Provably Safe AI – Steve Omohundro

Horizon Events
5 Jun 202436:45

Summary

TLDRThe speaker, Ste Mundro, discusses the urgent need for provably safe AI, arguing that current safety measures are insufficient. He highlights the rapid development and accessibility of powerful AI models, emphasizing the risks of unaligned AI and the potential for AI-driven manipulation and cyber threats. Mundro advocates for a security mindset, leveraging mathematical proof and the laws of physics to ensure AI safety, and suggests that provable software, hardware, and social mechanisms could form the foundation of a robust human infrastructure resistant to AI threats, ultimately choosing the path of human thriving.

Takeaways

  • 🧠 Powerful AI is already here: The script discusses the presence of advanced AI, including models like Meta's Llama with billions of parameters, indicating that we are in the era of significant AI capabilities.
  • 🚀 Open Source AI models are gaining momentum: The release of models like Llama 3 has led to widespread access and downloads, emphasizing the importance of considering safety in open-source AI development.
  • 💡 Current AI safety approaches are insufficient: The speaker argues that while current approaches to AI safety are valuable, they are not enough to address the challenges posed by rapidly advancing AI technologies.
  • 🔒 The need for mathematical proof in AI safety: The script suggests that for guaranteed safety, we should rely on mathematical proof and the laws of physics, moving beyond just alignment and regulation.
  • 🌐 AI's impact on society and infrastructure: The discussion highlights the potential risks of AI, such as manipulation, bribery, and cyber attacks, and the need to harden human infrastructure against these threats.
  • 🤖 The potential of provable software and hardware: The speaker introduces the concept of developing software and hardware that can be mathematically proven to be safe and reliable.
  • 🕊️ Choosing the path of human thriving: The script concludes with a call to action to choose a path that leads to human flourishing through the development of secure and beneficial AI technologies.
  • 🔢 The rise of large language models (LLMs): The transcript mentions the increasing capabilities of LLMs, their persuasive power, and the potential for them to be used in manipulative ways.
  • 🛡️ The importance of restructuring decision-making: To mitigate risks, the script suggests reorganizing how decisions are made to prevent AI manipulation and to ensure safety.
  • 🌟 Rapid advancements in AI agents: The development of AI agents capable of autonomous tasks, like gene editing, indicates a future where AI capabilities expand rapidly, necessitating robust safety measures.
  • ⏱️ The urgency of establishing AI safety: Timelines presented in the script suggest that significant AI influence on the world could occur within a few years, emphasizing the need for immediate action in AI safety.

Q & A

  • What is the main topic of Ste Mundro's talk?

    -The main topic of Ste Mundro's talk is 'provably safe AI', discussing the current state of AI safety, the insufficiency of existing approaches, and the need for mathematical proof and the laws of physics to ensure guaranteed safety.

  • Why did Meta release their LLaMA models?

    -The script does not provide specific reasons for Meta's release of the LLaMA models, but it mentions that Meta released models with 8 billion, 70 billion, and 400 billion parameters, indicating a push towards powerful AI models.

  • What is the significance of the 400 billion parameter LLaMA model?

    -The 400 billion parameter LLaMA model is significant because it has performance similar to the best models from labs and raises concerns about its potential open-source release, which could lead to widespread access to such powerful AI capabilities.

  • What is the potential impact of powerful AI running on inexpensive hardware like Raspberry Pi?

    -The potential impact is that millions of units of inexpensive hardware like Raspberry Pi, which can run powerful AI, could lead to a significant increase in the accessibility and distribution of AI capabilities, posing challenges for safety and control.

  • What is the current state of AI's persuasive abilities compared to humans, according to a paper mentioned in the script?

    -According to a paper mentioned in the script, current large language models (LLMs) are 81.7% more persuasive than humans, indicating a potential for AI to be used in manipulative ways.

  • Why should humans not directly control risky actions involving AI?

    -Humans should not directly control risky actions involving AI because they can be manipulated by AI, which could lead to undesirable outcomes or be exploited for malicious purposes.

  • What is the role of alignment in ensuring AI safety?

    -Alignment involves making sure that AI models have values and motivations that are consistent with human interests. However, the script suggests that alignment alone is insufficient for safety due to the potential for misuse of open-source models.

  • What are some of the top methods for preventing AI misuse mentioned in the script?

    -The top methods mentioned include alignment, red teaming, restricting AI to non-agentic tools, limiting system power, and pausing or halting AI progress.

  • What is the concept of 'provable software' in the context of AI safety?

    -'Provable software' refers to the use of mathematical proof to ensure that software meets specific requirements and is safe to use, even if the source of the software or its underlying motivations are untrusted.

  • What are the five important logical systems mentioned for underlying theorem provers?

    -The five important logical systems mentioned are propositional logic, first-order logic, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, type theory, and dependent type theory.

  • How can mathematical proof and the laws of physics provide absolute constraints on super intelligent entities?

    -Mathematical proof and the laws of physics provide absolute constraints because even the most powerful AI cannot prove a false statement or violate fundamental physical principles, such as creating matter from nothing or exceeding the speed of light.

  • What is the potential impact of AI on critical infrastructure if we continue with current security measures?

    -If we continue with current security measures, we may face increasing AI-powered cyber attacks, disruption of critical infrastructure, and a range of other security threats that could undermine the stability and safety of various systems.

  • What are 'approvable contracts' and how do they contribute to hardware security?

    -Approvable contracts are small modules or devices that can perform secure computation, guaranteed to be the intended computation, and communicate securely with other such devices. They contribute to hardware security by deleting cryptographic keys upon tampering attempts, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of the operations they perform.

  • What is the significance of using formal physical world models in developing secure hardware?

    -Formal physical world models are crucial for developing secure hardware as they allow for the creation of designs that are provably safe against a defined class of adversaries, ensuring that the hardware behaves as intended even under attack.

  • What are the core components that can be considered for building trusted systems using 'provable hardware'?

    -The core components include trusted sensing, trusted computation, trusted memory, trusted communication, trusted randomness, trusted raw materials, trusted actuators, and trusted deletion and destruction.

  • How can provable hardware be used to create new social mechanisms?

    -Provable hardware can be used to create new social mechanisms by providing a secure foundation for activities like voting, surveillance, identity verification, economic transactions, and governance, ensuring that these mechanisms are transparent, tamper-proof, and aligned with societal goals.

  • What is the potential outcome if we choose to build on 'provable technology' and develop a robust human infrastructure?

    -Choosing to build on 'provable technology' and developing a robust human infrastructure could lead to the elimination of cyber attacks, creation of reliable infrastructure, enhancement of media to support humanity, promotion of peace and prosperity, empowerment of citizens, and long-term environmental and societal flourishing.

