Understanding the Causes and Drivers of Violent Extremism in the Sahel – Angela Martin

Summary

Angela Martin from USAID discusses her extensive experience in development, starting with managing agricultural projects in Africa 30 years ago. She highlights the evolution of counter-extremism, initially focusing on development drivers such as corruption, lack of social services, and broken families, and later incorporating insights into terrorist group activities. Emphasizing an integrated approach, she explores four key aspects: motivation, membership, means, and methods of extremist groups. Angela stresses the importance of understanding both the community vulnerabilities and the actions of terrorist organizations for a comprehensive response to extremism.

Takeaways

• 🌍 Angela Martin from USAID shares her background, noting 30 years of experience in development, including agricultural projects in Africa.
• 🛡️ Martin emphasizes that she is not a security specialist but views issues from a development perspective.
• 📅 She started working on counter-extremism in 2005, focusing on the drivers of radicalization and vulnerabilities in communities.
• 💡 Key factors contributing to extremism include corruption, lack of social services, and broken social safety nets.
• 🔍 Martin notes the importance of understanding both the drivers of radicalization and the actions of terrorist groups.
• ⚔️ She categorizes terrorist groups into those with global aspirations, like Al-Qaeda, and those with more local insurgent goals.
• 👥 The role of women in extremist groups is highlighted as often more ideologically committed than male fighters.
• 💬 Martin points out the importance of addressing both the developmental and security aspects of countering extremism.
• 🌐 The distinction between global jihadist groups and local insurgencies has blurred over time, complicating counter-extremism efforts.
• 📊 She concludes by stressing the need for an integrated approach that includes both security and development responses to effectively counter extremism.

Q & A

Who is Angela Martin and what is her background?

Angela Martin is a development practitioner with 30 years of experience managing agricultural extension projects for Peace Corps in Africa. She has worked for 15 years on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).

What perspective does Angela Martin bring to the discussion on CVE?

Angela Martin brings a development perspective to the discussion on CVE, focusing on understanding the role of development assistance in addressing extremism.

What were the early focuses of CVE efforts according to Angela Martin?

Early CVE efforts focused on understanding the drivers, motivating factors, and risk factors that made individuals vulnerable to recruitment, such as corruption, lack of social services, and broken social safety networks.

What are the two sides of the coin in understanding violent extremist organizations?

The two sides of the coin are understanding the drivers and vulnerabilities of individuals and communities on one side, and understanding the actions and operations of the violent extremist organizations on the other.

What are the four aspects Angela Martin uses to analyze violent extremist groups?

The four aspects are motivation, membership, means, and methods.

How has the distinction between different types of terrorist groups changed over time?

The distinction has blurred, with groups shifting from territorial insurgencies to global jihad affiliations, making it harder to differentiate between their motivations and operations.

What role do women play in violent extremist organizations according to Angela Martin?

Women play a significant role as facilitators within violent extremist organizations, often being more ideologically committed than some male members and involved in activities like running safe houses and advance surveillance.

What has been the trend in recruitment within the Sahel region?

Recruitment in the Sahel has shifted from individual recruitment to groups joining en masse, often due to clan or family ties, leading to a vast expansion of membership.

How do criminal networks and illicit trade impact violent extremist groups?

Criminal networks and illicit trade provide resources and facilitate the movement of people and equipment, complicating the operating environment but not necessarily driving the groups' operations.

What is Angela Martin's view on the importance of understanding both sides of violent extremism?

Angela Martin emphasizes that understanding both the drivers of extremism and the actions of extremist groups is crucial for an integrated approach to effectively address and respond to violent extremism.

Outlines

00:00

👩‍🏫 Introduction and Background

Angela Martin from USAID introduces herself and discusses her extensive background in development, highlighting her work on agricultural extension projects for the Peace Corps in Africa and her 15 years of experience working on Counter Violent Extremism (CVE). She emphasizes her development perspective, not as a security specialist, and discusses the drivers of extremism, such as corruption, lack of social services, and broken families, primarily focusing on young men and the role of radicalization.

