Understanding the Causes and Drivers of Violent Extremism in the Sahel – Angela Martin
Summary
TLDRAngela Martin from USAID discusses her extensive experience in development, starting with managing agricultural projects in Africa 30 years ago. She highlights the evolution of counter-extremism, initially focusing on development drivers such as corruption, lack of social services, and broken families, and later incorporating insights into terrorist group activities. Emphasizing an integrated approach, she explores four key aspects: motivation, membership, means, and methods of extremist groups. Angela stresses the importance of understanding both the community vulnerabilities and the actions of terrorist organizations for a comprehensive response to extremism.
Takeaways
- 🌍 Angela Martin from USAID shares her background, noting 30 years of experience in development, including agricultural projects in Africa.
- 🛡️ Martin emphasizes that she is not a security specialist but views issues from a development perspective.
- 📅 She started working on counter-extremism in 2005, focusing on the drivers of radicalization and vulnerabilities in communities.
- 💡 Key factors contributing to extremism include corruption, lack of social services, and broken social safety nets.
- 🔍 Martin notes the importance of understanding both the drivers of radicalization and the actions of terrorist groups.
- ⚔️ She categorizes terrorist groups into those with global aspirations, like Al-Qaeda, and those with more local insurgent goals.
- 👥 The role of women in extremist groups is highlighted as often more ideologically committed than male fighters.
- 💬 Martin points out the importance of addressing both the developmental and security aspects of countering extremism.
- 🌐 The distinction between global jihadist groups and local insurgencies has blurred over time, complicating counter-extremism efforts.
- 📊 She concludes by stressing the need for an integrated approach that includes both security and development responses to effectively counter extremism.
Q & A
Who is Angela Martin and what is her background?
-Angela Martin is a development practitioner with 30 years of experience managing agricultural extension projects for Peace Corps in Africa. She has worked for 15 years on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).
What perspective does Angela Martin bring to the discussion on CVE?
-Angela Martin brings a development perspective to the discussion on CVE, focusing on understanding the role of development assistance in addressing extremism.
What were the early focuses of CVE efforts according to Angela Martin?
-Early CVE efforts focused on understanding the drivers, motivating factors, and risk factors that made individuals vulnerable to recruitment, such as corruption, lack of social services, and broken social safety networks.
What are the two sides of the coin in understanding violent extremist organizations?
-The two sides of the coin are understanding the drivers and vulnerabilities of individuals and communities on one side, and understanding the actions and operations of the violent extremist organizations on the other.
What are the four aspects Angela Martin uses to analyze violent extremist groups?
-The four aspects are motivation, membership, means, and methods.
How has the distinction between different types of terrorist groups changed over time?
-The distinction has blurred, with groups shifting from territorial insurgencies to global jihad affiliations, making it harder to differentiate between their motivations and operations.
What role do women play in violent extremist organizations according to Angela Martin?
-Women play a significant role as facilitators within violent extremist organizations, often being more ideologically committed than some male members and involved in activities like running safe houses and advance surveillance.
What has been the trend in recruitment within the Sahel region?
-Recruitment in the Sahel has shifted from individual recruitment to groups joining en masse, often due to clan or family ties, leading to a vast expansion of membership.
How do criminal networks and illicit trade impact violent extremist groups?
-Criminal networks and illicit trade provide resources and facilitate the movement of people and equipment, complicating the operating environment but not necessarily driving the groups' operations.
What is Angela Martin's view on the importance of understanding both sides of violent extremism?
-Angela Martin emphasizes that understanding both the drivers of extremism and the actions of extremist groups is crucial for an integrated approach to effectively address and respond to violent extremism.
Outlines
👩🏫 Introduction and Background
Angela Martin from USAID introduces herself and discusses her extensive background in development, highlighting her work on agricultural extension projects for the Peace Corps in Africa and her 15 years of experience working on Counter Violent Extremism (CVE). She emphasizes her development perspective, not as a security specialist, and discusses the drivers of extremism, such as corruption, lack of social services, and broken families, primarily focusing on young men and the role of radicalization.
🌍 Evolution of Terrorist Threats
The script discusses the changing landscape of terrorist threats, contrasting the early focus on global jihadists seeking to establish a global Caliphate with more recent insurgencies that have political and territorial objectives. It highlights the blurred lines between these groups, using examples like AQIM in the Sahel, which shifted from a territorial insurgency to aligning with global jihadist aspirations.