Outlines

00:00

🤖 Introduction to Provable Safe AI

The speaker, Ste mundro, opens the discussion on provably safe AI, emphasizing the insufficiency of current AI safety measures. He introduces the concept of using mathematical proof and the laws of physics to ensure AI safety, outlining the agenda for the presentation which includes discussing the prevalence of powerful AI, the need for guaranteed safety, and the potential of provable software, hardware, and social mechanisms. The talk also hints at the broader implications of AI on society and the importance of choosing a path that leads to human thriving.

05:00

🚀 The Emergence of Powerful Open Source AI

This paragraph delves into the reality of powerful AI systems that are now available in open source, such as Meta's llama models, and their impact on accessibility and safety. The speaker discusses the rapid development and dissemination of these models, the investment in GPU technology, and the potential dangers of AI manipulation and misuse. The paragraph also highlights the challenges posed by AI's persuasive capabilities and the need to restructure decision-making processes to mitigate risks associated with AI manipulation.

10:02

🛡️ The Imperative of Proven Infrastructure Safety

The speaker argues that with the rise of open source AI, relying solely on alignment for AI safety is insufficient. He suggests that the infrastructure must be hardened against potential threats, even from unaligned AI models. Mundro discusses the potential for AI to be used in cyber attacks, impersonation, and other harmful applications, and the importance of developing a human infrastructure that can withstand these challenges, emphasizing the need for mathematical proof in ensuring safety.

15:03

🔐 The Potential and Perils of AI in Cybersecurity

This section explores the dual-use nature of AI in cybersecurity, with its capacity to both defend and attack systems. The speaker cites examples such as Gidra and G3O, which simplify sophisticated reverse-engineering tasks, and studies showing AI's ability to exploit vulnerabilities. The paragraph underscores the growing trend of using AI for both protective and adversarial cyber measures and the need to anticipate the widespread availability of AI that can compromise common systems.

20:03

🌟 The Rapid Evolution of AI Agents and Timelines

The speaker discusses the rapid development of AI agents, which are becoming increasingly autonomous and capable of performing complex tasks. He references various studies and papers that are pushing the boundaries of AI agent development. Mundro also touches on the timelines for AI development, citing a tool from Open Philanthropy that estimates the speed of AI advancement and its potential impact on the world's economy and work by 2027.

25:05

🛑 Current Methods and the Need for a Security Mindset

This paragraph examines the current methods used to ensure AI safety, such as alignment, red teaming, restricting AI tools, limiting system power, and pausing AI progress. The speaker argues that while these methods are important, they may not be sufficient due to the proliferation of open source AI models. He advocates for adopting a security mindset, similar to that used in engineering for safety, and the need for mathematical proof and physical laws to provide robust safety guarantees.

30:05

📚 The Framework for Guaranteed Safe AI

The speaker introduces a framework for ensuring robust and reliable AI systems through the use of mathematical proof and the laws of physics. He discusses the importance of using universal logical languages for expressing precise statements and the role of proof checkers in verifying these proofs. The paragraph also highlights the need for a security mindset in AI development, emphasizing the use of formal methods and the potential of provable software.

35:05

🔬 The Importance of Formal Physical World Models

This section delves into the necessity of formal physical world models for hardware security, emphasizing the need for a formal safety specification and the generation of a formal system design that is provably safe. The speaker discusses the importance of the standard model of particle physics and general relativity as the foundation for these models and the potential for creating trusted components through this approach.

🤖 Transforming Hardware and Social Mechanisms with Provable Technology

The speaker outlines the potential for transforming various aspects of society and technology through provable hardware, including secure computation, communication, and robotics. He discusses the concept of 'approvable contracts' and how they can be used to create secure networks, robots, and supply chains. Mundro also touches on the potential for new social mechanisms that leverage this technology to create a more secure and beneficial society.

🌱 The Choice for Human Thriving Through Provable Infrastructure

In the concluding paragraph, the speaker presents the choice between continuing with current technology practices, which could lead to various negative outcomes, or embracing provable technology to build a human infrastructure that is resilient to AI threats. He envisions a future where provable technology can lead to the elimination of cyber attacks, reliable infrastructure, enhanced media, peace, prosperity, and long-term human flourishing.

Mindmap

Keywords

💡Provable Safe AI

Provable Safe AI refers to artificial intelligence systems that are guaranteed to operate safely through mathematical proof and adherence to the laws of physics. In the video's context, it is a central theme advocating for a shift from current AI safety approaches, which are deemed insufficient, to a more rigorous framework that ensures AI safety through verifiable methods. The script discusses the necessity of this approach given the rapid advancement and accessibility of powerful AI models.

💡Untrusted AI

Untrusted AI in the script represents AI systems that may have been developed by unknown or unverified sources, and thus their motivations and potential hidden agendas are uncertain. The speaker suggests a method where humans can still utilize the capabilities of untrusted AI by requiring these systems to provide a proof alongside their solutions, which humans can then verify using proof checkers, ensuring the AI's output meets specific requirements without direct interaction.

💡Theorem Proving

Theorem proving is a branch of computer science and mathematics concerned with the automation of proving mathematical statements. In the video, theorem proving is highlighted as a critical tool for achieving provable safety in AI. It is used to ensure that AI-generated solutions are correct and meet predefined specifications, with examples given of how AI can be trained on existing proofs to improve its ability to prove theorems.

💡Cryptography

Cryptography is the practice of secure communication in the presence of third parties, often referred to as adversaries. In the script, cryptography is discussed as a foundational technology for secure communication, but it is also noted that current cryptographic methods are vulnerable to quantum computing. The speaker suggests that the world should consider post-quantum cryptography and information-theoretic cryptography for provable security.

💡Quantum Computing

Quantum computing is a technology that uses quantum bits, or qubits, to perform computations at speeds exponentially faster than classical computers for certain tasks. The video script mentions quantum computing as a potential threat to current cryptographic systems, which are based on the difficulty of certain mathematical problems that quantum computers could solve more efficiently.

💡Formal Methods

Formal methods are a set of mathematical techniques for the specification, development, and verification of software and hardware systems. In the context of the video, formal methods are proposed as a way to ensure the correctness and security of AI systems. They are used to model systems, specify requirements, and design systems with safety guarantees against potential adversaries.

💡Provable Hardware

Provable hardware refers to physical computing components that are designed and verified using mathematical proofs to ensure they function correctly and securely. The script discusses the importance of provable hardware in creating a secure infrastructure that is resistant to tampering and attacks, even by powerful AI systems.