05:01

🌍 Evolution of Terrorist Threats

The script discusses the changing landscape of terrorist threats, contrasting the early focus on global jihadists seeking to establish a global Caliphate with more recent insurgencies that have political and territorial objectives. It highlights the blurred lines between these groups, using examples like AQIM in the Sahel, which shifted from a territorial insurgency to aligning with global jihadist aspirations.

10:03

👥 Recruitment and Membership

This section examines the changing dynamics of recruitment and membership in terrorist organizations. Initially, groups like AQIM were composed mainly of non-sub-Saharan Africans, but this shifted post-2011 with entire militias joining. The role of women, particularly through strategic intermarriage, is highlighted as a significant factor in embedding terrorist ideologies within communities. The Sahel's unique position as neither a significant exporter nor importer of jihadists is also discussed.

15:03

🔫 Means and Methods of Terrorist Groups

The means and methods employed by terrorist groups in the Sahel have evolved, with early activities focused on kidnapping for ransom and small-scale skirmishes. The influx of weapons in 2012 changed the dynamics, leading to more conventional insurgency tactics. The role of criminal networks and illicit trade, such as cigarette smuggling, in facilitating terrorist operations is also examined.

20:04

🤝 Strategic and Collaborative Approaches

The final paragraph emphasizes the need for an integrated approach combining development and security responses to effectively address terrorism. Understanding motivations and facilitating negotiated settlements are key to preventing the spread of violence, especially to littoral states like Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. The importance of a balanced response that minimizes the security footprint is stressed to avoid exacerbating the situation.

Keywords

💡CVE (Countering Violent Extremism)

CVE refers to strategies and actions aimed at preventing the spread of extremist ideologies and recruitment into violent extremist groups. In the video, Angela mentions her early work on counter extremism before the term CVE became common, highlighting its importance in development assistance.

💡Development Perspective

This refers to the viewpoint of addressing issues through economic, social, and institutional development rather than solely through security measures. Angela emphasizes her focus on understanding how development assistance can mitigate the factors that make individuals vulnerable to extremist recruitment.

💡Drivers of Extremism

Factors that make individuals or communities susceptible to extremist ideologies and recruitment. Angela discusses how her team looked at corruption, lack of social services, broken families, and more to understand the vulnerabilities in the Sahel region.

💡Integrated Approach

A strategy that combines both security and development responses to address the complex issues related to violent extremism. Angela stresses the necessity of collaboration between security specialists and development practitioners to create effective solutions.

💡Global Caliphate

An ideological goal of some extremist groups to establish a unified Islamic state under Sharia law. Angela references this as one of the two primary motivations for transnational terrorist organizations, contrasting it with territorial insurgencies.

💡Insurgency

A rebellion or uprising against a recognized authority, often using guerrilla tactics and terrorism. Angela explains that some terrorist groups, like the IRA or FARC, have political and territorial objectives, differentiating them from groups with global jihadist aims.

💡Membership

The composition and origins of individuals within extremist groups. Angela notes changes in recruitment patterns, such as entire militias joining extremist groups, and the role of local ties and intermarriage in expanding group membership.

💡Methods and Means

The tactics and resources used by extremist groups to carry out their activities. Angela describes how groups in the Sahel have evolved from small-scale kidnappings and skirmishes to more significant attacks and how illicit trade supports their operations.

💡Illicit Trade

Illegal trading activities that can fund and facilitate the operations of extremist groups. Angela discusses the impact of criminal networks and corruption on the security environment in the Sahel, including the role of cigarette smuggling.

💡Geographic Targeting

The strategic focus on specific areas for development or security interventions based on the presence and activities of extremist groups. Angela mentions how understanding the locations of attacks helps in targeting development assistance and security measures effectively.