👥 Recruitment and Membership
This section examines the changing dynamics of recruitment and membership in terrorist organizations. Initially, groups like AQIM were composed mainly of non-sub-Saharan Africans, but this shifted post-2011 with entire militias joining. The role of women, particularly through strategic intermarriage, is highlighted as a significant factor in embedding terrorist ideologies within communities. The Sahel's unique position as neither a significant exporter nor importer of jihadists is also discussed.
🔫 Means and Methods of Terrorist Groups
The means and methods employed by terrorist groups in the Sahel have evolved, with early activities focused on kidnapping for ransom and small-scale skirmishes. The influx of weapons in 2012 changed the dynamics, leading to more conventional insurgency tactics. The role of criminal networks and illicit trade, such as cigarette smuggling, in facilitating terrorist operations is also examined.
🤝 Strategic and Collaborative Approaches
The final paragraph emphasizes the need for an integrated approach combining development and security responses to effectively address terrorism. Understanding motivations and facilitating negotiated settlements are key to preventing the spread of violence, especially to littoral states like Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. The importance of a balanced response that minimizes the security footprint is stressed to avoid exacerbating the situation.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡CVE (Countering Violent Extremism)
💡Development Perspective
💡Drivers of Extremism
💡Integrated Approach
💡Global Caliphate
💡Insurgency
💡Membership
💡Methods and Means
💡Illicit Trade
💡Geographic Targeting
Highlights
Angela Martin from US Aid shares her extensive experience managing agricultural extension projects for Peace Corps in Africa, starting 30 years ago.
Angela discusses her transition from development practitioner to working on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) since 2005, before it was termed CVE.
The role of development assistance in addressing the drivers and motivating factors of violent extremism is emphasized.
Key factors making individuals vulnerable to recruitment include corruption, lack of social services, and broken families, especially in the Sahel.
Angela highlights the importance of understanding both the vulnerabilities and the actions of terrorist groups for an integrated response.
The concept of motivation, membership, means, and methods is introduced as a framework to analyze terrorist groups.
Early on, the primary focus was on transnational terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda aiming to set up a global Caliphate.
The distinction between global jihadist groups and insurgencies with political or territorial goals is discussed.
Membership dynamics have shifted, with entire groups joining terrorist organizations, changing recruitment patterns.
The role of women in terrorist groups is explored, noting their often more committed ideological stance.
The Sahel has not been a significant exporter of fighters to global jihadist hotspots like Iraq and Syria.
The integration of criminal networks and illicit trade with terrorist activities complicates the operating environment.
The geographical spread of terrorist activities in the Sahel is mapped, showing the progression from 2010 to 2018.
The need for a nuanced understanding of local grievances and motivations to prevent the spread of violence is stressed.
An integrated approach combining development and security responses is essential to address violent extremism effectively.
Transcripts
so good morning everyone and I'm Angela
Martin from US aid and well thank you
for reading my bio I'm going to add a
few more points because I'm always
struck by why when they posed the
question of what I was going to discuss
with you today I was a little curious
because besides my background and being
a development practitioner I started
doing this 30 years ago managing
agricultural extension projects for
Peace Corps in Africa so how I ended up
here is a bit curious right don't worry
I did have about 15 years of working on
CBE so some of the security side has
sort of worn off on me I have a little
bit of orientation but I wanted to to
just highlight this because I'm looking
at this from a development perspective
I'm not a security specialist at all
all of you are so I just want to remind
you when I'm looking at this because it
early on and I've been working on this
since I think I started in the fall of
2005 before we even called things CVE we
called it counter extremism not CVE I we
really focused on trying to understand
what is the role of development
assistance so we looked at the drivers
you've probably heard of this the
motivating factors the risk factors I'm
sure you'll have other conversations
you've probably heard this discussed in
your countries because over the years
this has become accepted terminology and
approach so what we would do is look at
what was discussed what are the factors
that make people particularly
individuals vulnerable to recruitment
and in the Sahel we looked at the things
that were just discussed we talked we
looked at corruption we looked at lack
of social services we even started
looking at the psychology of you know
sort of broken families social the
social safety network all those sorts of
things right and we looked at only young
men particularly we did look at religion
we looked at radicalization these points
of the scholarships and people going to
study in Saudi or in Sudan I mean this