💡Tamper Evidence

Tamper evidence is a property of a system that allows for the detection of unauthorized access or modification. In the video, the concept is used to describe mechanisms that can detect physical intrusion or alteration of hardware, such as the use of radio transmitters and receivers to monitor the integrity of a device's contents.

💡

💡Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Zero-knowledge proofs are a cryptographic method that allows one party to prove to another that they know a certain piece of information without revealing the information itself. In the script, the concept is related to the idea of secure computation, where provable contracts can perform computations that are guaranteed to be correct without revealing sensitive data.

💡Provable Contracts

Provable contracts are a concept where agreements or contracts are encoded with verifiable conditions and outcomes, often using blockchain technology. The video script suggests that provable contracts could be used to create a new kind of social mechanism that ensures fairness and adherence to rules without the need for human intermediaries.

💡Human-AI Alignment

Human-AI alignment refers to the challenge of ensuring that AI systems' goals and behaviors are consistent with human values and intentions. The speaker argues that current AI safety approaches, which include alignment, are insufficient due to the proliferation of unaligned open-source AI models, necessitating a move towards provable safety methods.

💡Open Source AI

Open source AI refers to artificial intelligence models and tools that are publicly available and can be modified and used by anyone. The script mentions the release of powerful AI models like the Llama series by Meta, which have been downloaded millions of times and can be fine-tuned for various tasks, highlighting the need for safety measures that go beyond alignment.

💡Provable Social Mechanisms

Provable social mechanisms are systems for organizing human activity that are based on verifiable and transparent rules, often enabled by cryptographic and formal methods. The video discusses the potential for such mechanisms to transform areas like voting, surveillance, and economic systems, making them more secure and fair.

Highlights

The current AI safety approaches are insufficient, and mathematical proof and the laws of physics are needed for guaranteed safety.

Powerful AI is already present in open source, exemplified by Meta's release of their LLaMA models.

Open source AI models are becoming increasingly accessible and powerful, posing a threat if not aligned properly.

The potential for AI to be used in manipulative and harmful ways, such as in cyber attacks and impersonation, is growing.

Current LLMs are more persuasive than humans, indicating a potential for AI manipulation in various sectors.

Humans should not directly control risky actions due to the risk of AI manipulation.

The development of tools like G3O, which simplifies complex reverse engineering, indicates increased cyber threat capabilities.

Large language models can autonomously exploit vulnerabilities, suggesting a future where AI could initiate cyber attacks.

The rapid development of AI agents capable of automating complex tasks like CRISPR gene editing is highlighted.

Estimations by Open Philanthropy suggest AI could significantly impact economic activities within the next few years.

The importance of aligning AI with human values to prevent malicious use by humans or the AI itself is underscored.

Current methods of preventing AI misuse, such as alignment, red teaming, and restricting to non-agentic AI, may not be sufficient.

A security mindset involving modeling the system and its adversaries is proposed for creating safe AI systems.

The use of mathematical proof for creating provable software that meets specific requirements is discussed.

Five important logical systems foundational to theorem proving in AI safety are introduced.

The rapid advancement in AI theorem proving, drawing parallels with game AI developments, is noted.

The necessity of secure hardware in the context of AI safety, including the protection against tampering and spying, is emphasized.

Approvable contracts, devices that perform secure computation and self-destruct upon tampering, are proposed.

The potential for provable hardware to transform social mechanisms, such as voting and surveillance, is highlighted.

A call to choose the path of human thriving through the development of provable technology and robust human infrastructure is made.

Transcripts

play00:00

okay great uh can everybody hear me is

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that sound

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okay don't know if I I can see

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anybody oh great thank you excellent hi

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my name is Ste mundro and thank you so

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much for uh for coming uh today I'd like

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to talk about provably safe Ai and I'd

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like to go through the slides and then

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we can discuss uh all the concepts

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afterward um so let me start here the

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agenda for today is I'm going to argue

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that first power but unsafe AI is

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already here uh that current AI safety

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approaches are important and valuable

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but they're insufficient to the T

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problems that we face that uh I'm going

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to argue that we need to use

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mathematical proof in the laws of

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physics to get guaranteed safety and

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I'll talk about how you could do

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provable software provable Hardware

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provable Social mechanisms and argue at

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the end that we must choose the path of

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human

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thriving so to start we actually already

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have very powerful well we have very

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powerful um AI in the big Labs but we're

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starting to get very powerful AI in open

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source and a few weeks ago uh meta re uh

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started releasing their llama 3 models

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uh they have an 8 billion parameter a 70

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billion parameter and a 400 billion

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parameter model and uh they apparently

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spent $30 billion on the gpus uh to do

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this the the largest model has a similar

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performance to the very best models from

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the labs from gp4 Turbo Claud three Opus

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Gemini Ultra and in the first week uh

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1.2 million downloads of the system uh

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came um just to sort of get a sense of

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what the impact of this type of model

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and they're not the only ones uh you

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know there's the Falcon model out of Abu

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Dhabi there's the mistol models lots and

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lots of Open Source models are

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progressively getting better and better

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they're not quite as good uh as the very

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best uh models in in the commercial Labs

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but they're getting very close the Llama

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3 8 billion parameter model uh somebody

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got running on a Raspberry Pi 5 which

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you can buy at Amazon right now for $93

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and uh apparently not the Raspberry Pi

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but raspberry pies in general have have

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sold 61 million units so if you just

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think about the impact we're going to

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have pretty powerful AIS running on $100

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uh computers uh and they'll probably be

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hundreds of millions of them so that

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that that's should be in the back of our

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minds as we're thinking about safety uh

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the 70 billion parameter model that

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one's getting you know very serious not

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quite as good as the very best models

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but up you know the best models of a

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year ago or something and this is a

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group that has shown how you can

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fine-tune them for any task any

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specialty on a home video cards so using

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two of the RTX 490 you can have a

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machine which is about

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$7,000 and uh using you know a fine

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tuning method called Kora you can get

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extremely high

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performance the 400

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billion parameter model is the one that

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is maybe even better than a lot of the

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top commercial models and I was really

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nervous about that one going open source

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fortunately the rumor from Jimmy apples

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if you've ever seen him not necessarily

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a reliable source his rumor is that they

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won't be open sourcing that and that he

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says that Dustin moscowitz who does the

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open philanthropy Foundation may have

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been responsible for that so if so thank

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you Dustin and it gives us a little bit

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more breathing

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room so what is the lesson from all

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these open powerful open source models

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uh I would say basically that we can't

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AI safety cannot rely only on alignment

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because uh in addition to the wonderful

