PHILOSOPHY - Religion: God and Morality, Part 2
Summary
TLDRIn this philosophical discourse, Stephen Darwall from Yale University explores the divine command theory, questioning whether morality is inherently God's commands. He examines various reasons one might follow God's commands, such as God's knowledge, concern for our well-being, superior authority, or love for God. Darwall argues that in each case, the reasons imply the existence of independent moral truths, suggesting that the divine command theory, which posits God as the source of all morality, is flawed. He also discusses the implications of obeying God due to His omnipotence, highlighting the distinction between power and moral obligation.
Takeaways
- 📜 The divine command theory posits that morality is derived from God's commands, but Stephen Darwall challenges this view by questioning the nature of God's authority in establishing moral laws.
- 🧐 Darwall suggests that if morality is based on God's commands, it implies there are independent moral truths that God is aware of, rather than creating them.
- 🤔 He explores different reasons people might follow God's commands, such as considering God an 'epistemic authority,' but argues that this does not equate to God creating moral law.
- 👨⚖️ The concept of 'epistemic authority' is likened to trusting someone with more knowledge on a subject, but it does not grant them the power to create laws or truths.
- 🔍 Darwall examines the idea that following God's commands could be based on their benefit to human well-being, but this also presupposes independent moral facts about what promotes well-being.
- 🏛️ He discusses the possibility of God having 'superior authority,' similar to a sergeant or legislature, which can make something required or forbidden, but this too implies a pre-existing moral obligation to obey.
- 💖 The argument that one should follow God's commands out of love for God is also critiqued, as it assumes the moral correctness of responding to loved ones' wishes, independent of divine command.
- 🚫 Darwall concludes that if any of these reasons are valid for following God's commands, it suggests that moral truths exist independently of God's commands, thus contradicting the divine command theory.
- 💪 The alternative of following God's commands solely due to His omnipotent power is considered, but this reduces God's commands to force, which cannot create moral obligations.
- 🔒 Darwall emphasizes that morality cannot be created by force alone and that it is logically impossible for it to result from mere power.
- 📚 The script is a philosophical exploration of the relationship between divine authority and morality, challenging the divine command theory's validity.
Q & A
What is the main topic of the lecture by Stephen Darwall?
-The main topic of the lecture is the exploration of the relationship between morality and God, specifically discussing the divine command theory and its implications.
What is the divine command theory?
-The divine command theory is a philosophical view that suggests morality is derived from God's commands, meaning what is right or wrong is determined by what God commands.
Why does Stephen Darwall believe the divine command theory might be attractive to some?
-Stephen Darwall suggests that the divine command theory is attractive because it can explain the sense that morality transcends earthly laws or social understanding.
What is an 'epistemic authority' according to the lecture?
-An 'epistemic authority' is a term used by philosophers to describe someone or something that is believed to know better than others what should be done, and whose say-so is trusted without requiring personal knowledge of the subject.
Why does Darwall argue that treating God as an epistemic authority does not support the divine command theory?
-Darwall argues that if one follows God's commands because God knows better, it implies that there are independent truths about morality that God knows, rather than God creating those moral truths through His commands.
What is the issue with the argument that we should follow God's commands because He knows what is good or bad for us?
-The issue is that this argument assumes morality must concern what promotes human well-being and prevents suffering, which implies that there are moral facts independent of God's commands.
What kind of authority does Stephen Darwall discuss as a possible reason for following God's commands?
-Darwall discusses the authority of a sergeant over a private or a legislature over its citizens as a type of authority that can make something required or forbidden by their command.
Why does Darwall say that if God's authority is the reason for following His commands, the divine command theory would be false?
-Darwall argues that for any authority to create requirements or prohibitions, it must already be true that we ought to follow their commands, which implies that the moral obligation to follow God's commands is independent of His commanding them.
What is the alternative perspective that Darwall presents regarding following God's commands?
-The alternative perspective Darwall presents is following God's commands out of love for God, suggesting that we should do what those we love ask us to do.