Highlights

Angela Martin from US Aid shares her extensive experience managing agricultural extension projects for Peace Corps in Africa, starting 30 years ago.

Angela discusses her transition from development practitioner to working on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) since 2005, before it was termed CVE.

The role of development assistance in addressing the drivers and motivating factors of violent extremism is emphasized.

Key factors making individuals vulnerable to recruitment include corruption, lack of social services, and broken families, especially in the Sahel.

Angela highlights the importance of understanding both the vulnerabilities and the actions of terrorist groups for an integrated response.

The concept of motivation, membership, means, and methods is introduced as a framework to analyze terrorist groups.

Early on, the primary focus was on transnational terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda aiming to set up a global Caliphate.

The distinction between global jihadist groups and insurgencies with political or territorial goals is discussed.

Membership dynamics have shifted, with entire groups joining terrorist organizations, changing recruitment patterns.

The role of women in terrorist groups is explored, noting their often more committed ideological stance.

The Sahel has not been a significant exporter of fighters to global jihadist hotspots like Iraq and Syria.

The integration of criminal networks and illicit trade with terrorist activities complicates the operating environment.

The geographical spread of terrorist activities in the Sahel is mapped, showing the progression from 2010 to 2018.

The need for a nuanced understanding of local grievances and motivations to prevent the spread of violence is stressed.

An integrated approach combining development and security responses is essential to address violent extremism effectively.