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aligned models from the labs there will

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be hundreds of millions of models that

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are not necessarily aligned and anyone

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in any country can cheaply fine-tune an

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open source model to create a

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world-class specialized model for

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anything you can imagine Cyber attack

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impersonation manipulation pathogen

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synthesis and so on so I believe that

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for True safety we need to harden the

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infrastructure the human infrastructure

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so that even in the presence of all of

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these uh potentially unsafe models uh we

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we still Thrive and and everything goes

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well um here's a paper showing that uh

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current llms are

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81.7% more persuasive than humans so

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that's a bit disturbing U that suggests

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people are going to start using llms for

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you know trying to sell things for

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trying try to convince you you know who

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you should vote for other persuasive

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things more Darkly we may get a AI

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manipulation bribery blackmail extortion

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intimidation and so on um and so what's

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the lesson from that uh humans should

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not directly control risky actions

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because then you put them in a position

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of being manipulated by AIS and so we

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need to restructure the way we make

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decisions so that uh this type of

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manipulation can't directly cause

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problems

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um the NSA in in the United States

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released a few years ago something

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called gidra a very powerful reverse

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engineering tool that lets you you know

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take code from any kind of a piece of

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software or hardware and figure out you

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know what its structure is and you can

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help use that to help protect it or you

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can use that to attack it uh and so but

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it's very you know sophisticated tool

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that's hard hard to use well somebody

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very helpfully created this g3o which is

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a large language model model that knows

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all about gidra and you can talk to it

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in English and it'll do it all for you

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and so that type of thing suggests that

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many groups will soon have access to

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nation state level Cyber attack

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capabilities um similarly uh this study

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showed that large language model agents

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can auton autonomously exploit one day

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vulnerabilities so if some system a

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router or your operating system has a

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flaw in it uh and that flaw is published

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like they call those one days zero days

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are the ones that you know haven't been

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published yet uh the llm could read that

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generate the code and attack it and so

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that's uh that's a disturbing

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development there's a huge amount of

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work going on right now in using llms

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both to prevent cyber attacks and also

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to to do cyber attacks this survey paper

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here at the bottom uh surveys 180 papers

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doing that so I think the lesson we

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should get from this is that we should

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expect widely available open- Source AIS

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which can exploit the vulnerabilities of

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every common

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system um this is one of many many

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papers which are taking Frontier Leading

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Edge large language models and turning

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trying to turn them into agents so this

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one is uh an agent for automating the

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design of crisper Gene editing

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experiments and they took several copies

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of uh large language models and they

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hook them up in a certain way and then

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it does reasoning it has goals it you

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know can uh operate every all the big

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labs are working on this and uh as you

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get a system which does something if a

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new large language model comes out you

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can just drop them in and so as language

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models improve agents should improve

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very rapidly and so the lesson I think

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we should take from this is that

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powerful agent models are likely to take

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off very rapidly in the next year or

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two so what are our timelines how long

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you know what's going to happen where's

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it going to go uh open philanthropy has

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been doing a lot of study of uh trying

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to really rigorously estimate timelines

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and take off times and they built this

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wonderful tool at takeoffs speed.com

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which lets you put in various

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assumptions about you know what the

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different costs and so on are and they

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use their model which is based on all

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kinds of historical data and they'll

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show you what the outcome of that is um

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Daniel Koka tahal I don't think I said

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his name right uh used to be at open AI

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he's one of the recent AI safety people

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that resigned and he's kind of famous

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because he resigned in a way where he's

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he

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uh he didn't sign their their

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non-disclosure thing um so very

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concerned about AI safety and he gave a

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talk a few months ago where he used this

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model he put in everything he knows as a

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you know as a safety person at open Ai

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and this is what he came up with and

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it's a little disturbing um for him that

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this line is called the wake-up call

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line where you know there's enough

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happening that people start getting

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concerned uh and that's 2025 in his

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model um this line is when 20 % of the

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world's um uh economic activity can be

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automated by AI systems and for his

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model that's in 2026 and then um this

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line is uh when when 100% of the world's

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uh work can be done can be done by these

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models and for him that's around 2027 so

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you know who knows if he's exactly right

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but uh it's reasonable assumptions and

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we're talking you know two or three

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years before very significant

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uh influence on on the

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world so what do we do about this well

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as this wonderful conference is I'm a

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fantastic interesting talks and

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interesting ideas uh a really nice

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summary I think of the current thinking

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is Dan Hendrick's book introduction to

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AI safety ethics and Society totally

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free at this um this URL and uh the two

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biggest sources of problems are

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malicious humans using AI to do

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malicious things and then AI which

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itself is malicious you know the gold

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driven agents and I think we need to

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worry about both of them my sense is