came up when I was doing an assessment
in nija in Nigeria in 2008 so or Nisha
are talking about as well so this has
been known for a while
and and you know the other side so when
we looked at sort of the ideas that
you're looking at all these drivers to
see what could be manipulated to have
make someone - so they're vulnerable for
recruitment it's not that we didn't look
at what the terrorist groups were doing
themselves and their actions but it was
looked at probably from our perspective
again for us to understand what we would
do more in like what areas are they
operating in right so where was the
attacks where were things occurring and
so it helped us with geographic
targeting but we didn't really pay that
much more attention beyond that mm-hmm
and you know but over the years and it
continues to become even more apparent
that without a good understanding as
much as we can of what the terrorist
groups or the violent extremist
organizations themselves are doing we're
missing we're missing a big part of the
picture you know and in part you know
there's an expression two sides of the
coin well if one side of the coin is
what are the drivers what are the
vulnerabilities what are the risk
factors in the community level or at the
individual level or even at the societal
level the other side is what are the
groups doing why are there operating how
are they doing they're what's what's
going on with them we need to understand
both sides because our you know one of
the things and this is logical to me are
one of the core principles from the very
beginning is an integrated approach it's
not just Security Response and obviously
it's not just a development response to
deal with this we need to work together
and if we're only each of us are only
looking at one side it makes it even
harder for us to work together and
collaborate and design it and you know a
full response and so for me I sort of
came up on my you know this is my own
way of trying to organize my thoughts is
looking at these groups what are some of
the things I can look at and how can i
how can I think about it so I came up
with four aspects and I call it the
motivation the membership the means and
the methods and you know what I'm trying
to sort of again go out of my comfort
zone and look at what are these groups
doing trying to analyze the the actual
actions and
they operate and so motivation going
back was frankly one of the primary
aspects from the very beginning of how
we understood these groups and and how
we decided what was in our national
security interests what are the threats
to the US and our interests and and and
also to help us think through what our
options for the response and why that
means is because at the beginning we had
two categories right
one was the transnational terrorist
organization that was trying to set up a
global Caliphate I mean I remember back
in 2005 2006 we had these maps that the
military showed up with the Caliphate
all over North Africa into sub-saharan
Africa and here's what they're trying to
do and but part of it was that if you're
trying to set up a global Caliphate
they're not there's no negotiation
there's no settlement there's no
grievances to address
there's no territories to hold except
for this broad aspiration it's to
disrupt Western influence Western
society Western norms so so there was
that sort of there's no there's no
talking to them because there's nothing
they want to talk about them being these
terrorist groups the global jihad in the
second category is the one that is it's
more what we would understand is an
insurgency it's a rebellion that maybe
that have resorted to tear us to tactics
as part of their overall achieved for
political or territorial gains and so
there are examples of that you know the
IRA right so that was you know we have
you have the Shining Path you in Peru
you have the FARC in Colombia so these
are groups that are terrorist groups
they tear they use terrorism tactics and
tools but there is somewhere in there
they started or there remains a
political and even military objectives
and so this was a nice neat division
right global terrorists a global jihad
that's who we're worried about aq right
and it seemed to work right you had so
thinking about in the Sahel you had the
GSPC came from Algeria they were
basically a territorial insurgency woman
are you who were terror
but then they became branded they
shifted to being a qim they signed
allegiance they've moved over to they
moved down into Mali whether they were
pushed or or you know whatever the
reason is and they started having
aspirations that were not territorial
anymore so it seemed to fit and and that
seemed to work for quite some time but
as was noted you know and just in the
previous speaker that this line has
blurred right considerably so now the
motivation goes back and forth the
groups sign allegiance but they're
maintaining their territorial ambitions
they're you know they're they're the
role of where they are in in a global
jihad particularly with Isis the ability
of being a member an adherent is much
less strict than it was for aq that had
some fairly clear qualifications and
rules and criteria for being considered
a full member and so so I think that's
made that distinction harder for us for
the motivation so so it's blurred the
next one is is membership so who are the
members where do they come from and
again you know early on it was much
neater you know when we started a qim
because again looking mostly at this a
hell it came from Algeria most of the
leadership most of the membership were