How does Darwall refute the idea of following God's commands out of love for God in relation to the divine command theory?
-Darwall refutes this by stating that if love for God is the reason for following His commands, it assumes that responding to the wishes of loved ones is right independently of God's commands, which contradicts the divine command theory.
What does Darwall suggest would happen if we followed God's commands solely because of His omnipotent power?
-Darwall suggests that if we followed God's commands only because of His omnipotent power, we would lose the moral obligation and instead be compelled by force, which is not how moral law can be created.
Outlines
📜 Divine Command Theory and Morality
Stephen Darwall, a philosophy professor at Yale University, introduces the concept of divine command theory, which posits that morality is derived from God's commands. He challenges this view by considering various reasons one might believe in the theory and argues that each reason implies the existence of moral truths independent of God's commands. Darwall uses the analogy of epistemic authority to illustrate that knowing something does not equate to creating law, and similarly, God's knowledge of moral truths does not mean He is the source of them. He also explores the idea of God's authority being akin to that of a sergeant or a legislature, suggesting that true authority would require adherence to commands based on a pre-existing moral framework, not merely on the command itself.
🛡️ Moral Obligation Beyond God's Power
Continuing the discussion on divine command theory, Darwall addresses the potential argument that one should follow God's commands due to His omnipotent power. He points out that viewing God's commands as obligatory only by force would equate them to laws created by coercion, which is logically inconsistent with the nature of morality. Darwall emphasizes that true moral law cannot be the result of force, and if one follows God's commands solely out of fear or obligation due to power, it loses the moral significance that comes from recognizing God's goodness and authority. The subtitles for the video are provided by the Amara.org community.
Mindmap
Keywords
💡Divine Command Theory
💡Epistemic Authority
💡Moral Law
💡Transcends
💡Superior Authority
💡Omnipotent Power
💡Human Well-being
💡Moral Truths
💡Philosophy
💡Yale University
💡Moral Obligation
Highlights
Divine command theory suggests that morality is based on God's commands, but it doesn't necessarily mean morality is the same as God's commands.
If God's commands are followed because He knows better, it implies God is an 'epistemic authority', not a law-making authority.
An epistemic authority's knowledge depends on independent truths, not their own say-so.
Following God's commands for His superior knowledge implies there are independent moral truths that God understands.
If God's commands are followed for what is good or bad for us, it assumes morality concerns human well-being, independent of divine commands.
Authorities can create requirements or prohibitions because it is already true that we should follow their commands.
God's superior authority can make something right or wrong through His command, but it must be wrong to violate His commands independently of His commanding it.
Following God's commands out of love assumes it is right to respond to loved ones' wishes, independent of divine commands.
The divine command theory would be false if we follow God's commands for any of the discussed reasons, as it assumes independent moral truths.
Following God's commands solely due to His omnipotent power loses the moral obligation and reduces it to force.
Morality logically cannot result from force alone, as it must be based on independent moral truths.
The contrast between God's power, authority, and goodness is essential for understanding the divine command theory.
God's commands cannot be seen as simply imposed without obligating us morally.
Law, in general, cannot be created by pure force, and the same applies to moral law.
The discussion explores the philosophical implications of the divine command theory and its limitations.
The transcript provides a critical examination of the divine command theory and its assumptions about morality and God's role.
The philosophical arguments presented challenge the notion that God is the sole source of all morality.
Transcripts
(Intro music)
My name is Stephen Darwall,
and I teach philosophy at Yale University
in New Haven, Connecticut.
And today I want to discuss[br]morality and God.
The divine command theory[br]is an attractive view
precisely because it can explain our sense
that morality transcends any earthly law
or social understanding.
Still, that doesn't show that morality
is the same thing as God's commands,
in the sense that if there were no
divine commands, then nothing[br]would be right or wrong.
To see this, let's assume again that
(1) God exists and[br](2) that it's wrong to
violate God's commands.