play09:32

that malicious humans are the most

play09:34

immediate threat um because you know

play09:37

they're already using them for you know

play09:39

trying to get more clicks on on Twitter

play09:42

and trying to extort people and you know

play09:44

all kinds of uh bad bad behaviors uh and

play09:47

they list the top existential threats as

play09:50

things like biot terrorism nuclear

play09:51

weapons lethal autonomous weapons and

play09:53

cyber attacks so very good very nice the

play09:57

what are the basic methods of preventing

play09:59

that and

play10:02

um I would say the top five methods that

play10:05

that I've been looking at at least are

play10:07

alignment trying to make sure these

play10:08

models have values which are aligned

play10:10

with humans red teaming trying to attack

play10:13

the models to force them into doing bad

play10:15

things and seeing how easily they can do

play10:17

that restricting them to non- agentic AI

play10:19

tools limiting system power you know the

play10:22

United States has put limits on if you

play10:24

if you train a model on more than a

play10:26

certain amount of compute flops you've

play10:28

got to notify the the government pausing

play10:30

or halting AI progress there's you know

play10:32

the the pause AI group there are various

play10:34

letters that that argue for that I think

play10:37

all of these efforts are fantastic

play10:38

really important very good unfortunately

play10:41

I don't think any of these will solve

play10:42

the problem many because of these open

play10:45

source models so alignment you know you

play10:47

align a corporate model great what about

play10:50

all the open source models that various

play10:52

groups are are playing with red teeming

play10:54

red teaming can show the presence of

play10:57

problems it can never show the absence

play10:58

of problems

play11:00

restricting to non- agentic AI tools

play11:02

well I think we've got 100 groups who

play11:03

are already not doing that limiting

play11:06

system power um that could be that's a

play11:08

potentially a good thing except many of

play11:11

these models run on you know cheap

play11:13

Hardware the Raspberry Pi and so uh

play11:16

there's some limits in that pausing and

play11:18

halting AI progress I think that's great

play11:21

uh the trouble is if you're going to

play11:22

pause it you need to do something during

play11:24

that pause to make the world make it a

play11:27

better situation when you finished

play11:28

pausing it's a is that thing so what I'm

play11:30

going to talk about hopefully are what

play11:32

we can do in that in that kind of a

play11:34

pause I would argue that we really need

play11:36

to take a security mindset and this book

play11:38

by Nancy levenson engineering a safer

play11:40

world is a very nice study of that in

play11:43

everyday things you know how to make

play11:45

sure airplanes don't fall out of the sky

play11:48

uh unfortunately we're seeing that more

play11:49

and more in the news um basically you

play11:52

need to model the system model the harms

play11:54

that you're trying to avoid model what

play11:56

your adversaries capabilities are and

play11:58

then create design that have safety

play12:00

guarantees against that

play12:02

adversary so a group of us um just a few

play12:05

I know a week or two ago wrote this

play12:07

paper towards guaranteed safe AI a

play12:09

framework for ensuring robust and

play12:11

reliable AI systems uh which lays that

play12:14

out and uh makes those pieces more

play12:16

formal and then takes a bunch of other

play12:18

proposals and shows where they lie on

play12:20

the spectrum of how strong their

play12:23

assumptions are and their guarantees are

play12:25

and uh I think it's great I think it

play12:27

starts putting everybody under a uh you

play12:30

know the same same tent um but against

play12:33

the strongest AI adversaries if we're

play12:35

really dealing with super intelligent uh

play12:38

entities unfortunately I think most of

play12:40

those methods won't really provide

play12:42

guarantees in that case that there are

play12:44

only two things that provide absolute

play12:47

constraints on super intelligent

play12:49

entities and that's mathematical proof

play12:50

and the laws of physics well why is this

play12:53

well it's because even the most powerful

play12:55

AI can't prove a false statement uh even

play12:57

the most powerful AI can't create matter

play13:00

out of nothing they can't go faster than

play13:01

the speed of light they can't make

play13:02

entropy decrease so the basic structure

play13:05

of the universe provides tight

play13:08

constraints and if we can use those

play13:10

constraints for human safety that would

play13:13

be a great thing and so that's the

play13:15

proposal that Max techmark and I did in

play13:18

this paper from a few months ago

play13:19

provably Safe Systems the only path to

play13:21

controllable AGI and I'll I'll sketch

play13:24

some of the the uh ideas there I think

play13:27

this is just the bare beginning there

play13:29

are many many many uh opportunities for

play13:32

expanding this and uh so this is really

play13:34

more a call to please start you know

play13:37

thinking in this direction and uh

play13:39

inventing new new ways of uh doing

play13:41

things safely so let me start with

play13:44

provable software uh so all of this is

play13:46

based on mathematical proof so let me

play13:48

just give the what do we need for

play13:50

mathematical proof uh we have these

play13:52

Universal logical languages which allow

play13:55

you to express any precise statement so

play13:58

you know these logics came from from

play14:00

natural language from human language

play14:02

where human language has ways of

play14:04

describing things but human language is

play14:05

very fuzzy and it has probabilistic

play14:07

things and so the logicians have sort of

play14:10

extracted the concepts from natural

play14:13

language and put them in a form where

play14:15

you can make say things which are

play14:16

absolutely precise and it turns out

play14:18

they've now gotten to the point where

play14:19

all of mathematics physics computer

play14:21

science engineering economics can all be

play14:23

expressed in these languages and that

play14:26

any statement which is true in all

play14:28

models in one of these these formal

play14:30

languag has a proof and proofs are these

play14:33

um sort of sequences of statements that

play14:36

can be checked and there are small fast

play14:39

proof Checkers which can check these

play14:40

proofs with absolute reliability and so

play14:43

that combination of characteristics I

play14:44

think is very very powerful for AI

play14:46

safety so here is an example of the kind

play14:49

of the simplest way that you might use

play14:51

this kind of thing let's say you have an

play14:53

untrusted AI somebody trained it you

play14:55

don't know who let's say it's running on

play14:57

hardware and some place you know in the

play14:59

middle of the desert somewhere you don't

play15:00

trust them uh you don't know what its

play15:02

motivations are you don't know if it

play15:04

might have some you know hidden agenda

play15:06

all of that can you still use that AI to

play15:09

do uh work that's of value to you in a

play15:12

way that you can trust it so here is a

play15:14

mechanism for doing that first of all

play15:16

the human never talks directly with the

play15:17

untrusted AI because then the AI could

play15:19

manipulate you it could kind Tri kind of

play15:21

trick you and all kinds of terrible

play15:23

things instead the human poses their

play15:25

problem or their software requirement if

play15:27

they need software or systems

play15:29

requirement if they're trying to build a

play15:30

a hardware or a social system they

play15:33

express it in this in one of these

play15:35

precise languages the precise statement

play15:37

is then given to the untrusted AI and

play15:40

it's allowed to solve it using any

play15:41

technique it wants it can use search it

play15:44

can use neural Nets it can use

play15:45

reinforcement anything you like uh and

play15:48

it can run on untrusted Hardware it can

play15:50

actually send jobs off to other

play15:51

untrusted AI so terrible horrible from a