not sub-saharan Africans you had a fair
number of Mauritania but they tended to
be sort of spokesperson and sort of
senior leadership but not the top you
know and and part of it I lived in
Mauritania years ago Mauritania itself
identifies as a Maghreb state not
sub-saharan and and their historical
position as an Islamic Republic and a
seat of Islamic learning also lends
credence that there's considered more of
the Arab states in that sense and so for
a long time while there was some concern
about recruitment we looked at our
programs it really wasn't a big factor
to be honest
obviously as noted this changed in the
end of 2011 into 2012
with with the Arab Spring the fall of
Qaddafi
and but also that there was these now
there were groups militias or rebellious
groups had joined whole the whole group
joined so what does that do so now
you're having recruitment that you don't
have to recruit as a ma lien or as a
Nigerian to join a group that's run by
it frankly outsiders right yes it's part
of the global Caliphate and global jihad
but it's run by outsiders now you could
be a member of group with family ties
with clan ties that's you're familiar
militia or your rebellion that you can
join in as a group and so now you can
and that has changed there's vast
expansion of numbers it's less about
individual recruitment although it's
happened but more about the group
joining and I think that pattern has
continued throughout the Sahel we're
seeing that with now the Isis the
expansion of Burkina and how it's
adopting with these groups there I think
the other thing that's a challenge is
that what's been noted I'll talk about a
little more this idea of local militias
that are protection / response and how
does that factor in trying to predict
what's happening coming forward I think
the other point is to think about is a
role of women now we've talked about and
we continue to think about fighters but
the membership one of the things that a
qim did strategically was intermarry
into some of these torrid groups
particularly in the north
early on this was starting in 2010-2011
even when they were just up in the in
the mountains because they wanted to
have a stronger tie and a stronger base
within the community and I think one of
the things that's been really not looked
at too much was what was the role of the
women and part of this is that so the
women intermarried they actually were
more hardliners and committed into the
ideology behind these groups than some
of the young men who just joined because
it was fighting it was something to do
it got get me a gun and gave me some
standing and this role of women as
facilitators is still very much
marginalized as far as what is the
importance of them are they running safe
houses are they going shopping are they
sort of the advance watch
we don't really know very well how
that's being done what's being noted
still is when they
become actual suicide bombers or actual
combatants and I think that that's a
sort of a talking about a better nuanced
understanding of how these groups are
embedding themselves into these
communities that we really don't have a
lot of visibility on that I think
another point about the Sahel compared
to even much of Africa both North Africa
and other parts is the role of the Sahel
and the membership whether it's a
destination or an exporter and it's
really been neither there hasn't been a
significant flow of the Sahel ian is
from the Sahel out to Somalia people
joining going out to go al-shabaab and
certainly not to Iraq and Syria it's the
same thing that concern while you do
have return fighters there is probably
less of a concern of Isis coming back to
the Sahel I'm not talking North Africa
then there is even for the DRC or in
other parts of East Africa and so this
movement into the global sort of jihad
or global fight to use that and not yet
that other term is is is different in
the Sahel and I think somewhat unique so
so going on to the to the next one which
is the means and methods so I think that
can be in intertwined a little bit and
again we thought it was talked about in
the previous speaker is the idea of akom
was relatively well armed but it was a
small group right and this was just they
had arms they were fighting and there
and there their methods were mostly
frankly kidnapping for ransom was their
big big attack assassinations and and
frankly sort of conventional assaults
against small military outposts to sort
of maintain an operating environment
rather than controlling territory and
there may have been some opportunistic
gita' assaults to get some some
visibility I would say but for the most
part in the early years it really was a
smaller scale community level sort of
skirmishes military skirmishes and
kidnapping for ransom again and then the
flow of weapons that came in 2012 sort
of
dynamic entirely and the scale and
persistence of the tax increased
although one would argue it still
remained for the most part what I would
call sort of conventional conflict and
less about sort of large-scale civilian
casualty attacks obviously that changed
there are a few spectacular events that
were done for different reasons in 2015
with the attacks on the hotels and
they've been drifting south into the
attack in cote ivoire but it really was
mostly one would say a more conventional
insurgency I think one of the other
things about the methods and means to
talk about is is the role of the
criminal networks in illicit trade there
have been conversations back and forth
about this particularly in Mali since
2012 I think we still don't have a