Transcripts

so good morning everyone and I'm Angela

Martin from US aid and well thank you

for reading my bio I'm going to add a

few more points because I'm always

struck by why when they posed the

question of what I was going to discuss

with you today I was a little curious

because besides my background and being

a development practitioner I started

doing this 30 years ago managing

agricultural extension projects for

Peace Corps in Africa so how I ended up

here is a bit curious right don't worry

I did have about 15 years of working on

CBE so some of the security side has

sort of worn off on me I have a little

bit of orientation but I wanted to to

just highlight this because I'm looking

at this from a development perspective

I'm not a security specialist at all

all of you are so I just want to remind

you when I'm looking at this because it

early on and I've been working on this

since I think I started in the fall of

2005 before we even called things CVE we

called it counter extremism not CVE I we

really focused on trying to understand

what is the role of development

assistance so we looked at the drivers

you've probably heard of this the

motivating factors the risk factors I'm

sure you'll have other conversations

you've probably heard this discussed in

your countries because over the years

this has become accepted terminology and

approach so what we would do is look at

what was discussed what are the factors

that make people particularly

individuals vulnerable to recruitment

and in the Sahel we looked at the things

that were just discussed we talked we

looked at corruption we looked at lack

of social services we even started

looking at the psychology of you know

sort of broken families social the

social safety network all those sorts of

things right and we looked at only young

men particularly we did look at religion

we looked at radicalization these points

of the scholarships and people going to

study in Saudi or in Sudan I mean this

came up when I was doing an assessment

in nija in Nigeria in 2008 so or Nisha

are talking about as well so this has

been known for a while

and and you know the other side so when

we looked at sort of the ideas that

you're looking at all these drivers to

see what could be manipulated to have

make someone - so they're vulnerable for

recruitment it's not that we didn't look

at what the terrorist groups were doing

themselves and their actions but it was

looked at probably from our perspective

again for us to understand what we would

do more in like what areas are they

operating in right so where was the

attacks where were things occurring and

so it helped us with geographic

targeting but we didn't really pay that

much more attention beyond that mm-hmm

and you know but over the years and it

continues to become even more apparent

that without a good understanding as

much as we can of what the terrorist

groups or the violent extremist

organizations themselves are doing we're

missing we're missing a big part of the

picture you know and in part you know

there's an expression two sides of the

coin well if one side of the coin is

what are the drivers what are the

vulnerabilities what are the risk

factors in the community level or at the

individual level or even at the societal

level the other side is what are the

groups doing why are there operating how

are they doing they're what's what's

going on with them we need to understand

both sides because our you know one of

the things and this is logical to me are

one of the core principles from the very

beginning is an integrated approach it's

not just Security Response and obviously

it's not just a development response to

deal with this we need to work together

and if we're only each of us are only

looking at one side it makes it even

harder for us to work together and

collaborate and design it and you know a

full response and so for me I sort of

came up on my you know this is my own

way of trying to organize my thoughts is

looking at these groups what are some of

the things I can look at and how can i

how can I think about it so I came up

with four aspects and I call it the

motivation the membership the means and

the methods and you know what I'm trying

to sort of again go out of my comfort

zone and look at what are these groups

doing trying to analyze the the actual

actions and

they operate and so motivation going

back was frankly one of the primary

aspects from the very beginning of how

we understood these groups and and how

we decided what was in our national

security interests what are the threats

to the US and our interests and and and

also to help us think through what our

options for the response and why that

means is because at the beginning we had

two categories right

one was the transnational terrorist

organization that was trying to set up a

global Caliphate I mean I remember back

in 2005 2006 we had these maps that the

military showed up with the Caliphate

all over North Africa into sub-saharan

Africa and here's what they're trying to

do and but part of it was that if you're

trying to set up a global Caliphate

they're not there's no negotiation

there's no settlement there's no

grievances to address

there's no territories to hold except

for this broad aspiration it's to

disrupt Western influence Western

society Western norms so so there was

that sort of there's no there's no

talking to them because there's nothing

they want to talk about them being these

terrorist groups the global jihad in the

second category is the one that is it's

more what we would understand is an

insurgency it's a rebellion that maybe

that have resorted to tear us to tactics

as part of their overall achieved for

political or territorial gains and so

there are examples of that you know the

IRA right so that was you know we have

you have the Shining Path you in Peru

you have the FARC in Colombia so these

are groups that are terrorist groups

they tear they use terrorism tactics and

tools but there is somewhere in there

they started or there remains a

political and even military objectives

and so this was a nice neat division

right global terrorists a global jihad

that's who we're worried about aq right

and it seemed to work right you had so

thinking about in the Sahel you had the