play15:54

you know alignment perspective but

play15:57

nonetheless let's say it succeeds if it

play15:59

succeeds it gives you the solution but

play16:01

in addition to the solution it also

play16:03

gives you a proof that is a solution you

play16:06

as a human reive the solution and the

play16:08

proof you can now run your proof Checker

play16:11

which is a teeny reliable piece of code

play16:13

there are you know 300 line python

play16:15

programs that check one of these systems

play16:17

called metam you if it checks the

play16:20

solution then it doesn't matter what the

play16:22

source of it was you have an absolute

play16:24

guarantee that it meets your

play16:25

requirements and so that's an example of

play16:27

how to move from from untrusted

play16:30

potentially dangerous AIS and yet use

play16:32

that to build trusted

play16:34

infrastructure so there are five

play16:37

important logical systems that are

play16:39

underlying a lot of the theorem provs

play16:42

today and I'll just briefly say what

play16:44

they are there's tons and tons of

play16:45

literature on them the simplest one is

play16:47

called propositional logic was invented

play16:49

in 1847 this is basically given a

play16:52

Boolean circuit is there an input that

play16:54

produces true as the output and there

play16:56

are very powerful they call them it's

play16:59

called satisfiability there are sat

play17:01

solvers Microsoft has one called Z3

play17:03

that's quite good in 1885 that was

play17:06

extended by including functions and

play17:08

variables and quantifiers and uh that's

play17:11

first order logic and first order logic

play17:13

can really Express anything that can be

play17:15

proven and there are some pretty good

play17:17

first order logic provs one called

play17:19

vampire prover uh in 1922

play17:22

mathematicians uh built a first order

play17:25

Theory which could express all of

play17:27

mathematics and therefore all of you

play17:29

know engineering and and physics and so

play17:31

on and that's now called zerof Frankle

play17:33

set theory and there is a system called

play17:35

metamath which pretty directly

play17:37

implements that in 1940 uh type theory

play17:42

was sort of a parallel uh set of

play17:44

developments to set theory and uh it's

play17:46

closer to comput computation and

play17:48

programming and so on the software side

play17:50

computer scientists often like type

play17:51

Theory and so in 1940 Church invented

play17:54

something that's now called Simple type

play17:56

Theory and Isabel is a their improver

play17:59

that's based on that and then in the

play18:01

1980s um people wanted a richer

play18:04

expressive capability they developed

play18:06

dependent type Theory and the two

play18:08

hottest systems I would say today are

play18:10

Koch and lean Koch is more for the

play18:13

computer science lean is more for the

play18:15

mathematicians um and they're both based

play18:18

on this dependent type Theory all of

play18:20

these last three are basically equally

play18:22

uh expressive and you can convert any

play18:25

any statement in any one of them and any

play18:26

proof in any one of them to the others

play18:28

so it's more a matter of taste which one

play18:31

you want to use AI theorum provs are

play18:34

moving ahead very rapidly and the reason

play18:37

is I think it's quite anal theorem provs

play18:39

are very analogous to game AI so we've

play18:42

had huge development in you know playing

play18:44

chess playing go playing Atari and uh in

play18:47

the case of gaming eyes we know what the

play18:49

legal moves are and we know when you've

play18:51

won same with a theum prover we know

play18:53

what steps you can take in a in a

play18:55

theorem uh in a proof that are valid and

play18:58

you know when you finished proving it uh

play19:01

in the 1990s IBM had deep blue for

play19:03

playing chess that basically just you

play19:05

searched it just searched they built

play19:07

special purpose hardware and they were

play19:08

able to beat the human uh world champion

play19:11

with that um later Deep Mind developed

play19:14

Alpha go where they trained a neural net

play19:17

on human PL games of go and then they

play19:20

combined that with Monte carler tree

play19:23

search and the combination was able to

play19:25

beat the world's best uh chess uh go

play19:27

player then then they said well let's

play19:29

not train it on human games and they

play19:31

created Alpha zero and it just played

play19:34

itself and it learned from its own

play19:36

self-play and was able to beat Alpha go

play19:39

they also said well let's let's train it

play19:41

on chess and Demis hassabis here is

play19:43

famous for having said uh that Alpha

play19:45

zero starting from scratch became the

play19:48

greatest chess playing entity that's

play19:49

ever existed in nine hours so I think

play19:53

that's an indicator of how rapidly

play19:56

things can move when they're able to

play19:58

generate their own training data um

play20:00

stockfish is a used to be a search-based

play20:03

chess player I think it's open source uh

play20:06

and but they Incorporated all the ideas

play20:08

of alpha zero and I believe stockfish is

play20:10

now the world's best chess player and

play20:12

then somebody just recently trained in

play20:14

llm on stockfish and they created a

play20:17

large language model for playing chess

play20:18

that uses no search so I think that

play20:21

progression is something that's very

play20:22

interesting to keep in mind it looks to

play20:24

me like the theorem provs are undergoing

play20:26

that the classical theorem provs like

play20:29

vampire and Z3 they're all based just on

play20:31

search with maybe a little bit of heris

play20:33

discs in there uh in 2020 open AI uh

play20:36

published about gpf f for formal uh in

play20:40

which they uh trained a uh large

play20:43

language model on 36,000 meta math

play20:45

theorems and they were able to prove 56%

play20:48

of the heldout theorems in 2022 meta did

play20:51

hypertree Proof search which was an

play20:53

alpha zero style Monte Carlo tree search

play20:56

Transformer and they uh trained on all

play20:58

of uh archive math math papers and they

play21:01

were able to prove 82% of meta maath

play21:03

theorems uh in the time since then there

play21:06

have been a whole bunch of Open Source

play21:07

provs lean Dojo Lemma reprover Koch Jim

play21:11

and that area is really hot a new paper

play21:13

just came out yesterday or day before

play21:14

yesterday which looks quite

play21:16

interesting um we for security we need

play21:19

to use cryptography and the world uses a

play21:22

lot of cryptography the the net is based

play21:25

on cryptography uh public key

play21:27

cryptography lets you exchange

play21:29

information unfortunately it is

play21:31

vulnerable to uh Quantum Quantum

play21:34

Computing and so the world is trying to

play21:37

sort of upgrade the public key

play21:38

infrastructure for post Quantum

play21:40

cryptography but it's not looking so

play21:42

good here's an estimate of when Quantum

play21:44

Computing will be a problem there

play21:47

there's a some somewhat um uh there's

play21:50

cryptography based on one-way function

play21:52

symmetric cryptography AES Jau and so on

play21:55

and that is more resistant against

play21:57

Quantum computing but it's still not

play21:59

proven correct and then there is

play22:01

information theoretic cryptography which

play22:03

is not very widely used right now

play22:05

because it's slightly more inconvenient

play22:07

but it's provably safe and so uh I

play22:11

suspect we should at least make the

play22:12

foundation of the systems we're building

play22:14

based on information theoretic

play22:16

cryptography so why what is all this

play22:19

proof AI proof what what what value does

play22:21

it have there's a big area in computer

play22:24

science called formal methods where they

play22:26

try and you know check programs and make

play22:28

sure that they're uh uh correct they

play22:31

check the programs in advance what we're

play22:33

go what we're proposing here is that you

play22:35

have ai systems which are generating

play22:38

programs as a part of the natural

play22:39

operation of systems correct this is