handle on it but I for in most cases
criminal networks are sort of a marriage
of convenience it's a way to move people
and equipment it can be a way of sort of
providing some resources but whether
significant is is unclear it's it's not
a cause and effect it's not something
that's driving the way the terrorist
groups are operating but it's certainly
making the operating environment easier
I think one of the arguments is the
overlap with corruption how is this
affecting the ability of security
services to operate
what is the corrupting influence of the
illicit trade to motivate or demotivate
security services to contain the
terrorist groups or to maintain the
instability it also complicates the idea
of closing borders you want to manage a
border you don't want to close it the
the role of illicit licit trade sort of
the the gray economy is also becoming
perhaps more important I I think one of
the things the issues and we've heard
this anecdotally I was in Mali in May
was the issue of cigarette trafficking
now you know in Europe and just like in
the US a pack of cigarettes can now be
upwards of almost $10
if you think about the potential for
making money in smuggling cigarettes
it's probably more important than drugs
again and certainly easier and going
back to the traditional start of motel
Belmokhtar who was a cigarette smuggler
so so the the illicit trade and how
that's manages also makes it very
complicated so its role is not very well
understood the last thing I think and
then I'm just going to go through a
little bit of how this is played out on
on the maps that we have of the
historical maps of the terrorist attacks
over the last five or six years is the
role of connections between these groups
so over the years where does a what how
is al-shabaab or Boko Haram helped these
helped or hindered what is their support
and now we would talk the global Isis
core and I would say for the most part
it was incidental I mean there was an
infamous sort of report of when the fall
and when the coup happened in Mali that
there was a Boko Haram group of training
group in in northern Mali so there are
connections but I think it's been more
about information perhaps a few
individuals but it certainly hasn't been
significant and it hasn't been sort of
chain of command directions I think
that's something that is still being
played out with Isis core and what their
role is now are they providing ability
to how to make a bomb how to conduct an
attack but perhaps amplifying messages
and their status it's unclear I think
some of it might be where there might be
attacked so that there is we are here
recognition in the global Caliphate to
sort of increase the stature but whether
it's tactically important in these
countries again I think is is probably
not as important as its sometimes played
out to be so I just wanted to go through
really quickly the slides to remind you
and I hopefully all of you have looked
at which sort of lays out about how the
spread has happened so in 2010 again
going back this is really just a qim
right and there really is a small scale
of attacks they
up in the mountains and this is where
you're having the kidnapping for ransom
going through into eleven and twelve now
you're starting to see the effect and
the spread into the south where we have
the increased weapons so again you're
spreading throughout Mali into 13 this
is where you have basically more of what
I call an active conflict
it looks like it's contained now in the
Sahel 14 15 now we have the spread south
again this is where you have a lot of
the mixed groups coming in and again
this is on the a CSS website this data
mostly is from another website called a
chlid which i think is very good to look
at and and you really have to filter the
data I would take some time to look at
the discussion because they also talk
about political violence they're about
protests about riots but I think it's
very informative about going back to the
point of looking at violence in general
and not just terrorist violence and that
that mix you know again going forward
you see now you see the rapid spread
into Burkina Faso and we're at 18 where
we really have sort of the unfortunate
where you have the sort of the violence
as being driven probably from community
level issues and grievances and less
about and being sort of co-opted and
merged with the transnational terrorist
I think the the last point and I think
cuz you know why talking about this way
to understand this I think there was the
the excellent sort of point from the
previous speaker of you have to try to
understand and maybe break it into parts
to tease out what can be negotiated now
going back to that earlier division
between transnational terrorism and sort
of insurgency what is there a political
settlement what are things that can be
handled and managed to try to
de-escalate the conflict where are areas
to protect to protect it from the spread
you know one of the greatest concerns
right now is is this going down into
what we call the littoral states what's
happening in Cote d'Ivoire what's
happening in a banana in a Togo and the
challenge is you do not want to have an
a response that's about terrorism only
you do not want to have just a security
response
because that tends to make it worse and
so how can we help understand the
motivations and who's joining and how
can we get to negotiated settlements and
leave the security response for the most
narrow possible because I think that is
really the way to prevent the spread and
the way out of it thank you
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