GSPC came from Algeria they were

basically a territorial insurgency woman

are you who were terror

but then they became branded they

shifted to being a qim they signed

allegiance they've moved over to they

moved down into Mali whether they were

pushed or or you know whatever the

reason is and they started having

aspirations that were not territorial

anymore so it seemed to fit and and that

seemed to work for quite some time but

as was noted you know and just in the

previous speaker that this line has

blurred right considerably so now the

motivation goes back and forth the

groups sign allegiance but they're

maintaining their territorial ambitions

they're you know they're they're the

role of where they are in in a global

jihad particularly with Isis the ability

of being a member an adherent is much

less strict than it was for aq that had

some fairly clear qualifications and

rules and criteria for being considered

a full member and so so I think that's

made that distinction harder for us for

the motivation so so it's blurred the

next one is is membership so who are the

members where do they come from and

again you know early on it was much

neater you know when we started a qim

because again looking mostly at this a

hell it came from Algeria most of the

leadership most of the membership were

not sub-saharan Africans you had a fair

number of Mauritania but they tended to

be sort of spokesperson and sort of

senior leadership but not the top you

know and and part of it I lived in

Mauritania years ago Mauritania itself

identifies as a Maghreb state not

sub-saharan and and their historical

position as an Islamic Republic and a

seat of Islamic learning also lends

credence that there's considered more of

the Arab states in that sense and so for

a long time while there was some concern

about recruitment we looked at our

programs it really wasn't a big factor

to be honest

obviously as noted this changed in the

end of 2011 into 2012

with with the Arab Spring the fall of

Qaddafi

and but also that there was these now

there were groups militias or rebellious

groups had joined whole the whole group

joined so what does that do so now

you're having recruitment that you don't

have to recruit as a ma lien or as a

Nigerian to join a group that's run by

it frankly outsiders right yes it's part

of the global Caliphate and global jihad

but it's run by outsiders now you could

be a member of group with family ties

with clan ties that's you're familiar

militia or your rebellion that you can

join in as a group and so now you can

and that has changed there's vast

expansion of numbers it's less about

individual recruitment although it's

happened but more about the group

joining and I think that pattern has

continued throughout the Sahel we're

seeing that with now the Isis the

expansion of Burkina and how it's

adopting with these groups there I think

the other thing that's a challenge is

that what's been noted I'll talk about a

little more this idea of local militias

that are protection / response and how

does that factor in trying to predict

what's happening coming forward I think

the other point is to think about is a

role of women now we've talked about and

we continue to think about fighters but

the membership one of the things that a

qim did strategically was intermarry

into some of these torrid groups

particularly in the north

early on this was starting in 2010-2011

even when they were just up in the in

the mountains because they wanted to

have a stronger tie and a stronger base

within the community and I think one of

the things that's been really not looked

at too much was what was the role of the

women and part of this is that so the

women intermarried they actually were

more hardliners and committed into the

ideology behind these groups than some

of the young men who just joined because

it was fighting it was something to do

it got get me a gun and gave me some

standing and this role of women as

facilitators is still very much

marginalized as far as what is the

importance of them are they running safe

houses are they going shopping are they

sort of the advance watch

we don't really know very well how

that's being done what's being noted

still is when they

become actual suicide bombers or actual

combatants and I think that that's a

sort of a talking about a better nuanced

understanding of how these groups are

embedding themselves into these

communities that we really don't have a

lot of visibility on that I think

another point about the Sahel compared

to even much of Africa both North Africa

and other parts is the role of the Sahel

and the membership whether it's a

destination or an exporter and it's

really been neither there hasn't been a

significant flow of the Sahel ian is

from the Sahel out to Somalia people

joining going out to go al-shabaab and

certainly not to Iraq and Syria it's the

same thing that concern while you do

have return fighters there is probably

less of a concern of Isis coming back to

the Sahel I'm not talking North Africa

then there is even for the DRC or in

other parts of East Africa and so this

movement into the global sort of jihad

or global fight to use that and not yet

that other term is is is different in

the Sahel and I think somewhat unique so

so going on to the to the next one which

is the means and methods so I think that

can be in intertwined a little bit and

again we thought it was talked about in

the previous speaker is the idea of akom

was relatively well armed but it was a

small group right and this was just they

had arms they were fighting and there

and there their methods were mostly

frankly kidnapping for ransom was their

big big attack assassinations and and

frankly sort of conventional assaults

against small military outposts to sort

of maintain an operating environment

rather than controlling territory and

there may have been some opportunistic

gita' assaults to get some some

visibility I would say but for the most

part in the early years it really was a

smaller scale community level sort of

skirmishes military skirmishes and

kidnapping for ransom again and then the

flow of weapons that came in 2012 sort

of

dynamic entirely and the scale and

persistence of the tax increased

