build up our true nationalism and our patriotic feelings?

Or say, the nationalism and patriotism it builds up,

does it really help our country, is it beneficial?

So, at the end of today's program, I recommend everyone

to take a look at Professor Jiang Keshi's book.

I think the issues he raises in this book truly make us reflect

on how to face history, how to face the future.

Okay, that's all for today, thank you, everyone.

The Eighth Route Army utilized favorable terrain to launch a fierce attack on the Japanese army,

and implemented a strategy of encirclement and segmentation against the chaotic Japanese forces.

A brutal melee battle ensued between the two sides.