play22:42

nice you know yeah the program has no

play22:44

flaws but humans can do that you know

play22:46

you think it through well enough and you

play22:48

test it a bunch you can kind of get to a

play22:50

pretty high level of correctness if

play22:52

you're in a security situation then even

play22:54

if you have say 0.1% of the inputs are

play22:57

flawed attacker can find those and

play23:00

exploit those chip design it's even more

play23:03

critical because if you have a flaw on a

play23:04

chip you got to you know redo it and

play23:07

change it Intel had that problem a few

play23:09

years ago and they now use lots of

play23:10

formal methods um the other benefit is

play23:14

that it's not just correctness and

play23:15

security but it gives you a certificate

play23:17

which is a social thing that says this

play23:20

is is correct and that can be used to uh

play23:23

combine multiple independent systems you

play23:25

can trust work done by untr trusted

play23:29

parties and so it's a very powerful I

play23:32

believe we need to extend this to

play23:33

hardware and so let me just give some

play23:35

examples with some a few lessons about

play23:37

today's Hardware somebody has an AI

play23:39

system that from the sound of you typing

play23:41

on your keyboard it can extract your

play23:44

password so that says to me the lesson

play23:46

is today's password-based cryptography

play23:48

is very vulnerable uh this is somebody

play23:50

who took a design for a chip and by

play23:52

adding one transistor deeply in the

play23:54

middle of it they uh basically make it

play23:57

so that an obscure your instruction

play23:59

sequence uh adds a little bit of charge

play24:02

to a capacitor and if you do that

play24:03

instruction sequence enough times it

play24:05

charges the capacitor up and it opens up

play24:07

a back door to the Chip And so you got

play24:10

how do you find that if you somebody

play24:12

some employee you know is uh doing

play24:15

working on your chip so the lesson for

play24:17

me is that both Fabs and Manufacturing

play24:19

must be

play24:20

secured uh the supply chains that we

play24:22

have today all kinds of stories about

play24:24

adversaries intercepting Hardware on

play24:27

Route and

play24:28

making changes to it so the lesson is

play24:31

today's Supply chains are insecure

play24:33

here's an example of a guy who took a $2

play24:36

microcontroller chip little teeny thing

play24:38

and stuck it into a Cisco firewall using

play24:41

I think they say $200 of tools that's

play24:44

the little addition and that opens up a

play24:46

back door for this firewall uh that

play24:49

probably nobody's going to notice in

play24:50

today's world uh unfortunately that's

play24:53

been happening in military hardware

play24:56

here's a story about uh you know

play24:58

counterfeit Cisco gear ending up in a

play25:01

hardware that's in combat operations so

play25:02

the lesson is today's military hardware

play25:04

is insecure row Hammer is an exam very

play25:08

important but kind of shocking thing

play25:10

that all of our drram memory chips today

play25:13

if you access them in a certain way it

play25:14

can cause bits to bits to flip and

play25:16

people are using that to violate

play25:18

security I believe the only way to deal

play25:20

with this is using uh mathematical proof

play25:25

uh our physical locks uh are really

play25:27

terrible there's a great YouTube channel

play25:28

called the lockpicking lawyer where

play25:30

every episode is uh he gets you know

play25:33

locks people send him or all kinds of

play25:35

locks and he breaks them he opens them

play25:37

in about you know a few seconds

play25:38

typically every front door lock of

play25:40

almost every home is subject to

play25:42

something called a bump key uh many

play25:44

safes are vulnerable most cars are

play25:46

vulnerable so our our physical security

play25:49

infrastructure is pretty much a disaster

play25:51

right now uh we're getting lots and this

play25:54

seems to be the year of the humanoid

play25:55

robot there are about 20 humanoid robot

play25:57

companies

play25:58

we got all kinds of drones we have drone

play26:00

boats submarine drones uh miniature

play26:03

drones big drones autonomous land

play26:05

vehicles and that's only going forward

play26:08

more and more quickly and people are

play26:09

figuring out how to use llms to uh

play26:11

operate them so how do we use

play26:14

mathematical proof for Hardware security

play26:16

first of all we need formal physical

play26:19

world models we need a formal model of

play26:21

the powers of of an adversary we need a

play26:24

formal safety specification and then we

play26:27

generate a formal system system design

play26:29

that is provably safe in that world

play26:31

model against that class of adversaries

play26:33

and so um typically in different

play26:35

engineering disciplines they use models

play26:38

they use fairly formal models today

play26:41

which are built in kind of a stack so

play26:43

like for chip design you have uh the

play26:46

design of the chip at the circuit level

play26:48

you know this gate you know you have a

play26:49

gate here and it goes there then you

play26:51

have the physical design which is how is

play26:53

that circuit laid out on the chip

play26:55

physically and and then below that you

play26:57

have the physical properties like what

play26:59

are the electromagnetic fields so like

play27:01

rammer is a problem that the

play27:03

electromagnetic fields on the chip are

play27:06

causing bit flips that shouldn't be

play27:08

there and so uh you need a model which

play27:10

can model that and down at the very

play27:13

bottom of all these Stacks is uh the

play27:16

basic fundamental laws of physics and

play27:18

fortunately we're very lucky to have a

play27:20

complete model of the laws of physics uh

play27:24

called the standard model of particle

play27:25

physics plus general relativity here's

play27:27

the equation with everything in it uh

play27:30

that is believed to be completely valid

play27:32

for energies less than about 10 to the

play27:34

11th electron volts and away from black

play27:36

holes neutron stars in the early

play27:38

Universe where quantum gravity and so on

play27:40

might be important Sean Carroll this is

play27:42

from Sean Carroll's paper the quantum

play27:44

field theory in which the everyday World

play27:45

subv he's got lots and lots of books and

play27:48

papers very interesting if you're

play27:49

interested in this and he argues that um

play27:52

the world we live in say around the

play27:54

solar system uh this core Theory

play27:56

completely describes everything of

play27:57

course there may be other particles and

play27:59

there may be an underlying reality which

play28:01

is different but our everyday experience

play28:03

of Life only depends on this core Theory

play28:05

and so for safety that's what we can

play28:08

rest on and I believe we need to use uh

play28:12

these kinds of models these kinds of

play28:13

formal models to develop trusted

play28:16

components which we can compose into

play28:18

more powerful uh systems and so the core

play28:21

components and my thinking are trusted

play28:24

sensing trusted trusted computation

play28:26

trusted memory trusted communication

play28:28

trusted Randomness trusted raw materials

play28:31

trusted actuators and trusted deletion

play28:33

and destruction and by combining these

play28:35

in various ways you can get trusted

play28:36

tamper sensing trusted provenance of the

play28:39

history of some physical object trusted

play28:42

3D printers where you can actually make

play28:44

things that you're guaranteed about

play28:45

their structure trusted manufacturing

play28:47

trusted Supply chains trusted networking

play28:50

trusted energy encryption hiding energy

play28:52

in a way that an adversary can't extract

play28:55

it trusted robots uh let me just go

play28:58

through a few of these quickly uh how do

play29:00

we get a physical material in a known

play29:02

State you know we've seen you can insert

play29:04

back doors into things you can hide them

play29:06

in chips you can do put them all over

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the place what if your raw materials