although one would argue it still

remained for the most part what I would

call sort of conventional conflict and

less about sort of large-scale civilian

casualty attacks obviously that changed

there are a few spectacular events that

were done for different reasons in 2015

with the attacks on the hotels and

they've been drifting south into the

attack in cote ivoire but it really was

mostly one would say a more conventional

insurgency I think one of the other

things about the methods and means to

talk about is is the role of the

criminal networks in illicit trade there

have been conversations back and forth

about this particularly in Mali since

2012 I think we still don't have a

handle on it but I for in most cases

criminal networks are sort of a marriage

of convenience it's a way to move people

and equipment it can be a way of sort of

providing some resources but whether

significant is is unclear it's it's not

a cause and effect it's not something

that's driving the way the terrorist

groups are operating but it's certainly

making the operating environment easier

I think one of the arguments is the

overlap with corruption how is this

affecting the ability of security

services to operate

what is the corrupting influence of the

illicit trade to motivate or demotivate

security services to contain the

terrorist groups or to maintain the

instability it also complicates the idea

of closing borders you want to manage a

border you don't want to close it the

the role of illicit licit trade sort of

the the gray economy is also becoming

perhaps more important I I think one of

the things the issues and we've heard

this anecdotally I was in Mali in May

was the issue of cigarette trafficking

now you know in Europe and just like in

the US a pack of cigarettes can now be

upwards of almost $10

if you think about the potential for

making money in smuggling cigarettes

it's probably more important than drugs

again and certainly easier and going

back to the traditional start of motel

Belmokhtar who was a cigarette smuggler

so so the the illicit trade and how

that's manages also makes it very

complicated so its role is not very well

understood the last thing I think and

then I'm just going to go through a

little bit of how this is played out on

on the maps that we have of the

historical maps of the terrorist attacks

over the last five or six years is the

role of connections between these groups

so over the years where does a what how

is al-shabaab or Boko Haram helped these

helped or hindered what is their support

and now we would talk the global Isis

core and I would say for the most part

it was incidental I mean there was an

infamous sort of report of when the fall

and when the coup happened in Mali that

there was a Boko Haram group of training

group in in northern Mali so there are

connections but I think it's been more

about information perhaps a few

individuals but it certainly hasn't been

significant and it hasn't been sort of

chain of command directions I think

that's something that is still being

played out with Isis core and what their

role is now are they providing ability

to how to make a bomb how to conduct an

attack but perhaps amplifying messages

and their status it's unclear I think

some of it might be where there might be

attacked so that there is we are here

recognition in the global Caliphate to

sort of increase the stature but whether

it's tactically important in these

countries again I think is is probably

not as important as its sometimes played

out to be so I just wanted to go through

really quickly the slides to remind you

and I hopefully all of you have looked

at which sort of lays out about how the

spread has happened so in 2010 again

going back this is really just a qim

right and there really is a small scale

of attacks they

up in the mountains and this is where

you're having the kidnapping for ransom

going through into eleven and twelve now

you're starting to see the effect and

the spread into the south where we have

the increased weapons so again you're

spreading throughout Mali into 13 this

is where you have basically more of what

I call an active conflict

it looks like it's contained now in the

Sahel 14 15 now we have the spread south

again this is where you have a lot of

the mixed groups coming in and again

this is on the a CSS website this data

mostly is from another website called a

chlid which i think is very good to look

at and and you really have to filter the

data I would take some time to look at

the discussion because they also talk

about political violence they're about

protests about riots but I think it's

very informative about going back to the

point of looking at violence in general

and not just terrorist violence and that

that mix you know again going forward

you see now you see the rapid spread

into Burkina Faso and we're at 18 where

we really have sort of the unfortunate

where you have the sort of the violence

as being driven probably from community

level issues and grievances and less

about and being sort of co-opted and

merged with the transnational terrorist

I think the the last point and I think

cuz you know why talking about this way

to understand this I think there was the

the excellent sort of point from the

previous speaker of you have to try to

understand and maybe break it into parts

to tease out what can be negotiated now

going back to that earlier division

between transnational terrorism and sort

of insurgency what is there a political

settlement what are things that can be

handled and managed to try to

de-escalate the conflict where are areas

to protect to protect it from the spread

you know one of the greatest concerns

right now is is this going down into

what we call the littoral states what's

happening in Cote d'Ivoire what's

happening in a banana in a Togo and the

challenge is you do not want to have an

a response that's about terrorism only

you do not want to have just a security

response

because that tends to make it worse and

so how can we help understand the

motivations and who's joining and how

can we get to negotiated settlements and

leave the security response for the most

narrow possible because I think that is

really the way to prevent the spread and

the way out of it thank you