And let us consider different[br]reasons we might have
for thinking that it's wrong[br]to violate God's command.
Suppose you think we[br]should follow God's commands
because God knows better than[br]we do what we should do.
If that's your attitude,
then you're treating God[br]as what philosophers call
an "epistemic authority."
You're believing something[br]on God's authority,
on his say-so,
that is, because God believes it.
This is a natural attitude to have.
We frequently believe[br]things on other's authority.
If a friend of yours knows[br]much more than you do
about the law of Missouri in the 1840s,
then you might reasonably be inclined
to believe something[br]just because she does.
But her having this epistemic authority
would not mean that she[br]has the kind of law-making
authority that can create law.
Her thinking something was the law
would not actually make it[br]the case that it was the law.
To the contrary, her[br]having epistemic authority
would itself depend on there[br]being independent truths
about the law in the 1840s
in Missouri, of which she has knowledge.
So by analogy, if your reason for thinking
you should follow God's command is that
God knows better than you do
what is morally right and wrong,
then it would not follow that God
makes the moral law.
To the contrary, it would[br]follow that there are
independent truths about the moral law
of which God has knowledge.
So if that were the reason[br]to follow God's commands,
the divine command[br]theory would not be true,
it would be false.
Or suppose you think you should follow
God's commands not because[br]he knows the moral law,
but because he knows what[br]is good and bad for us.
Not in moral terms, but[br]just what would make us
better or worse off,
what would benefit us or harm us.
But if that's your reason,
must you not be assuming that it is true,
independent of anything God commands,
that morality must somehow concern
what promotes human well-being[br]and prevents suffering.
So here again, if this is why you think
you should follow God's command,
you must be assuming that there are facts
about morality that are[br]independent of God's command.
Or suppose you think[br]you should follow God's
commands because God[br]has superior authority
over us, something in[br]the way a sergeant does
over a private, or a legislature[br]does over its citizens.
This reason does avoid the problem
that afflicted the last two.
Such authorities really do seem to be able
to make it the case that something
that would otherwise[br]not have been required
or forbidden in itself
is required or forbidden, just because
they forbid it or require it.
So if God has authority of this kind,
then he can make something right or wrong
through his command.
But notice that the only way authorities
can create requirements or[br]prohibitions in this way
is if it is already true that we
ought to do as they command.
It's only because the[br]sergeant has authority
over the private that the private must do
as the sergeant commands.
In other words, the fact that the private
must obey the sergeant can't itself result
from the sergeant's command.
That has to be true independently
of anything the sergeant commands.
So by analogy, if the reason we should do
what God commands is that he has superior
law-making authority over us,
then it must be true[br]that it would be wrong
to violate his commands,
quite independently of his commanding it.
And if so, the divine command[br]theory would be false.
Or suppose, finally, that[br]you think you should do
what God commands because you love God,
and we should do what[br]those we love ask us to do.
But here again, if that's[br]your reason for thinking
it would be wrong to deny God[br]obedience to his commands,
you must be assuming that it is right
so to respond to the[br]wishes of those we love,
and that this is true independently
of whether God commands us to do
what those we love ask us to do.
It seems, then, that if[br]we think we should do
what God commands for[br]any of these reasons,
we must also assume, not that[br]God is the source of morality,
but to the contrary:
that God cannot be the[br]source of all of morality.
In each case, we must assume[br]that there are moral truths
that are independent of God's commands,
so we must assume that the[br]divine command theory is false.
Now, we could avoid all of these problems
if we were to think not[br]that we should follow
God's commands for any of these reasons,
but just because of[br]God's omnipotent power.
But then we would lose the contrast
between God's power and his authority,
and his goodness.
We would have to see his commands
as simply imposed us[br]in a way that does not
obligate us morally,
but rather that obliges[br]or compels us by force,
just as law, in general, cannot[br]be created by pure force,
so neither can the moral law.
It's logically impossible for morality
to result from force.
Subtitles by the Amara.org community
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