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have have little Nanobots hidden inside

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them or something like that well

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fortunately from the laws of physics

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turns out we know what the strongest

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chemical bond is something called

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protonated hydrogen dinitrogen I don't

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know what that is uh steel melts at

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1500° tungsten melts at 3,000 de all IAL

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structure is destroyed by 10,000 de so

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if you really really really want to be

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sure just melt whatever it is at a high

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temperature and now you've got something

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in a known State and you can build up

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from that uh similarly for fluids and

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gases you can distill them in different

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ways um to have a device where you're

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sure no one has attacked it know today's

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computers are quite vulnerable and

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somebody could sneak in and uh you know

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read your hard drive or whatever um you

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need something uh you need anti-tamper

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systems and here's an example of one

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which which I think is quite nice you

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incase whatever the thing you're trying

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to protect uh in a a container and you

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have a radio transmitter and a radio

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receiver inside that container and it

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learns the signature whatever is in that

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container and if it that signature

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changes that means something has

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happened there's some kind of a a

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tampering going on and in their

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experiments they can detect a 16 mm

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insertion of a needle with a diameter is

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.1 mm so that's an example of with a

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very simple first order thing you can

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get detect very subtle uh attempts at

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attacks uh Apple has been building this

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apple secure Enclave into all of their

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products Macs MacBooks iPads iPhone

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Apple watch Apple TV homad that has all

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the elements you really need for good

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cryptography it has a truly random uh

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physical random number generator on it

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it has a unique ID which is not you

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can't read off the chip for identity it

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has Hardware encryption has encrypted

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memory and it has some level of tamper

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protection zeroz I think is a critical

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technique it's actually back from the

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1960s which is the idea that if you

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detect tampering you delete your

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cryptographic keys and so that means if

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you got a system with sensitive

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important information in it and an

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attacker tries to attack it you probably

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can't prevent them from blowing it up or

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cutting it open but if you detect any

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tampering you can delete the

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cryptographic keys and so all the

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information in it is useless and the

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adversary can't take over the system and

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so that's a very important uh primitive

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property uh of this and you can do

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similar things for things which take

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physical actions like if you have a

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robot you could have fuses and its

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actuators that get blown in the case of

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a tamper detection or in a biological

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laboratory for example you could have

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acid that gets mixed into the biological

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samples under detecting of of tampering

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so by composing these pieces you can

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build up much more uh interesting and

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complex pieces of Hardware if you

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combine tamper sensing with zeroz you

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get something we call approvable

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contract this is a little module little

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device that can do comp secure

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computation which is guaranteed to be

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the computation you think it is can do

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provably correct cryptography and

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communicate with other approvable

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contracts and if anybody tries to attack

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it or open it it deletes the keys and so

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it's totally secure in that sense out of

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those you can build proably secure

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networks by combining provable contracts

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with information theoretic cryptography

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you can do provable uh provenance you

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can make provable robots that only do

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exactly what you think they're going to

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do that nobody can get in there and and

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take it over you can have provable

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materials you can do provable

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manufacturing and you can build provable

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Supply chains and so using these kinds

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of ideas you can build up an an

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infrastructure human infrastructure

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which is not vulnerable to attack by

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even the most powerful

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agis so uh using once you have that

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Hardware you can use it to do new kinds

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of social mechanisms as well and we're

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just barely beginning to think about

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this area I think there's huge

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opportunity um so here are just a few

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examples of things we do today and what

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the new uh approvable version of it

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might look like so today we have voting

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but voting is insecure people are always

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saying you know people are cheating on

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the ballots and they're counting them

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wrong and so on uh using those provable

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contracts we can have proven aggregation

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of uh individual semantic preferences in

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in a sort of guaranteed way today we

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have surveillance you know surveillance

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cameras and either you have privacy or

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your all your information is available

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to everyone uh in this world of provable

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Hardware you can create controlled

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sensing say cameras which provably do

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not reveal any information about what

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they're looking at unless say they see a

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gun and then they reveal it for that

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would be an example you could do today

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many people are calling for human in the

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loop particularly around autonomous

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weapons and so on the trouble is as we

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talked about humans are vulnerable to

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manipulation threats and bribery and so

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on so I don't think we want humans in

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the loop uh I rather shift it to the

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human creates the loop so humans decide

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what the rules are for operating

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something but you don't want a human in

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the middle of it while things are

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happening I believe uh today we have

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humans running factories but then the

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humans are manipul manipulable uh

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instead we need provable provable robots

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maybe combined with human teleoperation

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then we can have Factory spaces where we

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have absolute guarantees that they're

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doing what they're supposed to be doing

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uh today we have biometric identity um

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we can uh extend that to provable

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contract identity with provenance today

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we have all kinds of social dilemmas and

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molok and you know um we we we've got

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the the um prisoners dilemma using these

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provable contracts you can put joint

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provable constraints over multiple

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agents and so you can guarantee that

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agents work together in the way that

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they would like to and so I think you

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can really transform the nature of

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economic interaction using some of these

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Technologies today we have laws but

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they're only you know partially uh

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enforced uh here we can have meta

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contracts which are provably guaranteed

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to govern uh contracts underneath them

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today economics goes for profit

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maximization often at the expense of

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individuals uh we can design a new sort

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of social benefit maximizing system that

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includes the ex alities of actions today

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we have arms races and uh with this type

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of Technology we could have guaranteed

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joint agreements so I think the

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potential is there for huge benefits uh

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but it certainly needs huge lots of

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flushing out so what happens next if we

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keep on with today's sloppy technology

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and the AIS get better and different

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groups you know have open source

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versions I think we're going to see

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increasing AI powered cyber attacks

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we're going to see disruption of

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critical infrastructure we're going to

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have social media is going to become

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even more

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dehumanizing U we're going to have ai

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powered crime AI powerered politics

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which ignores the citizens environmental

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damage and AAS to the bottom if we start

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building this provable technology and

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really develop the human infrastructure

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in this way we can eliminate all cyber

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attacks we can build reliable

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infrastructure we can create media which

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enhances our Humanity we can create

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peace and prosperity we can have

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empowered citizens can rebuild the

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environment and we can go for long

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longterm human flourishing so I think

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the choice is clear we should be you

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know we are at a fork in the road uh One

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path I think does not lead to a good

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outcome the other path I think

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potentially is a kind of Utopia so I

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would say let's choose the path of human

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thriving so thank you

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Related Tags
AI SafetyProvable AICybersecurityOpen SourceQuantum ComputingFormal MethodsHardware SecuritySocial ImplicationsEthical AIHuman Infrastructure